Article 3 — U-space airspace

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1. Where Member States designate U-space airspace for safety, security, privacy or environmental reasons such designation shall be supported by an airspace risk assessment.

2. All UAS operations in the U-space airspace shall be subject to at least the following mandatory U-space services:

(a) the network identification service referred to in Article 8;

(b) the geo-awareness service referred to in Article 9;

(c) the UAS flight authorisation service referred to in Article 10;

(d) the traffic information service referred to in Article 11.

3. For each U-space airspace, based on the airspace risk assessment referred to in paragraph 1, Member States may require additional U-space services selected from the services referred to in Articles 12 and 13.

4. For each U-space airspace, based on the airspace risk assessment referred to in paragraph 1 and using the criteria set out in Annex I, Member States shall determine:

(a) the UAS capabilities and performance requirements;

(b) the U-space services performance requirements;

(c) the applicable operational conditions and airspace constraints.

5. Member States shall give access to U-space service providers to the relevant data, if required for the application of this Regulation, as regards to:

(a) the UAS operators registration system, referred to in Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, of the Member State in which U-space service providers offer their services; and

(b) UAS operators registration systems of other Member States through the repository of information referred to in Article 74 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139.

6. Member States shall make the information on the U-space airspace available in accordance with Article 15(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/947, as well as through their aeronautical information service.

7. Where Member States decide to establish a cross-border U-space airspace, they shall jointly decide on:

(a) the designation of the cross-border U-space airspace;

(b) the provision of cross-border U-space services;

(c) the provision of cross-border common information services.

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GENERAL

(a) Member States have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above their territory and, therefore, have full authority over the designation of the U-space airspace.

(b) The designation of the U-space airspace is driven by safety, security, privacy or environmental considerations.

(c) For the designation of the U-space airspace, Member States are expected to assess numerous safety-significant factors, including, among others:

(1) the type, density, and complexity of existing and planned unmanned traffic, including UAS operations taking place in the context of authorised model aircraft clubs and associations;

(2) the type, density, and complexity of existing and planned manned traffic, including air sports activities;

(3) the operational capacity of the designated ATS providers to interface with the CIS provider and USSPs in the designated U-space airspace;

(4) the operational capacity of USSPs and, when relevant, the single CIS provider;

(5) the complexity of the airspace structure;

(6) the availability of safe and secure communication mechanisms to enable UAS operators and USSPs to exchange digital information;

(7) the classification of the airspace and the services provided to instrument flight rule (IFR) and visual flight rule (VFR) aircraft;

(8) existing UAS geographical zones defined in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947; and

(9) the topographical environment and prevalent meteorological conditions.

(d) Conversely, when a Member State considers issuing a new authorisation to model aircraft clubs and associations or when defining new UAS geographical zones, already designated U-space airspace should be considered.

(e) Initial designations of U-space airspace are expected to take place at low-level altitude, e.g. below 500 ft, and where there is very little expected manned traffic.

(f) Besides the four mandatory U-space services, Member States may decide that additional U‑space services are needed to support the safe, secure, and efficient conduct of UAS operations in specific volumes of U-space airspace.

(g) The regular reassessment of the U-space airspace is expected to be conducted by the Member States to evaluate its effectiveness in supporting the safe, secure, and efficient conduct of UAS operations.

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT

The designation of the U-space airspace is intended to enable the safe management of a large number of UAS operations, while ensuring safety continuum as regards manned aviation:

(a) The airspace risk assessment should primarily consider the air risk and the related ground risk as a collateral effect of UAS mid-air collisions, and should ensure that the related hazards are adequately addressed.

(b) The airspace risk assessment should cover, as a minimum:

(1) hazard identification, including safety, security, privacy and environmental hazards;

(2) risk analysis, meaning the evaluation of the likelihood and severity of harmful effects induced by the identified hazards;

(3) based on the previous analysis, the definition of mitigation actions that should be taken when necessary to ensure an acceptable risk level.

(c) The airspace risk assessment should further allow to derive the U-space airspace design, performance requirements, constraints, etc., required to enable safe operations.

(d) The reassessment of the U-space airspace should be conducted to:

(1) support the introduction of major changes to the designated U-space airspace; and

(2) dynamically evaluate its adequacy and adjust its definition based on the experience gained from operations and major evolutions that may occur in its environment (e.g. emergence of critical ground infrastructures, extension of populated areas).

(e) The airspace risk assessment process should consider the coordination mechanism laid down in Article 18(f) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

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REASONS FOR THE DESIGNATION OF U-SPACE AIRSPACE

The U-space airspace may be designated for several reasons; for example:

(a) Safety

(1) Having the need to share a common volume of airspace between manned and unmanned aircraft;

(2) To improve the visibility (e.g. by means of electronic conspicuity) of (un)manned aircraft, thus enabling a known traffic environment;

(3) To decrease the risk on ground in the case of multiple UAS flying over an assembly of people in urban areas or over highly populated areas (in combination with other means such as the certification of unmanned aircraft, UAS operators, etc.); and

(4) In the case of high UAS density, there could be a specific need to reduce the risk of UAS mid-air collision by organising the traffic through the introduction of certain UAS route structures. U-space services, such as geo-awareness, may provide support in that respect.

(b) Economy

(1) To ensure a fair and efficient sharing of the airspace volume between manned and unmanned aircraft, and between manned aircraft;

(2) To enable more complex and denser UAS operations; and

(3) To support the development of the drone sector and the provision of associated services to the public.

(c) Security

(1) To improve the visibility of unmanned aircraft by having most of the airspace users identified;

(2) To support the enforcement of local regulations and rules (e.g. prohibition of flights over sensitive sites, limited schedules, specific performance requirements) where there are too frequent violations, if the availability of the related UAS geographical zones is not sufficient to ensure the effective application of flight constraints to support UAS operations. This may notably concern the protection of critical infrastructures and no-fly zones;

(3) To support Member States’ authorities in identifying, responding to, and investigating the use of UAS for malicious or unlawful purposes; and

(4) To support the protection of services that are critical to the proper functioning of the Member States, the economies and the societies from the use of UAS for malicious or unlawful purposes.

(d) Privacy

To support the enforcement of particular conditions for certain or all UAS operations for privacy reasons. Flying over some specific areas could be restricted to some users or to some slots (as it is the case for restricted areas for manned aviation).

(e) Environment

(1) To define environmental requirements for UAS operations (noise could be limited, a minimum height could be required);

(2) To distribute traffic density to an acceptable level of disturbance over environmentally sensitive sites;

(3) Enabling a diverse set of UAS operations (e.g. commercial and residential areas etc.), while respecting environmentally protected areas.

(4) To minimise CO₂ emissions, especially in urban environments.

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — GENERAL

(a) An airspace risk assessment involves making use of information to determine possible relevant air and ground risks posed by unmanned aircraft flying in the airspace volume assessed, and regulate the conditions on privacy, security and environmental protection for all parties involved, including the citizens.

(b) An airspace risk assessment is a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis ensuring that safety and performance criteria are defined, and that assumptions and enablers are consistent with the current airspace design and procedures. The methodology used in this process needs to contain a clear set of objectives and a realistic view of the operations conducted in a given airspace volume.

(c) Different formats are recognised (formal to less formal) for the approach to the analytical aspects of an airspace risk assessment. For some hazards, the number of variables and the availability of both suitable data and mathematical models may lead to credible results with sole quantitative methods (requiring mathematical analysis of specific data). However, few hazards in aviation lend themselves to credible analysis solely through quantitative methods. Typically, these analyses are supplemented qualitatively through critical and logical analysis of the known facts and their relationships.

(d) When available, appropriate tools for the quantitative analysis of the ground and air risk assessment may be used for the substantiation of the airspace risk assessment.

(e) In the case of UAS operators that intend to operate within a specific category under an operational authorisation or a light UAS operator certificate (LUC), the risk assessment referred to in Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/947 should consider the outputs of the airspace risk assessment.

(f) The objective of the methodology applied should be to define a means for providing assurance that the U-space is acceptably safe, secure, and that privacy and environmental concerns are duly considered, covering at least the definition phase of the life cycle, and leading to the designation of the U-space airspace. Furthermore, the deployment of an operational U-space airspace requires an iterative process, through its development life cycle, from initial system definition to transition into service and finally to operations. The iterative process could make use of different tools and methods, such as fault-tree analyses, event-tree analyses, common‑-cause analyses, data collection, tests and validations, or documentation of the evidence, among others. During this process, the original airspace risk assessment could be modified through a feedback loop if necessary.

(g) An airspace risk assessment should be revised when the operational, regulatory and technology deployment context significantly evolves, or when the criteria too upon which the airspace has been designed significantly evolve. The operational context includes incident and accident reports, traffic density, new procedures, and new stakeholders. The frequency of the reassessment depends on local conditions, and is expected to be performed in conjunction with the activities of the coordination mechanism in Article 18(f) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — PROCESS PHASES

(a) An airspace risk assessment is a process composed of different phases that can be represented as detailed below:

Figure 1: Airspace risk assessment process

(1) The preparation phase begins with defining the airspace in the scope of the assessment, including operational, procedural and infrastructure design requirements from all involved stakeholders, as well as defining any assumptions and constraints. An assessment team needs to be created to ensure that no area is left unexamined.

(2) The reference scenario phase concerns only the analysis of the use of the airspace assessed before changes are introduced. An important step in this phase is conducting interviews with stakeholders (including non-aviation entities), assessing ground infrastructure, identifying technical support infrastructure, and collecting the necessary data in a common data format. This would ensure a harmonised approach for all entities involved.

(3) The assessment phase includes hazard identification, risk analysis and mitigation planning. These processes should be applied separately to safety, security, privacy, and environmental hazards, and their associated risks. As the nature of hazards, risks, and mitigation measures are specific to each of these four areas, the methodologies employed by Member States to identify hazards, assess risks, and plan appropriate mitigation measures should fit the specific needs of the area assessed, and of each Member State. Nevertheless, the assessment should guarantee that the risk is acceptable or tolerable while identifying the requirements that are to be met in that perspective. Ultimately, the appropriate mitigation measures from each assessment should be compatible with each other and they should not adversely impact on the other areas.

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — SAFETY PART

(a) The assessment phase considers the following items when approaching safety:

(1) Important aspects to include in the assessment are related to traffic density, mapping information related to population density and obstacles, in-depth assessment of encounters with manned aviation, consequences of mid-air collision between unmanned aircraft, and meteorological information, among others.

(2) It is expected that the assessment phase includes a description of the safety activities to be conducted during its life cycle (e.g. in a safety plan). The aim is to specify the detailed safety assessment activities to be undertaken for a given airspace. This preparatory process identifies the main safety issues associated with the airspace under assessment as soon as possible.

(3) It is recommended that the following safety assessment activities, at a minimum, be performed at safety planning level:

(A) Description of the key properties of the operational environment that are relevant to the safety assessment.

(B) Initial identification of the hazards in the airspace under assessment.

(C) Derivation of suitable safety criteria for the airspace under assessment.

(D) Determination of the operational activities relevant to the airspace under assessment.

(4) The safety assessment methodology describes the following elements:

(A)  Identification of hazards and definition of the safety criteria.

(B) To satisfy the safety criteria, definition of the airspace safety specification at operational level in normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.

(C) Definition of the airspace safety requirements describing the high-level design characteristics of the functional system to ensure that the system operates as specified.

(5) Such requirements may be allocated to different stakeholders (e.g. USSPs, UAS operators, etc.)

(b) Safety hazards

(1) Currently, in Regulation (EU) 2017/373, the term ‘hazard’ means ‘any condition, event, or circumstance which could induce a harmful effect’. This definition is maintained in the context of the U-space airspace risk assessment.

(2) This definition relates to a broader understanding of what a hazard is. It addresses two types of hazards: (i) hazards inherent to aviation, which the functional system will have to mitigate; and (ii) ‘system-generated’ hazards, which are created by the potential failure of the functional system.

(3) In an airspace risk assessment associated to UAS operations, both types of hazards (i.e. existing and system-generated hazards) need to be considered, analysed and mitigated.

(4) By definition, hazards inherent to aviation are hazards which exist in the operational environment before any form of deconfliction has taken place. These hazards are the base for the definition of the safety criteria. Two examples of these hazards inherent to aviation, regarding air risk and ground risk respectively, could be:

(A) a situation where the intended trajectories of two or more aircraft are in conflict;

(B) a situation where the intended trajectory of an aircraft conflicts with the terrain or an obstacle.

(5) System-generated hazards are hazards generated by the possible failure/malfunction of the functional system. Possible examples of system-generated hazards may be:

(A) unmanned aircraft entering controlled airspace;

(B) failure in separating two aircraft.

For the identified system-generated hazards, there is a need to provide:

(A) the assessed immediate operational effect(s);

(B) the possible mitigation means in terms of measures to be implemented to protect against the risk-bearing hazards;

(C) the assessed severity of the mitigated effect(s), in accordance with a severity classification scheme defined for the U-space airspace;

(D) the airspace safety specification elements, to limit the tolerable frequency with which the system-generated hazard could be allowed to occur.

(c) It is recommended that safety assurance activities be documented to present sufficient evidence that the actions taken have been adequate and complete in identifying and mitigating the risks (e.g. safety assessment report).

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — CHECKLIST TEMPLATE

For the purpose of conducting an airspace risk assessment, Member States may wish to use a checklist for different types of environments for which hazards and impacts may be considered when performing an airspace risk assessment (the following list is not exhaustive):

Non-exhaustive list of possible stakeholders involved in the airspace risk assessment process (in no restrictive order):

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SAFETY (ALS)

(a) One of the main objectives of the implementation of the U-space is to increase the level of safety of the introduction of UAS operations to an acceptable level. In aviation, the acceptable level of safety is generally defined in terms of the probability of an aircraft accident occurring and the consequences being acceptable to the society, i.e. the society is ready to accept or be subjected to the risk that the event might involve. The role of Member States in this regard is to translate the societal perception into qualitative or quantitative criteria addressing the probability and consequences of occurrences.

(b) The acceptable level of safety is defined by Member States, which should consider the inputs from UAS operators and USSPs regarding their needs and capacities. In order to set acceptable levels of safety for the U-space airspace, it is proposed to set safety criteria as per Regulation (EU) 2017/373 considering the singularities and specificities of the different types of risks posed by unmanned traffic in the U-space.

(c) The defined set of safety criteria should cover all possible identified risks. Each criterion should be verifiable and expressed in terms of an explicit level of safety risk or another measure that relates to a specific safety risk. In the absence of sufficient data related to U-space operations to take as a reference to determine the safety criteria, safety indicators from manned aviation operations may be used.

(d) It is worth remarking that when setting safety criteria for the U-space airspace, the goal is to maintain at least the safety levels attained over years of experience in manned aviation. However, considering the specificities of UAS operations in the U-space, this might mean a higher rate of mid-air collisions than for manned aviation. Nevertheless, considering the mitigation means that ensure separation between manned and unmanned aircraft, the mid-air collision between two unmanned aircraft will not result in casualties in the air. The ground risk is likely to be higher in populated areas, particularly when comparing high density of unmanned operations with traditional manned aviation. The definition of safety criteria should take these factors into account, as well as the presence of critical infrastructures in the vicinity which could be negatively impacted by UAS operations.

(e) With reference to units of measurement, the most common unit of measurement applied to manage aviation risks is generally the reference to ‘aircraft per flight hours’. Nevertheless, there are other units that could be used in the framework of an airspace risk assessment. In general, it is considered that the most appropriate unit of measurement to assess U-space safety risks refers to ‘per flight hour’ for en-route phases of flight, while for the take-off, approach and landing phases of flight, reference to ‘per movement’ over a period of time (e.g. ‘per year’) is the most convenient.

(f) The airspace safety specification at operational level will define what must happen at operational level in the airspace for the specified acceptable level of safety to be met. Different factors can be adjusted, like for instance the type of traffic, aircraft and system performance, equipment, procedures, aircraft speed, type of operation, maximum capacity, the number of people overflown (population density), among others, to comply with the airspace safety specification at operational level. Once the U-space is operational, comparative approaches to determine the appropriate level of safety to be attained by the changes in the functional system (reassessments) may be useful. In these cases, the rationale of ‘maintaining or improving’ the current safety level of operations in the U-space may be used to define the new safety criteria associated to the changes made to the functional system. Such an approach is convenient for the consolidation of the U-space where incremental improvements are applied, while planning safety in the long term in terms of procedures and system design can produce additional quantitative figures.

(g) Finally, the acceptable level of safety should be materialised through the definition of the U‑space airspace safety requirements, such as the set of U-space services, performance requirements, as well as the operational conditions and constraints, describing the high-level design characteristics of the functional system to ensure that the system operates as specified, thus satisfying the airspace safety specification at operational level.

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — QUANTITATIVE SAFETY FIGURES

At this early stage of the implementation of the U-space regulatory framework, the limited experience with assessing the safety of UAS operations and the uncertainty on the related level of risk acceptable to the society do not permit to define sensible and harmonised quantitative safety figures. This may require to use simplified assumptions and approximations to establish quantitative values.

In the future, when more operational experience will have been gained, numerical examples to propose an acceptable level of safety could be provided with the appropriate accuracy.

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OTHER RISKS

During the assessment phase, the following guidance regarding the associated security, privacy, and environmental risks may support the Member States.

Security

(a) The implementation of the European regulatory framework for the protection of critical infrastructure as well as cybersecurity may lead to risk assessments that are relevant to the airspace considered. These risk assessments may be considered as components of the airspace risk assessment if they are reviewed to take into consideration the possible designation of a U‑space airspace.

(b) It is recommended that a security risk assessment be conducted to assess the security risks of an organisation which emerge from intentional, unauthorised electronic interaction. The necessary process steps and methodologies to conduct the security risk assessment will vary depending on the particular security risk assessment process that has been adopted.

(c) The methodology used to assess cybersecurity risks is very similar to the one used for physical security risks and, therefore, recommended to use it during the assessment phase. The process for the risk assessment and for the sharing of information security risks is illustrated in Figure 2 on the next page. This comprises several activities that need to be performed for each risk assessment.

(d) There are fixed inputs (marked with the letters A, B, C, D) that should be common to all risk assessments conducted by an organisation. These would be established as part of the overall corporate risk management process. The activities described may be conducted in a different order depending on the particular methodology used, and the activities and fixed inputs may have different names as well. Risk sharing can happen at any life cycle stage and should be dependent on agreed thresholds for reporting.

Figure 2: Risk assessment and sharing of information according to EUROCAE ED-201A

(e) To ensure comparability and compatibility between the different security assessment methodologies and definitions of risk, it is recommended that the parties involved should have a common method for categorising risks and different classes of risks. The use of different methods may produce incomparable outputs that are unusable between the parties involved.

(f) The following principles may be used for risk sharing outputs where there is a safety impact identified between connected organisations and ecosystems using the same risk assessment method:

(1) Assurance that the outputs of the assessments produce results which are comparable internally and externally.

(2) Agreement upon common definitions for the connected interfaces (e.g. risk classes, vulnerabilities).

(3) Sharing information on assessed risks that have a potential safety impact on their partners, which relate to connecting networks, to sharing information, and to using third‑party products.

(4) The use of different risk assessment matrices should be used according to the type of impact that is being assessed and shared (e.g. safety, capacity).

(5) An organisation may only compare and use the severity of same-type impacts, i.e. a safety impact with a safety impact; a safety impact cannot be compared with an organisational impact.

(6) Security protection

(i) The general type of protection (e.g. type of encryption standard).

(ii) The attribute being protected is important as it may be the case that one organisation protects availability, but the receiving organisation is concerned with protecting integrity.

(iii) The assurance of security protection which represents the quality it has been designed to operate. If the assurance level of the protection measures of the connected organisation is not broadly equivalent, then each connected system will either have to agree to share and manage the risk to an acceptable level for both organisations or individually manage the risk to an acceptable level.

Privacy

(g) A risk assessment on privacy is aimed at assessing the privacy risks to third parties emerging from intentional or accidental visualisation, capture and/or retention of personal images or information through (close) overflight or hovering. The necessary process steps and methodologies to conduct the privacy risk assessment will vary depending on the particular privacy risk assessment process that has been adopted.

(h) The main legal reference regarding privacy risk assessment is Regulation (EU) 2016/679¹⁹ (the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)). However, the GDPR only applies to ‘personal data’ as defined in its Article 4(1), not to commercial information, which will generally be covered by national laws. A privacy risk assessment is conducted to additionally ensure the security of third‑party commercial data.

(i) Article 35 of the GDPR provides for the conduct of a data protection impact assessment (DPIA), where the processing of any personal data obtained is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the subjects of that data. This DPIA must describe the characteristics of the data treatment, the risks identified, and the mitigation measures adopted. A DPIA may be used to support the airspace risk assessment.

Environmental

(j) An environmental risk assessment should assess the risks to people, wildlife and the natural environment which emerge from flights near built-up areas, especially schools and hospitals, protected landscape, natural reserves, along known wildlife migratory routes, or over lakes, rivers, and other bodies of water. The necessary process steps and methodologies to conduct an environmental risk assessment will vary depending on the particular environmental risk assessment process that has been adopted.

(k) Environmental risk assessments for UAS operations should ensure compliance with plans and programmes for which such environmental assessments have been carried out.

Noise

(l) Regulations (EU) 2019/945 and 2019/947 lay down provisions as regards noise limitation of small UAS. They require manufacturers to minimise noise, and operators to follow the guidelines for reducing noise during operations. The assessment and management of environmental noise of small UAS should take these provisions into account. Directive 2002/49/EC²⁰ relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise remains applicable, and the action plans required in paragraphs 5 to 7 of its Article 8 should be updated to include noise from UAS used in the ‘specific’ and ‘certified’ category. In effect, environmental airspace risk assessments ensure that UAS operations comply with these action plans regarding environmental noise.

(m) Many regulations on aircraft noise include airports, for example Regulation (EU) No 598/2014 on the establishment of rules and procedures with regard to the introduction of noise-related operating restrictions at Union airports within a Balanced Approach²¹.

Air quality

(n) Directive 2008/50/EC²², implementing a common approach to ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, applies to the management of local air quality at and around airports. Assessments should determine whether drones whose lift and propulsion do not come solely from electric sources comply with this Directive.

Protection of wildlife and the natural environment

(o) Concerns regarding aviation and wildlife generally focus on strikes against aircraft, mostly by birds. This is also a problem for unmanned aircraft. Such strikes could cause the unmanned aircraft to become uncontrollable, presenting a danger to people and property on the ground. Assessments should ensure that UAS operations avoid known wildlife migratory routes.

Assessments should ensure that local laws on the protection of wild birds, notably through Directive 2009/147/EC²³ on the conservation of wild birds, are respected. They should also ensure that Directive 92/43/EEC²⁴ on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, and in particular of Natura 2000 sites and other areas of special scientific interest and of outstanding natural beauty, is observed.

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — COORDINATION WITH THE U-SPACE STAKEHOLDERS

In conjunction with Article 18(f) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, for Member States to ensure a viable and effective designation of the U-space airspace, it is recommended as best practice to:

(a) exchange on best practices with other Members States and/or the Agency to ensure consistency and interoperability across the European Union — for instance, in seeking harmonisation on safety criteria and performance requirements;

(b) coordinate with the providers of common information, the single CIS provider (when relevant) and USSPs to evaluate:

(1) the availability of the required capabilities and performance requirements;

(2) the operational capacity according to the volume of operations expected in the U-space airspace;

(3) the operational capacity to interface with ATS providers;

(4) the procedures supporting the dynamic airspace reconfiguration in controlled airspace;

(5) the availability of a common secure interoperable open communication protocol to enable digital information exchange between the U-space airspace actors;

(c) coordinate with the relevant ATS providers to evaluate the particularities or constraints of the controlled airspace to be considered during the designation of the U-space airspace;

(d) coordinate with UAS manufacturers to evaluate that UAS satisfy the required capabilities and performance requirements;

(e) coordinate with UAS operators to gain understanding of the intended operations and evaluate the service performance required, the practicability of the operational constraints, as well as the planned contingency and emergency procedures.

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AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT — COORDINATION AT LOCAL LEVEL

The public consultation (hearing process), as addressed in the AMC and GM to Article 18(f) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, is intended to further elaborate the U-space airspace risk assessment with regard to the following:

(a) evaluating the soundness of the risk assessment (technical aspects) and potentially enriching it with complementary risks that may be indicated during the public consultation;

(b) integrating the considerations from to the public impacted by the establishment of the U-space airspace, and refining its design accordingly (e.g. to cater for local well-being needs as per GM1 and GM3 to Article 18(f));

(c) ultimately evaluating, and supporting as necessary, the social acceptance of the U-space airspace deployment.

AMC1 Article 3(4) U-space airspace requirements

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — DESIGN, OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

Considering Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/664, Member States should establish and provide the U‑space airspace definition, encompassing:

(a) the geographical limits of the area where the U-space airspace is designated;

(b) the internal airspace structure (e.g. airspace blocks with their maximum and minimum size, subject to activation/deactivation);

(c) the UAS geographical zones defined in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947, which could be encompassed within the U-space airspace.

Furthermore, Member States should define the U-space airspace operational conditions and constraints:

(a) for U-space airspace designated in controlled airspace, the means and procedures to disseminate information regarding dynamic airspace reconfiguration;

(b) the potential pre-established contingency or emergency procedures;

(c) the weather limitations, in terms of maxima or minima for important meteorological parameters (e.g. maximum gust, and visibility minimum, temperature minimum);

(d) the maximum simultaneous UAS operations, and the maximum density of UAS flights allowed within the designated U-space airspace;

(e) the minimum safety distance (spacing) to be maintained between manned and unmanned aircraft in airspace where manned aircraft operations are not subject to air traffic control;

(f) the residual airspace risk class (ARC) to support the specific operations risk assessment (SORA) as defined in Regulation (EU) 2019/947;

(g) any other operational conditions and constraints derived from the airspace risk assessment (e.g. mitigation of specific hazards identified during the assessment).

AMC2 Article 3(4) U-space airspace requirements

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U-SPACE AIRSPACE — PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Considering Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/664, and derived from the airspace risk assessment, Member States should establish the following:

(a) The U-space services’ performance requirements and operational constraints:

(1) the ‘geographic proximity’ to UAS operators at which the UAS remote identification has to be acquired and provided to support the network information service;

(2) the maximum data ‘latency’ and ‘frequency’ at which the traffic information needs to be provided to UAS operators to ensure the proper functioning of the traffic information service;

(3) the ‘proximity’ to the UAS position, and the associated definition of the surveillance volume at/within which the traffic information should be provided to UAS operators;

(4) the ‘deviation thresholds’, meant to be the maximum acceptable deviation from the intended UAS flight path, to be considered by the USSP when processing a flight authorisation or to generate a non-conformance alert to the UAS operator;

(5) flight authorisation constraints that may be defined to ensure fair and efficient access to the U-space airspace;

(6) the data quality requirements for weather data, when relevant;

(7) the minimum coverage (e.g. horizontal and vertical range within and, when required, also outside the U-space airspace) for the receipt of information from electronically conspicuous manned aircraft that are not subject to air traffic control, considering the means of compliance as defined in AMC1 to point SERA.6005(c) of Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, and complementary information about manned aircraft traffic potentially shared by the relevant air traffic service units.

(b) The required UAS capabilities and performance requirements.

For the determination of the performance requirements, the contribution of the U-space actors (layers) should be taken into account including, when relevant, the single CIS provider, the USSP, and UAS operators (e.g. reaction time).

GM1 Article 3(4) U-space airspace requirements

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — RESULTS OF THE AIRSPACE RISK ASSESSMENT

The acceptable level of safety is supported by a comprehensive set of performance requirements, operational constraints and limitations that are to be subsequently considered and/or satisfied by the U-space actors (e.g. USSPs, UAS operators, UAS manufacturers). These performance requirements and operational constraints and limitations are intended to be established throughout the risk assessment, be performance based, and commensurate with the level of risk that needs to be mitigated in the U‑space airspace.

GM2 Article 3(4) U-space airspace requirements

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — STRUCTURE

The design of the U-space airspace could be organised into a set of airspace components that can be a basic set of airspace blocks which can be combined/deactivated in changing combinations/configurations to meet the actual manned aviation requirements. It can also be a more sophisticated mathematical grid, the geometry of which can vary depending on the complexity and density of the operations (e.g. triangles to allow for straight ‘areas’ boundaries). An efficient strategic approach to the design of the U-space airspace is therefore important, also taking into account the need to manage the complexity of the dynamic airspace reconfiguration procedure, which might be progressively increased at the later stage of the U-space implementation.

GM3 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — INTERNAL GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES

The U-space airspace may encompass sub-geographical zones as defined in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and in the related AMC and GM:

(a) zones limited in place and time (e.g. operations allowed only at certain periods and in certain areas);

(b) zones restricted to UAS operations that fulfil a specific set of conditions and specific authorisations;

(c) zones of exclusion where UAS operations are prohibited (e.g. no-fly zones).

GM4 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — AIR RISK CLASS (ARC) — APPLICATION OF THE SPECIFIC OPERATIONS RISK ASSESSMENT (SORA) FOR UAS OPERATIONS IN THE ‘SPECIFIC’ CATEGORY

While it is considered that the initial ARC of UAS operations in the ‘specific’ category is established taking into account the airspace classification and type of complexity of the airspace (e.g. height, danger area, etc.) for the purpose of a harmonised U-space airspace implementation, it is recommended to apply the residual ARC as follows (after having applied all the strategical and pre‑tactical and tactical means that support the implementation of the U-space airspace, and having ensured the proper utilisation of the required U-space services):

It is recommended to apply residual ‘ARC-b’ for U-space in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace (or in airspace where both controlled and uncontrolled manned aircraft may operate simultaneously), relying on the provision of tactical information through the ‘traffic information service’ and the U‑space segregation principle (e.g. dynamic airspace reconfiguration) to maintain safe separation from manned aircraft, while still accounting for a certain level of air risk for manned aircraft.

The demonstration by UAS operators of the relevant tactical mitigations performance requirements (TMPR) to their competent authority that has provided the operational authorisation is still required. In the context of U-space, additional requirements complementing the defined SORA/TMPR in Regulation (EU) 2019/947 may be established by the Member State through the definition of the U‑space performance requirements.

GM5 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR U-SPACE SERVICES

The performance requirements are related to the provision of services and to Regulation (EU) 2021/664 as follows:

(a) The maximum data ‘latency’ is related to the ‘traffic information service’ (Articles 5(2) and 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664);

(b) The ‘proximity’ to the UAS position is related to the ‘network information service’ (Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664);

(c) ‘Deviation thresholds’ are related to the ‘flight authorisation service’ (Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664), and the ‘conformance service’ (Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664);

(d) The ‘proximity’ to the UAS position and the definition of the surveillance volume are related to the ‘traffic information service’ (Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664);

(e) The ‘frequency’ at which the information needs to be provided to the UAS operator is related to the ‘traffic information service’ (Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664);

(f) The data quality requirements for weather data are related to the ‘weather information service’ (Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2021/664).

GM6 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — SAFETY AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES

To ensure that the acceptable level of safety is achieved, safety objectives may be specified in terms of required levels of integrity and reliability, and be allocated to the U-space actors. Similarly, security objectives aligned with the safety objectives, type of operation and level of threats may be also defined to ensure assurance in the security measures.

While the objectives are meant to be commensurate with those existing today for manned aviation, the practicality of the implementation may limit the approach (e.g. difficulty in applying a relevant software assurance level (SWAL) approach).

GM7 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — FLIGHT AUTHORISATION CONSTRAINTS

Linked to specific airspace, and to ensure efficiency as well as fairness as regards access to the U-space airspace, Member States may constrain:

(a) the minimum and maximum time (size of time window) before scheduled take-off time at which flight activation is requested;

(b) the maximum time a flight authorisation request may be sent in advance to ensure the effective implementation of the ‘first in, first serve’ principle and prevent undue occupation of the U‑space airspace.

GM8 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — FLIGHT AUTHORISATION DEVIATION THRESHOLDS

It is expected that the acceptable level of safety may be achieved by having UAS flight authorisation for 4D trajectories that do not intersect and contain their flights for 95 % of the time.

The UAS flight authorisation describes the flight trajectory as a series of one or more 4D volumes expressed in height (base, ceiling), longitudinal and lateral limits, and duration (entry and exit times). Each dimension includes the uncertainty of the flight, considering the UAS operational performance, and the assumptions on the operator proficiency and weather conditions.

It is recommended as best practice that these uncertainties be capped in the given probability of 95 %. The resulting deviation threshold defines an additional 4D volume around each planned 4D volume for a flight. The dimensions may be specified to balance the needs of safety with the efficient use of the airspace, and refine them over time for the U-space airspace under consideration based on the observed usage of the U-space airspace, the performance (and conformance) of the UAS flights in the airspace, and other factors.

GM9 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — TRAFFIC INFORMATION AND SURVEILLANCE VOLUME

Proximity is understood as the distance between two aircraft. In the context of traffic information service, its value should be determined in such a way to allow UAS operators enough time to take appropriate action to avoid collision hazards. Proximity values may vary depending on the geography of the U-space airspace and the type of expected operations (e.g. BVLOS/VLOS), and also on the type and performance of manned aircraft that operate in or cross through the U-space airspace.

The constraints in terms of situational awareness, and thus the proximity values, may differ for manned and unmanned aircraft. Manned aircraft are usually much faster than unmanned aircraft. Due to their higher velocity, and due to the fact that manned aircraft induce wake turbulence, UAS operators may need to ensure situational awareness at a much wider scale to effectively assess incoming traffic and take appropriate action to maintain sufficient spacing.

For instance, to enable a 10-minute reaction time for the UAS operator, and considering a manned traffic velocity of 120 kt (≈240 km), a wider volume of 20 NM (≈37 km) and 5 000 ft (≈1 500 m) may be taken as reference to adequately monitor manned traffic patterns.

These factors are to be considered by Member States to ultimately specify the appropriate ‘surveillance volume’. In addition, considering such constraints, and to safely enable operations close to the geographical borders of the U-space airspace, the ‘surveillance volume’ should include the adjacent airspace beyond the strict geographical limit of the U-space airspace.

GM10 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — RECEIPT OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION FROM UNCONTROLLED MANNED AIRCRAFT

Traffic information may be complemented by information about manned aircraft traffic shared by the relevant air traffic service units. This may include information from primary and secondary surveillance radars, multilateration surveillance systems and other surveillance or tracking systems already used by air traffic service units.

The complementary traffic information about manned aircraft traffic should be considered as one of the inputs to the airspace risk assessment referred to in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

The complementary traffic information may, in exceptional cases and subject to deriving positive results from the airspace risk assessment referred to in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, alleviate the need for the deployment of new ground infrastructure necessary for the continuous receipt of information from manned aircraft that make themselves electronically conspicuous in accordance with AMC1 to point SERA.6005(c) of Regulation (EU) No 923/2012. This is to be considered especially in situations where the deployment of new ground infrastructure could constitute a disproportionate burden on USSPs when compared to the existing requirement for manned aircraft that operate in airspace which is being considered for designation as U-space airspace by the Member States.

GM11 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — TIMELINESS AND LATENCY

The maximum latency values may vary depending on the geography of the U-space airspace and the type of the expected operations.

In general, information will be handled by multiple parties, and a maximum latency would have to be subdivided into fractions, and latency budgets would have to be allocated to individual parties, while at the same time the number of re-transfers would have to be limited in order to protect the maximum overall latency.

GM12 Article 3(4) U-space airspace

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Depending on the U-space airspace design and constraints, not all UAS types are capable of being safely operated within the U-space airspace. The UAS capabilities and performance requirements may be expressed in terms of expected:

(a) climb/descent rates or vertical speed, horizontal speed, autonomy/range/endurance,

(b) noise levels,

(c) connectivity,

(d) required navigation equipment,

(e) flight data accuracy, integrity and latencies (refresh rate),

(f) availability and integrity of the command-and-control link,

(g) resilience to environmental conditions (e.g. as applicable: wind, icing, electrical interference),

(h) resilience to cyberthreats and related security measures.

Article 4 — Dynamic airspace reconfiguration

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

Where a Member State designates a U-space airspace within controlled airspace, it shall ensure that the dynamic reconfiguration of the airspace within that U-space airspace as laid down in ATS.TR.237 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/665 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/373 is applied in order to make sure that manned aircraft which are provided with an air traffic control service and UAS remain segregated.

AMC1 Article 4 Dynamic airspace reconfiguration

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SEGREGATION ASSURANCE

(a) Protection buffers should be applied internally in the design phase, when assessing the volume of airspace to be designated as U-space airspace, so that flight authorisations are only granted to a specified vertical/horizontal distance from the U-space airspace limits.

(b) The values of the protection buffers should be taken into account and should be consistent with the UAS performance requirements for a given U-space airspace, specifically those requirements related to the lateral and vertical navigation performance or containment criteria.

AMC2 Article 4 Dynamic airspace reconfiguration

ED Decision 2022/022/R

PRELIMINARY ALERT TO UAS OPERATORS

When the location where UAS operations take place is to become deactivated, a preliminary alert should be issued soon enough by the USSPs to UAS operators to allow them to revise the UAS flight authorisations, or enable safe landing, before the restriction becomes active.

AMC3 Article 4 Dynamic airspace reconfiguration

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION

Once the U-space airspace, or parts of it, are clear of UAS traffic (i.e. UAS have been redirected to portions of the U-space airspace that remain active or have landed), the implementation of the dynamic airspace reconfiguration should be acknowledged to the ATC unit.

GM1 Article 4 Dynamic airspace reconfiguration

ED Decision 2022/022/R

GENERAL

(a) Article 4 introduces the concept of dynamic reconfiguration of the U-space airspace and requires Member States to ensure that this concept is effectively put in place to avoid proximity between manned and unmanned aircraft within the U-space airspace.

(b) The dynamic reconfiguration of the U-space airspace is an important element of the overall safety argument for safe operations in the U-space airspace. It applies to a U-space airspace that is established in controlled airspace and allows manned aircraft to fly clear of the U-space airspace whilst ensuring the containment of the U-space traffic. Dynamic reconfiguration is carried out by the ATC unit in response to variable manned traffic patterns, which demand short-term U-space airspace adaptations.

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

(c) Initially, at least, the number of instances where dynamic airspace reconfiguration would be required should be limited. In addition, certain strategic measures could be taken to limit the extent of the dynamic airspace reconfiguration through, for example, the design of the U-space airspace itself. The better the airspace is designed, the easier it will be for ATC units to segregate manned from unmanned aircraft in the U-space airspace.

(d) Operationally, the ATC unit will inform USSPs that, depending on the U-space airspace design, certain portions of the U-space airspace (or its entirety) are (is) not eligible for flight authorisation, activation, and utilisation by the UAS. When these portions of the U-space airspace are dynamically deactivated, for tactical, short-term changes in manned traffic demand, USSPs should not grant flight authorisation/activation and should request the UAS operator that already flies into the deactivated portion of the U-space airspace to either exit it or land.

(e) The time margins (time within which, after deactivation, it is expected that the UAS that occupies the relevant portions of the U-space airspace will exit them or will have to land) for these operations may be established on a case-by-case basis, based on different factors, such as the proximity of the ATC route to the U-space airspace, including standard instrument departure / standard instrument arrival (SID/STAR), typical performance of manned aircraft in that particular airspace, constraints in the controlled airspace, or unexpected situations (e.g. non-standard go-around, emergency).

OPERATIONAL SCENARIO

(f) When the ATC unit intends to issue a clearance to a manned aircraft to enter the U-space airspace, it will initiate a dynamic airspace reconfiguration procedure. The ATC unit will preliminarily alert, through its respective USSPs, UAS operators about the imminent deactivation of the entirety, or the relevant portions, of the U-space airspace to let them anticipate and engage the appropriate manoeuvres. The ATC unit will then publish a temporary U-space airspace restriction for UAS as part of the CIS for that U-space airspace. USSPs that are active in that U-space airspace will adhere to this newly published restriction and provide the corresponding information to all UAS operators connected to their services through the geo‑awareness service. In addition, they will check authorised UAS flights against the newly published restriction and cancel or amend flight authorisations accordingly.

(g) The UAS operators concerned will be notified through the UAS flight authorisation service and will need to either discontinue their flights or conform with the amended UAS flight authorisations, as applicable. USSPs will notify the ATC unit once the restricted portion of the U-space airspace is clear of UAS traffic as UAS will have exited the restricted portion of the U‑space airspace.

(h) The ATC unit will clear manned aircraft to enter the U-space airspace once it is ensured that the segregation from UAS traffic has been achieved.

(i) Upon completion of the manned flight through the U-space airspace, the ATC unit will complete the dynamic airspace reconfiguration procedure, by lifting the dynamic restriction, and USSPs will be allowed again to activate UAS flight authorisations or provide UAS new flight authorisations for UAS operators accordingly.

GM2 Article 4 Dynamic airspace reconfiguration

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SEGREGATION ASSURANCE

(a) The segregation effectiveness and assurance are highly dependent on the amount of time given to UAS operators to react according to the performance of the UAS they operate. As per GM2 to point ATS.TR.237 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, the ATC unit is expected to raise an alert as soon as practicable and ensure a recommended time window of 10 minutes before the implementation, plus 2 minutes once the restriction becomes active.

(b) To ensure that manned aircraft that operate in controlled airspace within a U-space airspace are segregated from UAS that operate in that U-space airspace, there is a need for:

(1) performance standards for UAS (those for manned aircraft being already widely established) to make reasonably sure that UAS will have the capability to stay within the defined airspace volume, with reference to both position accuracy and horizontal/vertical speed, and to exit the deactivated U-space airspace or land within a reasonable time;

(2) criteria (e.g. applicable buffer) to determine the airspace volume required to consider that segregation has been reasonably assured.

(c) According to Article 3(4)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, UAS capabilities and performance requirements are determined by Member States for each U-space airspace, based on the related airspace risk assessment.

GM3 Article 4 Dynamic airspace reconfiguration

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SEGREGATION ASSURANCE

According to the GM to point ATS.TR.237 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, it is recommended as best practice that the ATC unit raise an advisory alert to UAS operators either 10 minutes or 5 times the anticipation time before the U-space airspace becomes deactivated. This ‘anticipation time’ is suggested to be a minimum of 2 minutes.

Article 5 — Common information services

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1. Member States shall make the following data available as part of the common information services of each U-space airspace:

(a) horizontal and vertical limits of the U-space airspace;

(b) the requirements determined pursuant to Article 3(4);

(c) a list of certified U-space service providers offering U-space services in the U-space airspace, with the following information:

(i)  identification and contact details of active U-space service providers;

(ii)  U-space services provided;

(iii)  certification limitation(s), if any;

(d) any adjacent U-space airspace (s);

(e) UAS geographical zones relevant to the U-space airspace and published by Member States in accordance with Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947;

(f) static and dynamic airspace restrictions defined by the relevant authorities and permanently or temporarily limiting the volume of airspace within the U-space airspace where UAS operations can take place.

2. Member States shall ensure that the relevant operational data referred to in ATS.OR.127 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/665 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/373, as well as the data resulting from the dynamic airspace reconfiguration referred to in ATS.TR.237 thereof, are made available as part of the common information services of each U-space airspace.

3. U-space service providers shall make the terms and conditions of their services available as part of the common information services of each U-space airspace in which they offer their services.

4. The providers of common information services shall ensure that the information referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3:

(a) is made available in accordance with Annex II;

(b) complies with the necessary data quality, latency and protection requirements established in Annex III.

5. Access to common information services shall be granted to relevant authorities, air traffic service providers, U-space service providers and UAS operators on a non-discriminatory basis, including with the same data quality, latency and protection levels.

6. Member States may designate a single common information service provider to supply the common information services on an exclusive basis in all or some of the U-space airspaces under their responsibility. In this case, the information referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall be made available to the single common information service provider who then shall provide it in accordance with paragraph 5.

7. Such a single common information service provider shall fulfil the requirements referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 and shall be certified in accordance with Chapter V of this Regulation.

8. A Member State who designates a single common information service provider shall inform the Agency, and the other Member States without delay of any decision concerning the certificate of the single common information service provider. The Agency shall include in the repository referred to in Article 74 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 information about all decisions notified by Member States pursuant to this paragraph.

GM1 Article 5 Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE ARCHITECTURE

(a) Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 defines the content and organises the distribution of ‘common information’ — that is, the necessary information that needs to be shared between the relevant operational stakeholders for the safe operation of UAS in the U-space airspace.

(b) Common information is a collection of data that originates mainly from three different sources:

(1) the Members States responsible for the design of the U-space airspace, including its dimensions, performance requirements, and static or dynamic restrictions;

(2) the ATS providers responsible for the transmission of manned traffic information as laid down in point ATS.OR.127 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, and the ATS units when applying the dynamic reconfiguration of the U-space airspace;

(3) the USSPs, through the terms and conditions as regards access to their services.

(c) Member States may decide to designate a dedicated entity to provide CIS on an exclusive basis in a given U-space airspace. Such ‘single common information service provider’ (single CIS provider) would make the relevant information available to all relevant operational stakeholders. The single CIS provider would need to be certified for the services it provides. The designation of a single CIS provider would need to be notified to other Member States as well as to the Agency.

(d) In the absence of a single CIS provider, common information is directly exchanged between the relevant operational stakeholders in a distributed communication architecture, whereby each data provider communicates directly with another USSP for sharing information. Each USSP needs to communicate with other data providers. A clear allocation of common information elements between Member States, ATS providers and USSPs would allow data users to find target data quickly and efficiently. In the absence of a single CIS provider, there is no need for additional certification; the provision of common information elements by ATS providers and USSPs will be covered by their respective certificate and the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 and Regulation (EU) 2021/665 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/373.

(e) Members States may decide to designate different single CIS providers for different U-space airspace volumes, or designate a single CIS provider for some of their designated U-space airspace volumes only, otherwise opting for a distributed model of exchange of common information.

(f) To achieve a high level of data exchange and interoperability between the CIS and State services (law enforcement and potentially military authorities), the CIS may need to comply with the national security and defence requirements.

GM2 Article 5 Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

STAKEHOLDERS

(a) As regards information and data provided to or by the CIS provider, a variety of different stakeholders may be involved. Member States may consider taking the needs and requirements of the stakeholders listed below into consideration.

(b) Stakeholders to provide information to, and retrieve information from, the CIS provider:

(1) competent authorities;

(2) ANSPs/ATSPs;

(3) military authorities (e.g. when being also ATSPs);

(4) USSPs;

(5) single CIS provider, when relevant;

(6) other relevant authorities or organisations (e.g. State agencies, municipalities, nature protection authorities, law enforcement authorities, rescue coordination centres, GNSS services, aerodrome/heliport/vertiport operators, meteorological authorities).

GM3 Article 5 Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of Regulation (EU) 2021/664:

(a) ‘common information services’ (CIS) refers to the digital environment (network or platform) in which the common information elements (data) that support the implementation and proper functioning of the U-space airspace are provided/exchanged.

(b) ‘providers of common information’ refers to entities/organisations that provide common information elements (data) to the common information services (CIS).

(c) ‘single CIS provider’ refers to a certified organisation that ensures the interface and exchange between the ‘providers of common information’ and the USSPs. There is one ‘single CIS provider’ per U-space airspace. On the principles, the single CIS provider supports the provision of U-space services by providing common information to USSPs, but does not have active operational roles and responsibilities. For instance, it should not take part in the flight authorisation, which is the sole responsibility of the USSP.

(d) ‘distributed model’ or ‘decentralised model’ refers to a U-space architecture without a ‘single CIS provider’ where each ‘provider of common information’ makes common information elements (data) directly available to the other operational stakeholders (e.g. USSPs).

(e) ‘centralised model’ refers to a U-space architecture with a ‘single CIS provider’ which collects common information elements (data) from ‘providers of common information’ and makes them available to all operational stakeholders (e.g. USSPs).

AMC1 Article 5(1) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

FORMAT OF AIRSPACE INFORMATION

The format of airspace information, including geographical zones, static and dynamic airspace restrictions, adjacent U-space airspace, and the horizontal and vertical limits of the U-space airspace should be as described in Chapter VIII ‘UAS geographical zone data model’ of and Appendix 2 to the ED-269 ‘MINIMUM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR GEOFENCING’ standard in the version published in June 2020.

AMC2 Article 5(1) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

INTERFACES

Member States or, when designated, the single CIS provider should provide and document all information required by the users to identify and implement interfaces to support access to the CIS.

GM1 Article 5(1)(b) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

GEO-ZONE DATA FORMAT

Members States may define a format and data model to support the electronic sharing of information. They may use the JSON format (rfc7159) defined in EUROCAE ED-269. To support interoperability, Members States are encouraged to refer to standards and ensure consistency as regards the naming convention.

AMC1 Article 5(1)(f) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

TIMELINESS

Information on static and dynamic airspace restrictions should be made available within 30 and 5 seconds respectively for at least 99 % of the time.

GM1 Article 5(1)(f) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

COMPLEMENTARY AIRSPACE RESTRICTION

Relevant NOTAMs, airspace use plans (AUPs) / updated airspace use plans (UUPs) and navigation warnings are to be considered airspace information and should be made available online as part of the CIS, in accordance with Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

AMC1 Article 5(2) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

TIMELINESS

Traffic information should be made available with a latency that is lower than that necessary for the proper functioning of the traffic information service, as determined by the U-space airspace risk assessment, for at least 99 % of the time.

GM1 Article 5(4)(a) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

FEEDBACK ON CIS DATA QUALITY

The providers of common information may suggest categories of anomalies that USSPs or, when designated, the single CIS provider, may use to categorise the type of feedback they share. Those categories may be inspired by data quality requirements such as accuracy, timeliness, or completeness, and offer specific tags for user comments or requests.

AMC1 Article 5(5) U-space service providers 

ED Decision 2022/022/R

INSTRUCTIONS TO CIS USERS

The necessary information to get access and exchange data through the CIS (e.g. service descriptions, interfaces) should be made available to the public, and should encompass:

(a) the point of contact of the CIS administrator and the procedures to access the CIS (e.g. to obtain the required credentials);

(b) the instructions on how to configure the user interfaces/system to properly support the exchange;

(c) the instructions to ensure the security of the exchange.

AMC1 Article 5(6) U-space service providers 

ED Decision 2022/022/R

INSTRUCTIONS TO USSPs

The single CIS provider should develop and provide USSPs with instructions to:

(a) configure their interfaces and systems to properly support the provision of services;

(b) ensure the security of the exchange.

GM1 Article 5(6) U-space service providers

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE CIS STAKEHOLDERS

The single CIS provider may need to make a formal arrangement with CIS providers. To allow for flexibility, the formal form of the arrangement is left to the discretion of the parties involved, but may encompass the following items:

(a) The arrangement may:

(1) make reference to service ownership, accountability, roles and responsibilities;

(2) contain a description of the provision of data, information or services;

(3) match the expected service provision with the actual service support and delivery.

(b) The arrangement may establish:

(1) the subject matter, which may cover:

(i) the U-space airspace serviced (one arrangement may cover several U-space airspace volumes);

(ii) the coordination between stakeholders (may be covered in the same arrangement);

(2) the governance model, which may contain:

(i) points of contact for process coordination and system maintenance contacts;

(ii) a coordination process involving representatives from the stakeholders involved; the arrangement may cover procedures to organise meetings;

(iii) provision on dispute resolution;

(3) the data- and information-sharing attributes and constraints:

(i) the scope of data and information to be shared will depend on whether the U‑space is designed in controlled or uncontrolled airspace, or in airspace where both controlled and uncontrolled manned aircraft may operate simultaneously (i.e. ICAO airspace class E);

(ii) a data- and information-sharing plan may cover the following:

(A) the data and information shared;

(B) compliance with applicable data protection legislation;

(C) data processing;

(D) data quality;

(E) data subjects’ rights;

(F) data retention and deletion;

(G) security and training;

(H) security breaches and reporting procedures;

(I) responsibilities for providing data and services.

GM2 Article 5(6) U-space service providers

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE SINGLE CIS PROVIDER AND THE AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE PROVIDER (ATSP)

Similarly to USSPs, specific arrangements may be necessary between the single CIS provider and the relevant ATSP.

The arrangement may be established according to the example presented in GM1 to Article 5(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 and in Annex V to this Regulation to ensure the adequate exchange of relevant operational data and information.

AMC1 Article 5(7) U-space service providers

ED Decision 2022/022/R

MONITORING OF THE AVAILABILITY OF CIS PROVIDERS AND REPORTING OF DATA QUALITY ISSUES

The single CIS provider should monitor the availability of services of the providers of common information, as well as the quality of the exchange and data received. The single CIS provider should inform the providers of common information as soon as practically possible about any detected availability or quality issues with regard to the data received.

AMC2 Article 5(7) U-space service providers

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CIS DEGRADATION

The single CIS provider should inform USSPs without undue delay about CIS degradation.

AMC3 Article 5(7) Common information services

ED Decision 2022/022/R

PRESERVATION OF DATA INTEGRITY AND QUALITY

The single CIS provider should ensure for the data it collects and distributes that:

(a) it does not alter the information, and preserves the integrity of the information received;

(b) it takes the appropriate measures to maintain the completeness, accuracy, resolution, traceability, timeliness, and logical consistency of the data.

GM1 Article 5(7) U-space service providers

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CIS DEGRADATION

It is recommended that the single CIS provider inform USSPs about CIS degradation within 30 seconds.