CAT.GEN.MPA.100 Crew responsibilities
Regulation (EU) 2021/2237
(a) The crew member shall be responsible for the proper execution of his or her duties that are:
(1) related to the safety of the aircraft and its occupants; and
(2) specified in the instructions and procedures in the operations manual.
(b) The crew member shall:
(1) report to the commander any fault, failure, malfunction or defect which the crew member believes may affect the airworthiness or safe operation of the aircraft including emergency systems, if not already reported by another crew member;
(2) report to the commander any incident that endangered, or could have endangered, the safety of the operation, if not already reported by another crew member;
(3) comply with the relevant requirements of the operator’s occurrence reporting schemes;
(4) comply with all flight and duty time limitations (FTL) and rest requirements applicable to their activities;
(5) when undertaking duties for more than one operator:
(i) maintain his or her individual records regarding flight and duty times and rest periods as referred to in the applicable FTL requirements;
(ii) provide each operator with the data needed to schedule activities in accordance with the applicable FTL requirements; and
(iii) provide each operator with the data needed regarding operations on more than one type or variant.
(c) The crew member shall not perform duties on an aircraft:
(1) when under the influence of psychoactive substances or when unfit due to injury, fatigue, medication, sickness or other similar causes;
(2) until a reasonable time period has elapsed after deep water diving or following blood donation;
(3) if applicable medical requirements are not fulfilled;
(4) if he or she is in any doubt of being able to accomplish his or her assigned duties; or
(5) if he or she knows or suspects that he or she is suffering from fatigue as referred to in Annex V, point 7.5, to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 or feels otherwise unfit, to the extent that the flight may be endangered.
COPIES OF REPORTS
Where a written report is required, a copy of the report should be communicated to the commander concerned unless the terms of the operator’s reporting schemes prevent this.
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
The operator should issue instructions concerning the consumption of alcohol by crew members. The instructions should be not less restrictive than the following:
(a) no alcohol should be consumed less than 8 hours prior to the specified reporting time for a flight duty period or the commencement of standby;
(b) the blood alcohol level should not exceed the lower of the national requirements or 0.2 per thousand at the start of a flight duty period;
(c) no alcohol should be consumed during the flight duty period or whilst on standby.
ELAPSED TIME BEFORE RETURNING TO FLYING DUTY
24 hours is a suitable minimum length of time to allow after normal blood donation or normal recreational (sport) diving before returning to flying duties. This should be considered by operators when determining a reasonable time period for the guidance of crew members.
Information on the effects of medication, drugs, other treatments and alcohol can be found in Annex IV (Part-MED) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/201172 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 311, 25.11.2011, p. 1)..
CAT.GEN.MPA.105 Responsibilities of the commander
Regulation (EU) 2019/1384
(a) The commander, in addition to complying with CAT.GEN.MPA.100, shall:
(1) be responsible for the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board, as soon as the commander arrives on board the aircraft, until the commander leaves the aircraft at the end of the flight;
(2) be responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft:
(i) for aeroplanes, from the moment the aeroplane is first ready to move for the purpose of taxiing prior to take-off, until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s) used as primary propulsion unit(s) is(are) shut down;
(ii) for helicopters, when the rotors are turning;
(3) have authority to give all commands and take any appropriate actions for the purpose of securing the safety of the aircraft and of persons and/or property carried therein in accordance with 7.c of Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008;
(4) have authority to disembark any person, or any part of the cargo, that may represent a potential hazard to the safety of the aircraft or its occupants;
(5) not allow a person to be carried in the aircraft who appears to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs to the extent that the safety of the aircraft or its occupants is likely to be endangered;
(6) have the right to refuse transportation of inadmissible passengers, deportees or persons in custody if their carriage increases the risk to the safety of the aircraft or its occupants;
(7) ensure that all passengers are briefed on the location of emergency exits and the location and use of relevant safety and emergency equipment;
(8) ensure that all operational procedures and checklists are complied with in accordance with the operations manual;
(9) not permit any crew member to perform any activity during critical phases of flight, except duties required for the safe operation of the aircraft;
(10) ensure that:
(i) flight recorders are not disabled or switched off during flight;
(ii) in the event of an occurrence other than an accident or a serious incident that shall be reported according to ORO.GEN.160(a), flight recorders' recordings are not intentionally erased; and
(iii) in the event of an accident or a serious incident, or if preservation of recordings of flight recorders is directed by the investigating authority:
(A) flight recorders’ recordings are not intentionally erased;
(B) flight recorders are deactivated immediately after the flight is completed; and
(C) precautionary measures to preserve the recordings of flight recorders are taken before leaving the flight crew compartment;
(11) decide on acceptance of the aircraft with unserviceabilities in accordance with the configuration deviation list (CDL) or the minimum equipment list (MEL);
(12) ensure that the pre-flight inspection has been carried out in accordance with the requirements of Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014;
(13) be satisfied that relevant emergency equipment remains easily accessible for immediate use;
(14) record, at the termination of the flight, utilisation data and all known or suspected defects of the aircraft in the aircraft technical log or journey log of the aircraft to ensure continued flight safety.
(b) The commander, or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated, shall, in an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action, take any action he/she considers necessary under the circumstances in accordance with 7.d of Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. In such cases he/she may deviate from rules, operational procedures and methods in the interest of safety.
(c) Whenever an aircraft in flight has manoeuvred in response to an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) resolution advisory (RA), the commander shall submit an ACAS report to the competent authority.
(d) Bird hazards and strikes:
(1) Whenever a potential bird hazard is observed, the commander shall inform the air traffic service (ATS) unit as soon as flight crew workload allows.
(2) Whenever an aircraft for which the commander is responsible suffers a bird strike that results in significant damage to the aircraft or the loss or malfunction of any essential service, the commander shall submit a written bird strike report after landing to the competent authority.
(e) The commander shall, as soon as possible, report to the appropriate air traffic services (ATS) unit any hazardous weather or flight conditions encountered that are likely to affect the safety of other aircraft.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE SEVERITY OF AN OCCURRENCE BY THE COMMANDER
The definitions of an accident and a serious incident as well as examples thereof can be found in Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
CAT.GEN.MPA.110 Authority of the commander
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that all persons carried in the aircraft obey all lawful commands given by the commander for the purpose of securing the safety of the aircraft and of persons or property carried therein.
CAT.GEN.MPA.115 Personnel or crew members other than cabin crew in the passenger compartment
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The operator shall ensure that personnel or crew members, other than operating cabin crew members, carrying out their duties in the passenger compartment of an aircraft:
(a) are not confused by the passengers with operating cabin crew members;
(b) do not occupy required cabin crew assigned stations;
(c) do not impede operating cabin crew members in their duties.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.115(a) Personnel or crew members other than cabin crew in the passenger compartment
MEASURES TO PREVENT CONFUSION BY PASSENGERS
If personnel or crew members other than operating cabin crew members carry out duties in a passenger compartment, the operator should ensure that they do not perform tasks or wear a uniform in such a way that might identify them as members of the operating cabin crew.
POSITIONING CABIN CREW MEMBERS
To prevent confusion by passengers and undue expectations in case of emergency, positioning cabin crew members should not wear, or should at least make invisible to passengers, parts of the operator’s cabin crew uniform, such as main jacket or crew signs or badges, that might identify them as members of the operating cabin crew.
CAT.GEN.MPA.120 Common language
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The operator shall ensure that all crew members can communicate with each other in a common language.
CAT.GEN.MPA.124 Taxiing of aircraft
Regulation (EU) 2015/140
The operator shall establish procedures for taxiing of aircraft in order to ensure safe operation and in order to enhance runway safety.
PROCEDURES FOR TAXIING
Procedures for taxiing should include at least the following:
(a) application of the sterile flight crew compartment procedures;
(b) use of standard radio-telephony (RTF) phraseology;
(c) use of lights;
(d) measures to enhance the situational awareness of the minimum required flight crew members. The following list of typical items should be adapted by the operator to take into account its operational environment:
(1) each flight crew member should have the necessary aerodrome layout charts available;
(2) the pilot taxiing the aircraft should announce in advance his/her intentions to the pilot monitoring;
(3) all taxi clearances should be heard and should be understood by each flight crew member;
(4) all taxi clearances should be cross-checked against the aerodrome chart and aerodrome surface markings, signs, and lights;
(5) an aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area should stop and hold at all lighted stop bars, and may proceed further when an explicit clearance to enter or cross the runway has been issued by the aerodrome control tower, and when the stop bar lights are switched off;
(6) if the pilot taxiing the aircraft is unsure of his/her position, he/she should stop the aircraft and contact air traffic control;
(7) the pilot monitoring should monitor the taxi progress and adherence to the clearances, and should assist the pilot taxiing;
(8) any action which may disturb the flight crew from the taxi activity should be avoided or done with the parking brake set (e.g. announcements by public address);
(e) subparagraphs (d)(2) and (d)(7) are not applicable to single-pilot operations.
CAT.GEN.MPA.125 Taxiing of aeroplanes
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The operator shall ensure that an aeroplane is only taxied on the movement area of an aerodrome if the person at the controls:
(a) is an appropriately qualified pilot; or
(b) has been designated by the operator and:
(1) is trained to taxi the aircraft;
(2) is trained to use the radio telephone;
(3) has received instruction in respect of aerodrome layout, routes, signs, marking, lights, air traffic control (ATC) signals and instructions, phraseology and procedures;
(4) is able to conform to the operational standards required for safe aeroplane movement at the aerodrome.
SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE
The following skills and knowledge may be assessed to check if a person can be authorised by the operator to taxi an aeroplane:
(a) positioning of the aeroplane to ensure safety when starting engine;
(b) getting ATIS reports and taxi clearance, where applicable;
(c) interpretation of airfield markings/lights/signals/indicators;
(d) interpretation of marshalling signals, where applicable;
(e) identification of suitable parking area;
(f) maintaining lookout and right-of-way rules and complying with air traffic control (ATC) or marshalling instructions, when applicable;
(g) avoidance of adverse effect of propeller slipstream or jet wash on other aeroplanes, aerodrome facilities and personnel;
(h) inspection of taxi path when surface conditions are obscured;
(i) communication with others when controlling an aeroplane on the ground;
(j) interpretation of operational instructions;
(k) reporting of any problem that may occur while taxiing an aeroplane; and
(l) adapting the taxi speed in accordance with prevailing aerodrome, traffic, surface and weather conditions.
SAFETY-CRITICAL ACTIVITY
(a) Taxiing should be treated as a safety-critical activity due to the risks related to the movement of the aeroplane and the potential for a catastrophic event on the ground.
(b) Taxiing is a high-workload phase of flight that requires the full attention of the flight crew.
CAT.GEN.MPA.130 Rotor engagement — helicopters
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
A helicopter rotor shall only be turned under power for the purpose of flight with a qualified pilot at the controls.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.130 Rotor engagement — helicopters
INTENT OF THE RULE
(a) The following two situations where it is allowed to turn the rotor under power should be distinguished:
(1) for the purpose of flight, this is described in the Implementing Rule;
(2) for maintenance purposes.
(b) Rotor engagement for the purpose of flight: the pilot should not leave the control when the rotors are turning. For example, the pilot is not allowed to get out of the aircraft in order to welcome passengers and adjust their seat belts with the rotors turning.
(c) Rotor engagement for the purpose of maintenance: the Implementing Rule, however, does not prevent ground runs being conducted by qualified personnel other than pilots for maintenance purposes.
The following conditions should be applied:
(1) the operator should ensure that the qualification of personnel, other than pilots, who are authorised to conduct maintenance runs is described in the appropriate manual;
(2) ground runs should not include taxiing the helicopter;
(3) there should be no passengers on board; and
(4) maintenance runs should not include collective increase or autopilot engagement (due to the risk of ground resonance).
CAT.GEN.MPA.135 Admission to the flight crew compartment
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
(a) The operator shall ensure that no person, other than a flight crew member assigned to a flight, is admitted to, or carried in, the flight crew compartment unless that person is:
(1) an operating crew member;
(2) a representative of the competent or inspecting authority, if required to be there for the performance of his/her official duties; or
(3) permitted by and carried in accordance with instructions contained in the operations manual.
(b) The commander shall ensure that:
(1) admission to the flight crew compartment does not cause distraction or interference with the operation of the flight; and
(2) all persons carried in the flight crew compartment are made familiar with the relevant safety procedures.
(c) The commander shall make the final decision regarding the admission to the flight crew compartment.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SINGLE-PILOT OPERATIONS UNDER VFR BY DAY
Where an aircraft is used in a single-pilot operation under visual flight rules (VFR) by day, but has more than one pilot station, the instructions of the operator may permit passengers to be carried in the unoccupied pilot seat(s), provided that the commander is satisfied that:
(a) it will not cause distraction or interference with the operation of the flight; and
(b) the passenger occupying a pilot seat is familiar with the relevant restrictions and safety procedures.
CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The operator shall not permit any person to use a portable electronic device (PED) on board an aircraft that could adversely affect the performance of the aircraft’s systems and equipment, and shall take all reasonable measures to prevent such use.
TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE USE OF PEDS
(a) Scope
This AMC describes the technical prerequisites under which any kind of portable electronic device (PED) may be used on board the aircraft without adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft’s systems and equipment.
(b) Prerequisites concerning the aircraft configuration
(1) Before an operator may permit the use of any kind of PED on-board, it should ensure that PEDs have no impact on the safe operation of the aircraft. The operator should demonstrate that PEDs do not interfere with on-board electronic systems and equipment, especially with the aircraft’s navigation and communication systems.
(2) The assessment of PED tolerance may be tailored to the different aircraft zones for which the use of PEDs is considered, i.e. may address separately:
(i) the passenger compartment;
(ii) the flight crew compartment; and
(iii) areas not accessible during the flight.
(c) Scenarios for permitting the use of PEDs
(1) Possible scenarios, under which the operator may permit the use of PEDs, should be as documented in Table 1. The scenarios in Table 1 are listed in a descending order with the least permitting scenario at the bottom.
(2) Restrictions arising from the corresponding aircraft certification, as documented in the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or equivalent document(s), should stay in force. They may be linked to different aircraft zones, or to particular transmitting technologies covered.
(3) For Scenarios Nos. 3 to 8 in Table 1 the use of C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices may be further expanded, when the EMI assessment has demonstrated that there is no impact on safety as follows:
(i) for C-PEDs by using the method described in (d)(2); and
(ii) for cargo tracking devices by using the method described in (d)(3).
Table 1 – Scenarios for permitting the use of PEDs by the operator
|
No. |
Technical condition |
Non-intentional transmitters |
T-PEDs |
|
1 |
The aircraft is certified as T-PED tolerant, i.e. it has been demonstrated during the aircraft certification process that front door and back door coupling have no impact on the safe operation of the aircraft |
All phases of flight |
All phases of flight |
|
2 |
A complete electromagnetic interference (EMI) assessment for all technologies, using the method described in (d)(1), has been performed and has demonstrated the T-PED tolerance |
All phases of flight |
All phases of flight |
|
3 |
The aircraft is certified for the use of T-PEDs using particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or mobile phone) |
All phases of flight |
All phases of flight, restricted to those particular technologies |
|
4 |
The EMI assessment, using the method described in (d)(1), has demonstrated that: (a) the front door coupling has no impact on safety; and (b) the back door coupling has no impact on safety when using particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or mobile phone) |
All phases of flight |
All phases of flight, restricted to those particular technologies |
|
5 |
The EMI assessment, using the method described in (d)(1)(i), has demonstrated that the front door coupling has no impact on safety caused by non-intentional transmitters |
All phases of flight |
Not permitted |
|
6 |
The EMI assessment, using the method described in (d)(1)(ii), has demonstrated that the back door coupling has no impact on safety when using particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or mobile phone) |
All phases of flight - except low visibility approach operation |
All phases of flight - except low visibility approach operation, restricted to those particular technologies |
|
7 |
An EMI assessment has not been performed |
All phases of flight - except low visibility approach operation |
Not permitted |
|
8 |
Notwithstanding Scenarios Nos. 3 to 7 |
(a) before taxi-out; (b) during taxi-in after the end of landing roll; and (c) the commander may permit the use during prolonged departure delays, provided that sufficient time is available to check the passenger compartment before the flight proceeds |
|
(d) Demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility
(1) EMI assessment at aircraft level
The means to demonstrate that the radio frequency (RF) emissions (intentional or non-intentional) are tolerated by aircraft systems should be as follows:
(i) to address front door coupling susceptibility for any kind of PEDs:
(A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130A / RTCA DO-363 ‘Guidance for the Development of Portable Electronic Devices (PED) Tolerance for Civil Aircraft’, Section 5; or
(B) EUROCAE, ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, ED-239 / RTCA DO-307A, Section 4;
The use of RTCA, ‘Guidance on Allowing Transmitting Portable Electronic Devices (T PEDs) on Aircraft’, DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 5C; or RTCA DO-307 ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 4 may be acceptable.
(ii) to address back door coupling susceptibility for T-PEDs:
(A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs) on board aircraft’, ED-130A/RTCA DO-363, Section 6; or
(B) EUROCAE, ‘Aircraft Design and Certification for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance’, ED-239 / RTCA DO-307A, Section 3; or
(C) The use of EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft’, ED-130, Annex 6; or RTCA DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 6D; or RTCA DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 3 may be acceptable.
(2) Alternative EMI assessment of controlled PEDs (C-PEDs)
(i) To address front door coupling:
(A) C-PEDs should comply with the levels as defined by:
(a) EUROCAE/RTCA, ‘Environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne equipment’, ED-14D/DO-160D (or later revisions), Section 21, Category M, for operation in the passenger compartment and the flight crew compartment; and
(b) EUROCAE ED-14D/RTCA DO-160D (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H, for operation in areas not accessible during the flight.
(B) If the C-PEDs are electronic flight bags used in the flight crew compartment and if the DO-160 testing described in (A) identifies inadequate margins for interference or has not been performed, it is necessary to test the C-PED in each aircraft model in which it will be operated. The C-PED should be tested in operation on the aircraft to show that no interference with aircraft equipment occurs. Credit may be given to other aircraft that are similarly equipped (meaning in particular that they contain the same avionics equipment) of the same make and model as the one tested.
(ii) To address back door coupling susceptibility for C-PEDs with transmitting capabilities, the EMI assessment described in (1)(ii) should be performed.
(3) Alternative EMI assessment of cargo tracking devices
In cases where a transmitting function is automatically deactivated in a cargo tracking device that is a T-PED, the unit should be qualified for safe operation on board the aircraft. One of the following methods should be considered to be acceptable as evidence of its safe operation:
(i) A type-specific safety assessment, including failure mode and effects analysis, has been performed at the aircraft level. The main purpose of the assessment should be to determine the hazards and to demonstrate that the design assurance levels of the relevant hardware and software components of the cargo tracking device are adequate.
(ii) The high intensity radiated field (HIRF) certification of the aircraft has been performed, i.e. the aircraft type has been certified after 1987 and meets the appropriate special condition. In such a case, the operator should ensure that the following conditions are met:
(A) The tracking device:
(a) features an automated and prolonged radio suspension in flight using multiple modes of redundancy; and
(b) has been verified in the aircraft environment to ensure deactivation of the transmitting function in flight.
(B) The emissions from the tracking device comply with the levels as defined by EUROCAE ED-14E/RTCA DO-160E (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H.
(C) The operator should ensure that the following documents are provided by the tracking device manufacturer:
(a) a declaration from the manufacturer identifying the device and confirming that the device and its deactivation function comply with the requirement (A) and (B) above;
(b) a declaration showing that robust design and production controls are in place during the manufacturing of the tracking device;
(c) a declaration of conformity and technical documentation showing compliance with the European Norms (EN), regulating the transmitter characteristics of the tracking device or its transmission module; and
(d) the EMI assessment report documenting compliance with point (B) above.
(iii) The tracking device interference levels during transmission are below those considered acceptable for the specific aircraft environment.
(e) Operational conditions of C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices
The operator should ensure that C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices are maintained in good and safe condition, having in mind that:
(1) damage may modify their emissions characteristics; and
(2) damage to the battery may create a fire hazard.
(f) Batteries in C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices
Lithium-type batteries in C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices should meet:
(1) United Nations (UN) Transportation Regulations, ‘Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods - manual of tests and criteria’, UN ST/SG/AC.10/11; and
(2) one of the following standards:
(i) Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Lithium batteries’, UL 1642;
(ii) Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Household and commercial batteries’, UL 2054;
(iii) Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Information technology equipment – safety’, UL 60950-1;
(iv) International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), ‘Secondary cells and batteries containing alkaline or other non-acid electrolytes - safety requirements for portable sealed secondary cells, and for batteries made from them, for use in portable applications’, IEC 62133;
(v) RTCA, ‘Minimum operational performance standards for rechargeable lithium battery systems’, DO-311. RTCA DO-311 may be used to address concerns regarding overcharging, over-discharging, and the flammability of cell components. The standard is intended to test permanently installed equipment; however, these tests are applicable and sufficient to test electronic flight bags rechargeable lithium-type batteries; or
(vi) European Technical Standard Order (ETSO), ‘Non-rechargeable lithium cells and batteries’, ETSO C142a.
PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF PEDS
(a) Scope
This AMC describes the procedures under which any kind of portable electronic device (PED) may be used on board the aircraft without adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft’s systems and equipment. This AMC addresses the operation of PEDs in the different aircraft zones — passenger compartment, flight compartment, and areas inaccessible during the flight.
(b) Prerequisites
Before permitting the use of any kind of PEDs the operator should ensure compliance with (c) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140.
(c) Hazard identification and risk assessment
The operator should identify the safety hazards and manage the associated risks following the management system implemented in accordance with ORO.GEN.200. The risk assessment should include hazards associated with:
(1) PEDs in different aircraft zones;
(2) PED use during various phases of flight;
(3) PED use during turbulence;
(4) improperly stowed PEDs;
(5) impeded or slowed evacuations;
(6) passenger non-compliance, e.g. not deactivating transmitting functions, not switching off PEDs or not stowing PEDs properly;
(7) disruptive passengers; and
(8) battery fire.
(d) Use of PEDs in the passenger compartment
(1) Procedures and training
If an operator permits passengers to use PEDs on board its aircraft, procedures should be in place to control their use. These procedures should include provisions for passenger briefing, passenger handling and for the stowage of PEDs. The operator should ensure that all crew members and ground personnel are trained to enforce possible restrictions concerning the use of PEDs, in line with these procedures.
(2) Provisions for use
(i) The use of PEDs in the passenger compartment may be granted under the responsibility of the operator, i.e. the operator decides which PED may be used during which phases of the flight.
(ii) Notwithstanding (b), medical equipment necessary to support physiological functions may be used at all times and does not need to be switched-off.
(3) Stowage, passenger information and passenger briefing of PEDs
(i) In accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.160 the operator should establish procedures concerning the stowage of PEDs. The operator should:
(A) identify the phases of flight in which PEDs are to be stowed; and
(B) determine suitable stowage locations, taking into account the PEDs’ size and weight.
(ii) The operator should provide general information on the use of PEDs to the passengers before the flight. This information should specify at least:
(A) which PEDs can be used during which phases of the flight;
(B) when and where PEDs are to be stowed; and
(C) that the instructions of the crew are to be followed at all times.
(iii) In accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.170, the use of PEDs should be part of the passenger briefings. The operator should remind passengers to pay attention and to avoid distraction during such briefings.
(4) In-seat electrical power supplies
Where in-seat electrical power supplies are available for passenger use, the following should apply:
(i) information giving safety instructions should be provided to the passengers;
(ii) PEDs should be disconnected from any in-seat electrical power supply during taxiing, take-off, approach, landing, and during abnormal or emergency conditions; and
(iii) flight crew, cabin crew and technical crew should be aware of the proper means to switch-off in-seat power supplies used for PEDs.
(5) Operator’s safety measures during boarding and any phase of flight
(i) Appropriate coordination between flight crew, cabin crew and technical crew should be established to deal with interference or other safety problems associated with PEDs.
(ii) Suspect equipment should be switched off.
(iii) Particular attention should be given to passenger misuse of equipment.
(iv) Thermal runaways of batteries, in particular lithium batteries, and potential resulting fire, should be handled properly.
(v) The commander may, for any reason and during any phase of flight, require deactivation and stowage of PEDs.
(vi) When the operator restricts the use of PEDs, consideration should be given to handle special requests to operate a T-PED during any phase of the flight for specific reasons (e.g. for security measures).
(6) Reporting
Occurrences of suspected or confirmed interference should be reported to the competent authority. Where possible, to assist follow-up and technical investigation, reports should describe the suspected device, identify the brand name and model number, its location in the aircraft at the time of the occurrence, interference symptoms, the device user’s contact details and the results of actions taken by the crew.
(e) Use of PEDs in the flight crew compartment
In the flight crew compartment the operator may permit the use of PEDs, e.g. to assist the flight crew in their duties, when procedures are in place to ensure the following:
(1) The conditions for the use of PEDs in-flight are specified in the operations manual.
(2) The PEDs do not pose a loose item risk or other hazard.
(3) These provisions should not preclude use of a T-PED (specifically a mobile phone) by the flight crew to deal with an emergency. However, reliance should not be predicated on a T-PED for this purpose.
(f) PEDs not accessible during the flight
PEDs should be switched off, when not accessible for deactivation during flight. This should apply especially to PEDs contained in baggage or transported as part of the cargo. The operator may permit deviation for PEDs for which safe operation has been demonstrated in accordance with AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140. Other precautions, such as transporting in shielded metal boxes, may also be used to mitigate associated risks.
DEFINITIONS
(a) Categories of PEDs
PEDs include the following two categories:
(1) Non-intentional transmitters can non-intentionally radiate RF transmissions, sometimes referred to as spurious emissions. This category includes, but is not limited to, calculators, cameras, radio receivers, audio and video players, electronic games and toys; when these devices are not equipped with a transmitting function.
(2) Intentional transmitters radiate RF transmissions on specific frequencies as part of their intended function. In addition, they may radiate non-intentional transmissions like any PED. The term ‘transmitting PED’ (T-PED) is used to identify the transmitting capability of the PED. Intentional transmitters are transmitting devices such as RF-based remote control equipment, which may include some toys, two-way radios (sometimes referred to as ‘private mobile radio’), mobile phones of any type, satellite phones, computers with mobile phone data connection, wireless local area network (WLAN) or Bluetooth capability. After deactivation of the transmitting capability, e.g. by activating the so-called ‘flight mode’ or ‘flight safety mode’, the T-PED remains a PED having non-intentional emissions.
(b) Cargo tracking device
A cargo tracking device is a PED attached to or included in airfreight (e.g. in or on containers, pallets, parcels or baggage). Cargo tracking devices can be assigned to the category of non-intentional transmitters or T-PEDs. If the device is a T-PED, it complies with the European Norms (EN) for transmissions.
(c) Definition of the switched-off status
Many PEDs are not completely disconnected from the internal power source when switched off. The switching function may leave some remaining functionality e.g. data storage, timer, clock, etc. These devices can be considered switched off when in the deactivated status. The same applies to devices having no transmitting capability and are operated by coin cells without further deactivation capability, e.g. wrist watches.
(d) Electromagnetic interference (EMI)
The two classes of EMI to be addressed can be described as follows:
(1) Front door coupling is the possible disturbance to an aircraft system as received by the antenna of the system and mainly in the frequency band used by the system. Any PED internal oscillation has the potential to radiate low level signals in the aviation frequency bands. Through this disturbance especially the instrument landing system (ILS) and the VHF omni range (VOR) navigation system may indicate erroneous information.
(2) Back door coupling is the possible disturbance of aircraft systems by electromagnetic fields generated by transmitters at a level which could exceed on short distance (i.e. within the aircraft) the electromagnetic field level used for the aircraft system certification. This disturbance may then lead to system malfunction.
CREW REST COMPARTMENT, NAVIGATION, TEST ENTITIES AND FIRE CAUSED BY PEDS
(a) When the aircraft is equipped with a crew rest compartment, it is considered being part of the passenger compartment.
(b) Front door coupling may influence the VOR navigation system. Therefore, the flight crew monitors other navigation sensors to detect potential disturbances by PEDs, especially during low visibility departure operation based on VOR guidance.
(c) Specific equipment, knowledge and experience are required, when the industry standards for evaluating technical prerequisites for the use of PEDs are applied. In order to ensure conformity with the industry standards, the operator is encouraged to cooperate with an appropriately qualified and experienced entity, as necessary. For this entity an aviation background is not required, but is considered to be beneficial.
(d) Guidance to follow in case of fire caused by PEDs is provided by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ‘Emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods’, ICAO Doc 9481-AN/928.
EVALUATION OF CARGO TRACKING DEVICES
(a) Safety assessment
Further guidance on performing a safety assessment can be found in:
(1) EASA, ‘Certification specifications and acceptable means of compliance for large aeroplanes’, CS-25, Book 2, AMC-Subpart F, AMC 25.1309;
(2) EUROCAE/SAE, ‘Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems’, ED-79/ARP 4754 (or later revisions); and
(3) SAE, ‘Guidelines and methods for conducting the safety assessment process on civil airborne systems and equipment’, ARP 4761 (or later revisions).
(b) HIRF certification
The type certificate data sheet (TCDS), available on the EASA website for each aircraft model having EASA certification, lists whether the HIRF certification has been performed through a special condition. The operator may contact the type certification holder to gain the necessary information.
(c) Multiple modes of redundancy
Multiple modes of redundancy means that the device is designed with a minimum of two independent means to turn it off completely, turn off the cellular or mobile functions, or a combination of both when airborne. These independent methods should use different sources to identify that the aircraft is in flight, for example, a cargo-tracking device may be designed to sense rapid altitude changes and acceleration to determine when to turn off cellular transmissions. Redundant sources of the same information, such as two vertical accelerometers, should not be considered independent.
CAT.GEN.MPA.141 Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
Regulation (EU) 2018/1975
(a) Where an EFB is used on board an aircraft, the operator shall ensure that it does not adversely affect the performance of the aircraft systems or equipment, or the ability of the flight crew member to operate the aircraft.
(b) The operator shall not use a type B EFB application unless it is approved in accordance with Subpart M of Annex V (Part-SPA).
DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of EFB use, the following definitions apply:
(a) Aircraft administrative communications (AAC):
AAC are defined by ICAO as non-safety communications that are used by aeronautical operating agencies and are related to the business aspects of operating their flights and transport services. These communications are used for a variety of purposes, such as flight and ground transportation, bookings, deployment of crew, and aircraft or any other logistical purposes that maintain or enhance the efficiency of overall flight operations. AAC data links receive/transmit information that includes, but is not limited to, the support of EFB applications.
(b) Aeronautical operational control (AOC):
AOC communications are defined by ICAO as communications required for the exercise of authority over the initiation, continuation, diversion or termination of flight for safety, regularity, and efficiency reasons.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Further related information on EFB hardware and EFB applications can be found in the following documents:
(a) EASA AMC 20-25, Airworthiness considerations for EFBs;
(b) EASA CS-25, Book 2, AMC Subpart F, AMC 25.1309, System Design and Analysis;
(c) EUROCAE ED-14D/DO-160D (or later revisions) Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment;
(d) EASA ETSO-C165A, Electronic Map Systems for Graphical Depiction of Aircraft Position;
(e) FAA AC 120-76(C), Authorization for an Electronic Flight Bag Program;
(f) FAA AC 120-78, Electronic Signatures, Electronic Recordkeeping, and Electronic Manuals;
(g) ICAO Doc 10020, Manual of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs).
HARDWARE
Before using a portable EFB, the following considerations should be assessed by the operator:
(a) General
A portable EFB is a portable electronic device (PED) and may host type A and/or type B EFB applications. In addition, it may host miscellaneous software applications. Portable EFBs are controlled PEDs (C-PEDs).
A portable EFB should be capable of operation autonomously inside and outside the aircraft.
The mass, dimensions, shape, and position of the portable EFB should not compromise flight safety.
The power supply of a portable EFB may be provided by aircraft sources through an adequate power source.
If mounted or stowed, a portable EFB should be easily removable from its mounting device/viewable stowage device or attached to it, without the use of tools by the flight crew. Any locking devices used to prevent theft should be unlocked during flight.
A portable EFB may be part of a system that contains EFB-installed resources which are part of the certified aircraft configuration. The intended functions of the EFB-installed components may be to mount the EFB onto the aircraft and/or connect it to other systems.
Portable EFBs may be used in all phases of the flight if secured to a certified mount or securely attached to a viewable stowage device in a manner that allows its use.
Portable EFBs that do not meet the above characteristics should be stowed during critical phases of the flight.
However, this does not preclude a flight crew from using a portable EFB during restricted portions of the critical phases of flight to complete a task related to the safety of the flight on the condition that the device is continuously handheld and used only during a short period of time. When the task is completed, the device should be stowed again.
Any EFB component that is either not accessible in the flight crew compartment by the flight crew members or not removable by the flight crew members should be installed as ‘certified equipment’ covered by a type certificate (TC), a change to a TC or a supplemental (S)TC.
(b) Characteristics and placement of the EFB display
For a portable EFB, the considerations on the location of the display proposed below should apply to the proposed location of the display when the EFB is in use.
The EFB display and any other elements of the EFB system should be placed in such a way that they do not unduly impair the flight crew’s external view during any of the phases of the flight. Equally, they should not impair the view of or access to any flight-crew-compartment control or instrument.
The location of the display unit and the other EFB system elements should be assessed for their possible impact on egress requirements.
When the EFB is in use (intended to be viewed or controlled), its display should be within 90 degrees on either side of each flight crew member’s line of sight.
Glare and reflection on the EFB display should not interfere with the normal duties of the flight crew.
(c) Power source
If the aircraft is equipped with electrical power outlet(s) in the flight crew compartment, the operator should ensure that their certified characteristics are compatible with the intended use of the EFB system. The powering or charging of the EFB system should be compatible with the electrical characteristics of the power supplied by the outlets in terms of power consumption, voltage, frequency, etc., not to impair the EFB system or other aircraft systems.
(d) EFB data connectivity
Portable EFBs may have data connectivity to aircraft systems, either wired or wireless, provided that the connections (hardware and software for data connection provisions) and adequate interface protection devices are incorporated into the aircraft type design.
A portable EFB may receive any data from aircraft systems, but data transmission from EFBs should be limited to aircraft systems that have been certified for this intended purpose (refer to AMC 20-25 for more details).
(e) External connecting cables (to avionics and/or power sources)
When external cables are used to connect a portable EFB to the aircraft systems and/or to a power source, the following should apply:
(1) cables should not hang loosely in a way that compromises task performance and safety; flight crew members should be able to easily secure the cables out of the way during operations (e.g. by using cable tether straps); and
(2) cables should be of sufficient length so that they do not obstruct the use of any movable device (e.g. flight controls, switches, seats, windows) in the flight crew compartment.
(f) Electromagnetic interference (EMI) demonstrations
See paragraph (b), (c) and (d) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140.
The EMI demonstration should cover any cable connected to the EFB as well as non-certified power chargers.
(g) Batteries
See paragraph (f) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140.
(h) Viewable stowage
The evaluation of the viewable stowage should be performed for a given location in the flight deck. This location should be documented and this information should be part of the EFB policy.
The viewable stowage should not be positioned in such a way that it creates significant obstruction to the flight crew members’ view or hinders physical access to aircraft controls and/or displays and/or aircraft safety equipment, flight crew ingress or egress. The viewable stowage as positioned should allow the flight crew to retain a sufficiently extensive, clear, and undistorted view, to enable them to safely perform any manoeuvres within the operating limitations of the aircraft, including taxiing, take-off, approach, and landing. The design of the viewable stowage should allow the user easy access to any item of the EFB system, even if stowed, and notably to the EFB controls and a clear view of the EFB display while in use. The following design practices should be considered:
(1) The viewable stowage and associated mechanisms should not impede the flight crew members in the performance of any task (whether normal, abnormal, or emergency) associated with operating any aircraft system;
(2) When the viewable stowage is used to secure an EFB display, it should be able to be easily locked in position. If necessary, the selection of positions should be adjustable enough to accommodate a range of flight crew member preferences. In addition, the range of available movement should accommodate the expected range of users’ physical abilities (i.e. anthropometric constraints). Locking mechanisms should be of a low-wear type that will minimise slippage even after extended periods of normal use;
(3) The viewable stowage should be designed and installed so that it will sustain all foreseeable conditions relative to the flight environment (e.g. severe turbulence, hard landings) while retaining its structural integrity and without becoming detached. The use of restraints of the device should be considered where appropriate;
(4) A provision should be available to secure or lock the device in a position out of the way of flight crew operations when not in use. When stowed, the device and its securing mechanism should not intrude into the flight crew compartment space to the extent that they cause either visual or physical obstruction of flight controls/displays and/or ingress/egress routes;
(5) Possible mechanical interference issues of the viewable stowage, either on the side panel (side stick controller), or on the control yoke, in terms of full and free movement under all operating conditions and non-interference with buckles, etc., should be prevented;
(6) Adequate means should be provided (e.g. hardware or software) to shut down the portable EFB when its controls are not accessible by the flight crew members when strapped in the normal seated position; and
(7) The viewable stowage device should be easily removable from the aircraft without the use of tools.
Some types of means for securing viewable stowage may have characteristics that degrade noticeably with ageing or due to various environmental factors. In that case, the documentation should include procedures (e.g. crew procedures, checks, or maintenance actions) to ensure that the stowage characteristics remain within acceptable limits for the proposed operations. Securing means based on vacuums (e.g. suction cups) have holding capacities that decrease with pressure. It should be demonstrated that they will still perform their intended function at operating cabin altitudes or in the event of a rapid decompression.
In addition, it should be demonstrated that if the EFB moves or is separated from its stowage, or if the viewable stowage is unsecured from the aircraft (as a result of turbulence, manoeuvring, or other action), it will not jam flight controls, damage flight deck equipment, or injure flight crew members.
The risks associated with an EFB fire should be minimised by the design and location of the viewable stowage.
VIEWABLE STOWAGE
(a) Viewable stowage devices have been involved in several reported incidents worldwide. The following issues should be considered by the operator when assessing the compliance of a viewable stowage device:
(1) The EFB or EFB stowage interfering with controls (e.g. side sticks, tillers, PTT switches, etc.);
(2) Stowage or EFB cables interfering with the opening of windows;
(3) Stowage or EFB cables interfering with the access to oxygen masks;
(4) The EFB falling during take-off, cruise, or landing, interfering with flight controls, disengaging the autopilot, or hurting the flight crew; and
(5) Suction cups detaching following a loss of pressurisation, adding to the crew’s workload.
(b) Guidance on the safety, reliability and usability of different viewable stowage solutions and on the related operating conditions can be found in a study published by the FAA73 http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/other/efb%20securing%20solutions%20environme….
With regard to the specific example of suction cups, the following means of mitigation are recommended:
(1) The suction cups and the surface to which they will be attached should be properly cleaned with isopropyl alcohol or aircraft window cleaner prior to attachment of the suction cups;
(2) Attachment surfaces should be substantially smooth and flat;
(3) Periodic cleaning and reattachment should be performed, as appropriate, for the conditions of the environment in which they are used (dusty, etc.);
(4) Suction cups should not be left attached to the aircraft windscreen for long periods of time;
(5) Suction cups should be replaced every 6 months at a minimum, and, more often in extreme environments.
APPLICATION CLASSIFICATION
An EFB software application is an application that is not part of the configuration of the certified aircraft and is installed on an EFB system to support flight operations. The classification of the applications, based on their respective safety effects, is intended to provide clear divisions between such applications and, therefore, between the assessment processes applied to each.
For the purpose of the following process, ‘malfunction or misuse’ means any failure, malfunction of the application, or design-related human errors that can reasonably be expected in service.
(a) Determination of an application type:
AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) and AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) should be used to justify a classification, provided that the application does not feature design or functional novelties that introduce new forms of crew interaction or unusual procedures.
An application may also be recognised as a type A or type B EFB application through an appropriate approval (e.g. ETSO authorisation) granted by EASA.
If an application is not listed in AMC2 or AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b), presents a high degree of novelty, or is not covered by an EASA approval (e.g. ETSO authorisation), the classification should be established using the definitions and criteria provided hereafter.
As a first step, it should be verified that the application does not belong to the following list of applications that are not eligible for classification as either type A or type B EFB applications.
Applications that:
(1) display information which is tactically used by the flight crew members to check, control or deduce the aircraft position or trajectory, either to follow the intended navigation route or to avoid adverse weather, obstacles or traffic during the flight;
(2) display information which may be directly used by the flight crew members to assess the real-time status of aircraft critical and essential systems, as a replacement for existing installed avionics, and/or to manage aircraft critical and essential systems following a failure;
(3) send data to air traffic services;
are not eligible to be classified as either type A or type B EFB applications.
Then, the next steps in this process should be to:
(1) identify any failure conditions resulting from potential losses of function or malfunction (with either detected or undetected erroneous outputs), taking into consideration any relevant factors (e.g. aircraft/system failures, operational or environmental conditions) and any established mitigation (e.g. flight crew procedures, flight crew training) that would intensify or alleviate the effects; and
(2) classify the application as follows, based on the assessment of the safety effect of each failure condition:
(i) if there is no failure condition that may have a safety effect, the application should be classified as a type A EFB application;
(ii) if one or several failure conditions with a safety effect that is limited to minor are identified, the application should be classified as type B;
(iii) if more severe failure conditions are identified, the application should not be eligible for classification as an EFB application.
Software applications with failure conditions that are classified as more severe than minor are ineligible as type A or type B EFB applications.
Notes:
— The severity of the failure conditions linked to displaying a function that already exists in the certified type design, or that is already authorised through an ETSO, and used with same concept of operation (considering the intended function but also operational means of mitigation), should be considered in the assessment of the severity of the failure condition of an application and cannot be less than the severity already assessed for this function.
— The data resulting from this process may be reused by the operators in the context of the EFB risk assessment process.
(b) Miscellaneous software applications
Miscellaneous software applications are applications that support function(s) that are not directly related to operations conducted by the flight crew on the aircraft. Miscellaneous software applications are not considered to be EFB applications for the purposes of this AMC.
Examples of miscellaneous software applications are web browsers (not used for operational purposes), email clients, picture management applications, or even applications used by ground crews (e.g. for maintenance purposes).
AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
ED Decision 2019/008/R
TYPICAL TYPE A EFB APPLICATIONS
The following EFB application should be considered type A EFB applications:
(a) browsers that display:
(1) the certificates and other documents which are required to be carried by the applicable operational regulations, including digitally created documents such as:
(i) the certificate of registration;
(ii) the certificate of airworthiness (CofA);
(iii) the noise certificate, and its English translation if applicable;
(iv) the air operator certificate (AOC);
(v) the operations specifications relevant to the aircraft type, issued with the AOC;
(vi) the third-party liability insurance certificate(s); and
(vii) the aircraft continuing airworthiness records, including the technical log (flight crew view thereof);
(2) some manuals and additional information and forms which are required to be carried by the applicable operational regulations such as:
(i) notifications of special categories of passenger (SCPs) and special loads; and
(ii) passenger and cargo manifests, if applicable; and
(3) other information within the operator’s aircraft library such as:
(i) airport diversion policy guidance, including a list of special designated airports and/or approved airports with emergency medical service (EMS) support facilities;
(ii) maintenance manuals;
(iii) emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods (see ICAO Doc 9481-AN/928);
(iv) aircraft parts manuals;
(v) service bulletins/published airworthiness directives, etc.;
(vi) current fuel prices at various airports;
(vii) trip scheduling and bid lists;
(viii) passenger information requests;
(ix) examiner and flight instructor records; and
(x) flight crew currency requirements;
(b) interactive applications for crew rest calculations in the framework of flight time limitations;
(c) interactive forms to comply with the reporting requirements of the competent authority and the operator;
(d) applications that make use of aircraft administrative communications (AAC) to collect, process and then disseminate data that has no effect on the safe operation of an aircraft.
TYPICAL TYPE B EFB APPLICATIONS
The following EFB applications should be considered type B EFB applications, provided that they do not feature design or functional novelties that introduce new forms of crew interaction or unusual procedures:
(a) Document browsers that display the manuals and additional information and forms required to be carried by regulations and that are necessary for the safe operation of the aircraft, such as:
(1) the operations manual (including the minimum equipment list (MEL) and configuration deviation list (CDL));
(2) the aircraft flight manual, or equivalent document;
(3) the operational flight plan;
(4) meteorological information with graphical interpretation;
(5) air traffic services (ATS) flight plan;
(6) notices to airmen (NOTAMs) and aeronautical information service (AIS) briefing documentation.
(b) Electronic aeronautical chart applications including en-route, area, approach, and airport surface maps.
(c) Airport moving map display (AMMD) applications.
(d) Applications that make use of the aeronautical operational control (AOC) communications to collect, process and then disseminate operational data.
(e) Aircraft performance calculation applications that use algorithmic data or that perform calculations using software algorithms to provide aircraft performance data such as:
(1) take-off, en-route, approach and landing, missed approach and other phases of flight, performance calculations providing limiting masses, distances, times and/or speeds, etc.;
(2) power settings, including reduced take-off thrust settings, etc.
(f) Mass and balance calculation applications used to establish the mass and centre of gravity of the aircraft and to determine that the load and its distribution are such that the mass and balance limits of the aircraft are not exceeded.
(g) Applications providing in-flight weather information.
TACTICAL USE
The tactical use of an EFB application is considered to be related to short-term decision-making, while strategic use is related to long-term decision-making support.
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
ED Decision 2019/008/R
HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE (HMI) FOR TYPE A EFB APPLICATIONS
An HMI assessment is not required for a type A EFB application. However, type A EFB applications should be designed in accordance with the human factor principles in order to minimise their impacts on crew workload.
CAT.GEN.MPA.145 Information on emergency and survival equipment carried
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The operator shall at all times have available for immediate communication to rescue coordination centres (RCCs) lists containing information on the emergency and survival equipment carried on board any of their aircraft.
ITEMS FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRE
The information, compiled in a list, should include, as applicable, the number, colour and type of life rafts and pyrotechnics, details of emergency medical supplies, e.g. first-aid kits, emergency medical kits, water supplies and the type and frequencies of emergency portable radio equipment.
CAT.GEN.MPA.150 Ditching — aeroplanes
Regulation (EU) 2019/1384
The operator shall only operate an aeroplane with a passenger seating configuration of more than 30 on overwater flights at a distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing, greater than 120 minutes at cruising speed, or 400 NM, whichever is less, if the aeroplane complies with the ditching provisions prescribed in the applicable certification specification or specifications.
CAT.GEN.MPA.155 Carriage of weapons of war and munitions of war
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
(a) The operator shall only transport weapons of war or munitions of war by air if an approval to do so has been granted by all States whose airspace is intended to be used for the flight.
(b) Where an approval has been granted, the operator shall ensure that weapons of war and munitions of war are:
(1) stowed in the aircraft in a place that is inaccessible to passengers during flight; and
(2) in the case of firearms, unloaded.
(c) The operator shall ensure that, before a flight begins, the commander is notified of the details and location on board the aircraft of any weapons of war and munitions of war intended to be carried.
WEAPONS OF WAR AND MUNITIONS OF WAR
(a) In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, weapons of war may be carried on board an aircraft, in a place that is not inaccessible, if the required security conditions in accordance with national laws have been fulfilled and authorisation has been given by the States involved.
(b) There is no internationally agreed definition of weapons of war and munitions of war. Some States may have defined them for their particular purposes or for national need.
(c) It is the responsibility of the operator to check, with the State(s) concerned, whether or not a particular weapon or munition is regarded as a weapon of war or munitions of war. In this context, States that may be concerned with granting approvals for the carriage of weapons of war or munitions of war are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the consignment and the State of the operator.
(d) Where weapons of war or munitions of war are also dangerous goods by definition (e.g. torpedoes, bombs, etc.), CAT.GEN.MPA.200 Transport of dangerous goods also applies.
CAT.GEN.MPA.160 Carriage of sporting weapons and ammunition
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
(a) The operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that any sporting weapons intended to be carried by air are reported to the operator.
(b) The operator accepting the carriage of sporting weapons shall ensure that they are:
(1) stowed in the aircraft in a place that is inaccessible to passengers during flight; and
(2) in the case of firearms or other weapons that can contain ammunition, unloaded.
(c) Ammunition for sporting weapons may be carried in passengers’ checked baggage, subject to certain limitations, in accordance with the technical instructions.
SPORTING WEAPONS
(a) In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 sporting weapons may be carried on board an aircraft, in a place that is not inaccessible, if the required security conditions in accordance with national laws have been fulfilled and authorisation has been given by the States involved.
(b) There is no internationally agreed definition of sporting weapons. In general, it may be any weapon that is not a weapon of war or munitions of war. Sporting weapons include hunting knives, bows and other similar articles. An antique weapon, which at one time may have been a weapon of war or munitions of war, such as a musket, may now be regarded as a sporting weapon.
(c) A firearm is any gun, rifle or pistol that fires a projectile.
(d) The following firearms are generally regarded as being sporting weapons:
(1) those designed for shooting game, birds and other animals;
(2) those used for target shooting, clay-pigeon shooting and competition shooting, providing the weapons are not those on standard issue to military forces; and
(3) airguns, dart guns, starting pistols, etc.
(e) A firearm, which is not a weapon of war or munitions of war, should be treated as a sporting weapon for the purposes of its carriage on an aircraft.
CAT.GEN.MPA.161 Carriage of sporting weapons and ammunition — alleviations
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
Notwithstanding CAT.GEN.MPA.160(b), for helicopters with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 3 175 kg or less operated by day and over routes navigated by reference to visual landmarks, a sporting weapon may be carried in a place that is accessible during flight, provided that the operator has established appropriate procedures and it is impracticable to stow it in an inaccessible stowage during flight.
SPORTING WEAPONS — HELICOPTERS
Procedures for the carriage of sporting weapons may need to be considered if the helicopter does not have a separate compartment in which the weapons can be stowed. These procedures should take into account the nature of the flight, its origin and destination, and the possibility of unlawful interference. As far as possible, the weapons should be stowed so they are not immediately accessible to the passengers, e.g. in locked boxes, in checked baggage that is stowed under other baggage or under fixed netting.
CAT.GEN.MPA.165 Method of carriage of persons
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The operator shall take all measures to ensure that no person is in any part of an aircraft in flight that is not designed for the accommodation of persons unless temporary access has been granted by the commander:
(a) for the purpose of taking action necessary for the safety of the aircraft or of any person, animal or goods therein; or
(b) to a part of the aircraft in which cargo or supplies are carried, being a part that is designed to enable a person to have access thereto while the aircraft is in flight.
CAT.GEN.MPA.170 Psychoactive substances
Regulation (EU) 2020/745
(a) The operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that no person enters or is in an aircraft when under the influence of psychoactive substances to the extent that the safety of the aircraft or its occupants is likely to be endangered.
(b) The operator shall develop and implement a policy on the prevention and detection of misuse of psychoactive substances by flight and cabin crew members and by other safety-sensitive personnel under its direct control, in order to ensure that the safety of the aircraft or its occupants is not endangered.
(c) Without prejudice to the applicable national legislation on data protection concerning testing of individuals, the operator shall develop and implement an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure for the prevention and detection of cases of misuse of psychoactive substances by its flight and cabin crew and other safety-sensitive personnel.
(d) In case of a confirmed positive test result, the operator shall inform its competent authority and the authority responsible for the personnel concerned, such as a medical assessor of the licensing authority.
POLICY ON PREVENTION OF MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
(a) The operator’s policy on prevention of misuse of psychoactive substances should ensure that flight and cabin crew, as well as other safety-sensitive personnel, are dealt with in a consistent, just and fair manner as regards the prevention and detection of misuse of psychoactive substances.
(b) The operator’s training policy on misuse of psychoactive substances should include training and/or educational material on:
(1) the effects of psychoactive substances on individuals and on flight safety;
(2) established procedures within the organisation to prevent misuse of psychoactive substances;
(3) individual responsibilities with regard to applicable legislation and policies on psychoactive substances; and
(4) assistance provided by the support programme in accordance with CAT.GEN.MPA.215.
POLICY TO PREVENT MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
The operator’s policy should ensure testing for psychoactive substances at least in the following cases:
(a) upon employment by the operator; and
(b) with due cause in the following cases:
(1) following a reasonable suspicion, and following an assessment by appropriately trained personnel; and
(2) after a serious incident or accident within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, provided that testing is possible due to the location of the serious incident or accident.
POLICY ON PREVENTION OF MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
Guidance for the development and implementation of the policy on prevention of misuse of psychoactive substances is contained in ICAO Doc 9654 ‘Manual on Prevention of Problematic Use of Substances in the Aviation Workplace’.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION PROGRAMMES
Guidance for the development and implementation of training and education programmes is contained in ICAO Doc 9654 ‘Manual on Prevention of Problematic Use of Substances in the Aviation Workplace’.
OPERATOR RANDOM TESTING PROGRAMME
Nothing should prevent an operator from implementing a random testing programme in accordance with national requirements on testing of individuals, in order to mitigate the risk that misuse of psychoactive substances remains undetected and endangers the safety of the aircraft or its occupants.
MEANING OF ‘PERSONNEL UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE OPERATOR’
(a) Personnel under the direct control of the operator means personnel that is directly employed by the operator. This excludes personnel of contractors or subcontractors of the operator unless they act as flight or cabin crew.
(b) The operator may require the contracted service provider to carry out testing of personnel as part of the contract between the operator and the contracted service provider.
POLICY TO PREVENT MISUSE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
After referral and assessment by the medical assessor of the licencing authority, the operator may consider unannounced testing as part of a periodic medical follow-up after rehabilitation and return to work.
OBJECTIVE, TRANSPARENT AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY TESTING PROCEDURE
The operator’s objective, transparent and non-discriminatory testing procedure should specify:
(a) means to ensure confidentiality and protection of data;
(b) the responsibilities of the person carrying out a test, which should be in accordance with national legislation;
(c) the timing and suitable locations for testing;
(d) that the body responsible for testing should be an independent, accredited body using standard guidelines on psychoactive substance testing in line with national legislation;
(e) the testing process, and in particular:
(1) the psychoactive substances to be tested for;
(2) the applicable national legislation and use of recognised quality standards applied to the testing methodology;
(3) initial screening and confirmation methods used; and
(4) handling of test results, which should be conducted by impartial and trained personnel, in order to ensure adherence to the procedure, to determine the true positives and to prevent false positives;
(f) applicable limits applying to psychoactive substance tests;
(g) the process to be followed in case of a confirmed positive test result; and
(h) the internal appeal process.
CAT.GEN.MPA.175 Endangering safety
Regulation (EU) 2018/1042
(a) The operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that no person recklessly, intentionally or negligently acts or omits to act so as to:
(1) endanger an aircraft or person therein; or
(2) cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.
(b) The operator shall ensure that flight crew has undergone a psychological assessment before commencing line flying in order to:
(1) identify psychological attributes and suitability of the flight crew in respect of the work environment; and
(2) reduce the likelihood of negative interference with the safe operation of the aircraft.
(c) Considering the size, nature and complexity of the activity of an operator, an operator may replace the psychological assessment referred to in point (b) with an internal assessment of the psychological attributes and suitability of flight crew.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
(a) The psychological assessment should be:
(1) appropriate to the particularity, the complexity and the challenges of the operational environment that the flight crew is likely to be exposed to, as defined by a job analysis identifying the safety-critical dimensions related to the flight crew’s function and role within the operator and should include at least the following assessment criteria:
(i) cognitive abilities;
(ii) personality traits;
(iii) operational and professional competencies; and
(iv) social competences in accordance with crew resource management principles;
(2) validated and either directly performed or overseen by a psychologist with acquired knowledge in aviation relevant to the flight crew’s operating environment and with expertise in psychological assessment, and where possible, the psychological selection of aviation personnel; and
(3) undertaken at least within the past 24 months before commencing line flying, unless the operator can demonstrate that the psychological assessment undertaken more than 24 months ago is still adequate for the risk mitigation as required by ORO.GEN.200(a)(3). Such a demonstration should be based on the tests previously performed, an updated risk assessment based on data gathered from previous operational experience and continuous human performance monitoring since the last psychological assessment.
(b) As regards the psychological assessment, the following should be documented:
(1) the procedures followed;
(2) the personnel involved;
(3) the assessment criteria and instruments used in the assessment; and
(4) the validity period.
GUIDANCE ON CONDUCTING A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
(a) A psychological assessment performed by one operator may subsequently be accepted by a different operator, provided that the latter is satisfied that the assessment has been performed in accordance with AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.175(b).
(b) A psychological assessment conducted by or on behalf of an operator should not be considered or conducted as a clinical psychological evaluation.
(c) When establishing the policy on psychological assessment of flight crews, the operator may refer to recognised industry standards and best practices in the field of pilot selection, aptitude testing and psychological assessment such as:
(1) IATA ‘Guidance Material and Best Practices for Pilot Aptitude Testing’; and
(2) national or European standards of ethical codes of conduct when conducting a psychological assessment, such as by national or European associations for (aviation) psychology.
INTERNAL ASSESSMENT FOR NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS
(a) An operator may replace the psychological assessment with an internal assessment of the psychological attributes and suitability of the flight crew, if the operator is considered to be a non-complex operator, i.e. when it has a workforce of 20 full-time equivalents (FTEs) or less, that are involved in an activity subject to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and its implementing rules.
(b) The internal assessment for non-complex operators should as far as possible apply the same principles as the psychological assessment before commencing line flying for complex operators.
CAT.GEN.MPA.180 Documents, manuals and information to be carried
Regulation (EU) 2019/1384
(a) The following documents, manuals and information shall be carried on each flight, as originals or copies unless otherwise specified:
(1) the aircraft flight manual (AFM), or equivalent document(s);
(2) the original certificate of registration;
(3) the original certificate of airworthiness (CofA);
(4) the noise certificate, including an English translation, where one has been provided by the authority responsible for issuing the noise certificate;
(5) a certified true copy of the air operator certificate (AOC), including an English translation when the AOC has been issued in another language;
(6) the operations specifications relevant to the aircraft type, issued with the AOC, including an English translation when the operations specifications have been issued in another language;
(7) the original aircraft radio licence, if applicable;
(8) the third party liability insurance certificate(s);
(9) the journey log, or equivalent, for the aircraft;
(10) the aircraft technical log, in accordance with Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014;
(11) details of the filed ATS flight plan, if applicable;
(12) current and suitable aeronautical charts for the route of the proposed flight and all routes along which it is reasonable to expect that the flight may be diverted;
(13) procedures and visual signals information for use by intercepting and intercepted aircraft;
(14) information concerning search and rescue services for the area of the intended flight, which shall be easily accessible in the flight crew compartment;
(15) the current parts of the operations manual that are relevant to the duties of the crew members, which shall be easily accessible to the crew members;
(16) the MEL;
(17) appropriate notices to airmen (NOTAMs) and aeronautical information service (AIS) briefing documentation;
(18) appropriate meteorological information;
(19) cargo and/or passenger manifests, if applicable;
(20) mass and balance documentation;
(21) the operational flight plan, if applicable;
(22) notification of special categories of passenger (SCPs) and special loads, if applicable; and
(23) any other documentation that may be pertinent to the flight or is required by the States concerned with the flight.
(b) Notwithstanding (a), for operations under visual flight rules (VFR) by day with other-than complex motor-powered aircraft taking off and landing at the same aerodrome or operating site within 24 hours, or remaining within a local area specified in the operations manual, the following documents and information may be retained at the aerodrome or operating site instead:
(1) noise certificate;
(2) aircraft radio licence;
(3) journey log, or equivalent;
(4) aircraft technical log;
(5) NOTAMs and AIS briefing documentation;
(6) meteorological information;
(7) notification of SCPs and special loads, if applicable; and
(8) mass and balance documentation.
(c) Notwithstanding (a), in case of loss or theft of documents specified in (a)(2) to (a)(8), the operation may continue until the flight reaches its destination or a place where replacement documents can be provided.
GENERAL
The documents, manuals and information may be available in a form other than on printed paper. Accessibility, usability and reliability should be assured.
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT(S)
‘Aircraft flight manual, or equivalent document(s)’ means in the context of this rule the flight manual for the aircraft, or other documents containing information required for the operation of the aircraft within the terms of its certificate of airworthiness unless these data are available in the parts of the operations manual carried on board.
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES
(a) Certified true copies may be provided:
(1) directly by the competent authority; or
(2) by persons holding privileges for certification of official documents in accordance with the applicable Member State’s legislation, e.g. public notaries, authorised officials in public services.
(b) Translations of the air operator certificate (AOC) including operations specifications do not need to be certified.
JOURNEY LOG OR EQUIVALENT
‘Journey log, or equivalent’ means that the required information may be recorded in documentation other than a log book, such as the operational flight plan or the aircraft technical log.
PROCEDURES AND VISUAL SIGNALS FOR USE BY INTERCEPTING AND INTERCEPTED AIRCRAFT
The procedures and the visual signals information for use by intercepting and intercepted aircraft should reflect those contained in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 2. This may be part of the operations manual.
SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION
This information is usually found in the State’s aeronautical information publication.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180(a)(18) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
ED Decision 2022/005/R
APPROPRIATE METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The appropriate meteorological information should be relevant to the planned operation, as specified in point (a) of point MET.TR.215 of Annex V (Part MET) to Regulation (EU) 2017/373, and comprise the following:
(a) the meteorological information that is specified in point (e) of point MET.TR.215 of Part-MET; and
(b) supplemental meteorological information:
(1) information other than that specified in point (a), which should be based on data from certified meteorological service providers; or
(2) information from other reliable sources of meteorological information that should be evaluated by the operator.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180(a)(18) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
ED Decision 2022/005/R
DATA FROM CERTIFIED METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
In the context of point (b)(1) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180(a)(18), the operator may consider that any meteorological information that is provided by the organisation within the scope of the meteorological information included in the flight documentation defined in point (e) of point MET.TR.215 of Part-MET should originate only from authoritative sources or certified providers, and should not be transformed or tampered, except for the purpose of presenting the data in the correct format. The organisation’s process should provide assurance that the integrity of such service is preserved in the data to be used by both flight crews and operators, regardless of their form.
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.180(a)(18) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
ED Decision 2022/005/R
INFORMATION FROM OTHER RELIABLE SOURCES OF METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
In the context of point (b)(2) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180(a)(18), reliable sources of meteorological information are organisations that are able to provide an appropriate level of data assurance in terms of accuracy and integrity. The operator may consider in the evaluation that the organisation has a quality assurance system in place that covers source selection, acquisition/import, processing, validity period check, and distribution phase of data.
GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.180(a)(18) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
ED Decision 2022/005/R
SUPPLEMENTAL METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Supplemental meteorological information: when operating under specific provisions and without the meteorological information from a certified service provider, the operator should use ‘supplemental meteorological information’, such as digital imagery. Related information can be found in point (e)(4) of AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.192.
Supplementary information: it is included in point (a) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180(a)(18) and refers to meteorological information to be reported in specific cases such as freezing precipitation, blowing snow, thunderstorm, etc.
DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE PERTINENT TO THE FLIGHT
Any other documents that may be pertinent to the flight or required by the States concerned with the flight, may include, for example, forms to comply with reporting requirements.
STATES CONCERNED WITH THE FLIGHT
The States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the flight.
CAT.GEN.MPA.185 Information to be retained on the ground
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
(a) The operator shall ensure that at least for the duration of each flight or series of flights:
(1) information relevant to the flight and appropriate for the type of operation is preserved on the ground;
(2) the information is retained until it has been duplicated at the place at which it will be stored; or, if this is impracticable
(3) the same information is carried in a fireproof container in the aircraft.
(b) The information referred to in (a) includes:
(1) a copy of the operational flight plan, where appropriate;
(2) copies of the relevant part(s) of the aircraft technical log;
(3) route-specific NOTAM documentation if specifically edited by the operator;
(4) mass and balance documentation if required; and
(5) special loads notification.
CAT.GEN.MPA.190 Provision of documentation and records
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
The commander shall, within a reasonable time of being requested to do so by a person authorised by an authority, provide to that person the documentation required to be carried on board.
CAT.GEN.MPA.195 Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
Regulation (EU) 2019/1387
(a) Following an accident, a serious incident or an occurrence identified by the investigating authority, the operator of an aircraft shall preserve the original recorded data of the flight recorders for a period of 60 days or until otherwise directed by the investigating authority.
(b) The operator shall conduct operational checks and evaluations of the recordings to ensure the continued serviceability of the flight recorders which are required to be carried under this Regulation.
(c) The operator shall ensure that the recordings of flight parameters and data link communication messages required to be recorded on flight recorders are preserved. However, for the purpose of testing and maintaining those flight recorders, up to 1 hour of the oldest recorded data at the time of testing may be erased.
(d) The operator shall keep and maintain up to date documentation that presents the necessary information to convert raw flight data into flight parameters expressed in engineering units.
(e) The operator shall make available any flight recorder recordings that have been preserved, if so determined by the competent authority.
(f) Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council74 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
(1) Except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, audio recordings from a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used unless all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) a procedure related to the handling of such audio recordings and of their transcript is in place;
(ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent;
(iii) such audio recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety.
(1a) When inspecting flight recorder audio recordings to ensure flight recorder serviceability, the operator shall protect the privacy of those audio recordings and make sure that they are not disclosed or used for purposes other than for ensuring flight recorder serviceability.
(2) Flight parameters or data link messages recorded by a flight recorder shall not be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or an incident which is subject to mandatory reporting, unless such recordings meet any of the following conditions:
(i) are used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only;
(ii) are de-identified;
(iii) are disclosed under secure procedures.
(3) Except for ensuring flight recorder serviceability, images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or used unless all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) a procedure related to the handling of such image recordings is in place;
(ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent;
(iii) such image recordings are used only for maintaining or improving safety.
(3a) When images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, then:
(i) those images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than for ensuring flight recorder serviceability;
(ii) if body parts of crew members are likely to be visible on the images, the operator shall ensure the privacy of those images.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
PRESERVATION OF RECORDED DATA FOR INVESTIGATION
(a) The operator should establish procedures to ensure that flight recorder recordings are preserved for the investigating authority.
(b) These procedures should include:
(1) instructions for flight crew members to deactivate the flight recorders immediately after completion of the flight and inform relevant personnel that the recording of the flight recorders should be preserved. These instructions should be readily available on board; and
(2) instructions to prevent inadvertent reactivation, test, repair or reinstallation of the flight recorders by operator personnel or during maintenance or ground handling activities performed by third parties.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
REMOVAL OF RECORDERS IN CASE OF AN INVESTIGATION
The need for removal of the recorders from the aircraft is determined by the investigating authority with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the operation.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS
(a) The operator should perform an inspection of the FDR recording and the CVR recording every year unless one or more of the following applies:
(1) If the flight recorder records on magnetic wire or uses frequency modulation technology, the time interval between two inspections of the recording should not exceed 3 months.
(2) If the flight recorder is solid-state and the flight recorder system is fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, the time interval between two inspections of the recording may be up to 2 years.
(3) In the case of an aircraft equipped with two solid-state flight data and cockpit voice combination recorders, where
(i) the flight recorder systems are fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation, and
(ii) the flight recorders share the same flight data acquisition, a comprehensive inspection of the recording needs only to be performed for one flight recorder position. The inspection of the recordings should be performed alternately so that each flight recorder position is inspected at time intervals not exceeding 4 years.
(4) Where all the following conditions are met, the inspection of the FDR recording is not needed:
(i) the aircraft flight data is collected in the frame of a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme;
(ii) the data acquisition of mandatory flight parameters is the same for the FDR and for the recorder used for the FDM programme;
(iii) an inspection similar to the inspection of the FDR recording and covering all mandatory flight parameters is conducted on the FDM data at time intervals not exceeding 2 years; and
(iv) the FDR is solid-state and the FDR system is fitted with continuous monitoring for proper operation.
(b) the operator should perform every 5 years an inspection of the data link recording;
(c) The operator should perform, at time intervals not exceeding 2 years, an inspection of the recording of flight recorders other than an FDR, which are installed on an aircraft, in order to ensure compliance with CAT.IDE.A.191 or CAT.IDE.H.191.
(d) When installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking of the flight recorders for proper operation should be used on each day when the aircraft is operated. When no such means is available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at intervals not exceeding 150 flight hours or 7 calendar days of operation, whichever is considered more suitable by the operator.
(e) The operator should check every 5 years, or in accordance with the recommendations of the sensor manufacturer, that the parameters dedicated to the FDR and not monitored by other means are being recorded within the calibration tolerances and that there is no discrepancy in the engineering conversion routines for these parameters.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS’ RECORDINGS FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY
(a) The inspection of recorded flight parameters usually consists of the following:
(1) Making a copy of the complete recording file.
(2) Converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the documentation required to be held.
(3) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters — this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered:
(i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range — for this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and
(ii) (only applicable to an FDR) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed:
(A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and
(B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose.
(4) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held.
(b) When performing the inspection of an audio recording from a flight recorder, precautions need to be taken to comply with CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1a). The inspection of the audio recording usually consists of:
(1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording;
(2) examining samples of in-flight audio recording from the flight recorder for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel and in all phases of flight; and
(3) preparing and retaining an inspection report.
(c) The inspection of the DLR recording usually consists of:
(1) Checking the consistency of the data link recording with other recordings for example, during a designated flight, the flight crew speaks out a few data link messages sent and received. After the flight, the data link recording and the CVR recording are compared for consistency.
(2) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording and the corresponding inspection report.
(d) When inspecting images recorded by a flight recorder, precautions need to be taken to comply with CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a). The inspection of such images usually consists of the following:
(1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording;
(2) examining samples of images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera are of acceptable quality; and
(3) preparing and retaining an inspection report.
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
MONITORING AND CHECKING THE PROPER OPERATION OF FLIGHT RECORDERS — EXPLANATION OF TERMS
For the understanding of the terms used in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b):
(a) ‘operational check of the flight recorder’ means a check of the flight recorder for proper operation. It is not a check of the quality of the recording and, therefore, it is not equivalent to an inspection of the recording. This check can be carried out by the flight crew or through a maintenance task.
(b) ‘aural or visual means for preflight checking the flight recorders for proper operation’ means an aural or visual means for the flight crew to check before the flight the results of an automatically or manually initiated test of the flight recorders for proper operation. Such a means provides for an operational check that can be performed by the flight crew.
(c) ‘flight recorder system’ means the flight recorder, its dedicated sensors and transducers, as well as its dedicated acquisition and processing equipment.
(d) ‘continuous monitoring for proper operation’ means for a flight recorder system, a combination of system monitors and/or built-in test functions which operates continuously in order to detect the following:
(1) loss of electrical power supply to the flight recorder system;
(2) failure of the equipment performing acquisition and processing;
(3) failure of the recording medium and/or drive mechanism; and
(4) failure of the recorder to store the data in the recording medium as shown by checks of the recorded data including, as reasonably practicable for the storage medium concerned, correct correspondence with the input data.
However, detections by the continuous monitoring for proper operation do not need to be automatically reported to the flight crew compartment.
GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
CVR AUDIO QUALITY
Additional guidance material for performing the CVR recording inspection may be found in the document of the French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, titled ‘Guidance on CVR recording inspection’ and dated October 2018 or later.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
USE OF AUDIO RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY
(a) The procedure related to the handling of audio recordings from flight recorders and of their transcripts should be documented and signed by all parties (aircraft operator, crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the crew themselves, maintenance personnel representatives if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/67975 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). and as a minimum, define:
(1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned;
(2) an access and security policy that restricts access to audio recordings from flight recorders and their transcripts to specifically authorised persons identified by their position;
(3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to be taken to ensure the security of audio recordings from flight recorders and their transcripts and their protection from misuse. The retention policy should specify the period of time after which such audio recordings and identified transcripts are destroyed;
(4) a description of the uses made of audio recordings from flight recorders and their transcripts ;
(5) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of audio recordings from flight recorders and their transcripts;
(6) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and
(7) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern.
(b) Each time an audio recording file from a flight recorder is read out under the conditions defined by CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1):
(1) parts of the audio recording file that contain information with a privacy content should be deleted to the extent possible, and it should not be permitted that the detail of information with a privacy content is transcribed; and
(2) the operator should retain, and when requested, provide to the competent authority:
(i) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the audio recording file; and
(ii) evidence that the persons concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the audio recording file.
(c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for the protection and use of audio recordings from flight recorders and their transcripts, as well as for the assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned.
(d) In case a third party is involved in the use of audio recordings from flight recorders, contractual agreements with this third party should cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b).
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
INSPECTION OF AUDIO RECORDINGS FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY
(a) When an inspection of the audio recordings from a flight recorder is performed for ensuring audio quality and intelligibility of recorded communications:
(1) the privacy of the audio recordings should be ensured (e.g. by locating the replay equipment in a separated area and/or using headsets);
(2) access to the replay equipment should be restricted to specifically authorised persons identified by their position;
(3) provision should be made for the secure storage of the recording medium, the audio recording files and copies thereof;
(4) the audio recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than 2 months and not later than 1 year after completion of the inspection of the audio recordings, except that audio samples with no privacy content may be retained for enhancing this inspection (e.g. for comparing audio quality);
(5) only the accountable manager of the operator and, when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the audio recording files.
(b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the audio recordings is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(2) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
USE OF FDR DATA FOR AN FDM PROGRAMME
The use of FDR data in the framework of an FDM programme may be acceptable if it fulfils the conditions set by sub-paragraph (f)(2) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
ED Decision 2021/005/R
USE OF IMAGES FROM THE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY
(a) The procedure related to the handling of images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder should be documented and signed by all parties involved (aircraft operator, crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the crew themselves, maintenance personnel representatives if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define the following aspects:
(1) the method to obtain the consent of all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned;
(2) an access and security policy that restricts access to the image recordings to specifically authorised persons identified by their position;
(3) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to ensure the security of the image recordings and their protection from misuse. The retention policy should specify the period of time after which such image recordings are destroyed;
(4) a description of the uses made of the image recordings;
(5) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of the image recordings;
(6) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and
(7) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern.
(b) Each time an image recording file from a flight recorder that contains images of the flight crew compartment is read out for purposes other than ensuring the serviceability of that flight recorder:
(1) images that contain information with a privacy content should be deleted to the extent possible, and it should not be permitted that the detail of information with a privacy content is transcribed; and
(2) the operator should retain, and when requested, provide the competent authority with:
(i) information on the use made (or the intended use) of this image recording file; and
(ii) evidence that the crew members concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of the flight crew compartment images.
(c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for the protection and use of images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder, as well as for the assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned.
(d) In case a third party is involved in the use of images of the flight crew compartment that are recorded by a flight recorder, contractual agreements with this third party should cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b).
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
ED Decision 2021/005/R
INSPECTION OF IMAGES OF THE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY
(a) When images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, and any body part of a crew member is likely to be visible on these images, then:
(1) the privacy of the image recordings should be ensured (e.g. by locating the replay equipment in a separated area);
(2) access to the replay equipment should be restricted to specifically authorised persons identified by their position;
(3) provision should be made for the secure storage of the recording medium, the image recording files and copies thereof;
(4) the image recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than 2 months and not later than 1 year after completion of the inspection of the image recordings. Images that do not contain any body part of a person may be retained for enhancing this inspection (e.g. for comparing image quality); and
(5) only the accountable manager of the operator and, when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200, the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the image recording files.
(b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the image recording is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover these aspects.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
ED Decision 2021/005/R
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT
If there are no compartments to physically segregate the flight crew from the passengers during the flight, the ‘flight crew compartment’ in point (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 should be understood as the area including:
(a) the flight crew seats;
(b) aircraft and engine controls;
(c) aircraft instruments;
(d) windshield and windows used by the flight crew to get an external view while seated at their duty station; and
(e) circuit breakers accessible by the flight crew while seated at their duty station.
CAT.GEN.MPA.200 Transport of dangerous goods
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
(a) Unless otherwise permitted by this Annex, the transport of dangerous goods by air shall be conducted in accordance with Annex 18 to the Chicago Convention as last amended and amplified by the ‘Technical instructions for the safe transport of dangerous goods by air’ (ICAO Doc 9284-AN/905), including its supplements and any other addenda or corrigenda.
(b) Dangerous goods shall only be transported by an operator approved in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA), Subpart G, except when:
(1) they are not subject to the technical instructions in accordance with Part 1 of those instructions; or
(2) they are carried by passengers or crew members, or are in baggage, in accordance with Part 8 of the technical instructions.
(c) An operator shall establish procedures to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to prevent dangerous goods from being carried on board inadvertently.
(d) The operator shall provide personnel with the necessary information enabling them to carry out their responsibilities, as required by the technical instructions.
(e) The operator shall, in accordance with the technical instructions, report without delay to the competent authority and the appropriate authority of the State of occurrence in the event of:
(1) any dangerous goods accidents or incidents;
(2) the discovery of undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods in cargo or mail; or
(3) the finding of dangerous goods carried by passengers or crew members, or in their baggage, when not in accordance with Part 8 of the technical instructions.
(f) The operator shall ensure that passengers are provided with information about dangerous goods in accordance with the technical instructions.
(g) The operator shall ensure that notices giving information about the transport of dangerous goods are provided at acceptance points for cargo as required by the technical instructions.
DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT REPORTING
(a) Any type of dangerous goods accident or incident, or the finding of undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods should be reported, irrespective of whether the dangerous goods are contained in cargo, mail, passengers’ baggage or crew baggage. For the purposes of the reporting of undeclared and misdeclared dangerous goods found in cargo, the Technical Instructions considers this to include items of operators’ stores that are classified as dangerous goods.
(b) The first report should be dispatched within 72 hours of the event. It may be sent by any means, including e-mail, telephone or fax. This report should include the details that are known at that time, under the headings identified in (c). If necessary, a subsequent report should be made as soon as possible giving all the details that were not known at the time the first report was sent. If a report has been made verbally, written confirmation should be sent as soon as possible.
(c) The first and any subsequent report should be as precise as possible and should contain the following data, where relevant:
(1) date of the incident or accident or the finding of undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods;
(2) location, the flight number and flight date;
(3) description of the goods and the reference number of the air waybill, pouch, baggage tag, ticket, etc.;
(4) proper shipping name (including the technical name, if appropriate) and UN/ID number, when known;
(5) class or division and any subsidiary risk;
(6) type of packaging, and the packaging specification marking on it;
(7) quantity;
(8) name and address of the shipper, passenger, etc.;
(9) any other relevant details;
(10) suspected cause of the incident or accident;
(11) action taken;
(12) any other reporting action taken; and
(13) name, title, address and telephone number of the person making the report.
(d) Copies of relevant documents and any photographs taken should be attached to the report.
(e) A dangerous goods accident or incident may also constitute an aircraft accident, serious incident or incident. Reports should be made for both types of occurrences when the criteria for each are met.
(f) The following dangerous goods reporting form should be used, but other forms, including electronic transfer of data, may be used provided that at least the minimum information of this AMC is supplied:
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DANGEROUS GOODS OCCURRENCE REPORT |
DGOR No: |
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1. Operator:
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2. Date of Occurrence: |
3. Local time of occurrence: |
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4. Flight date:
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5. Flight No: |
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6. Departure aerodrome:
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7. Destination aerodrome: |
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8. Aircraft type:
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9. Aircraft registration: |
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10. Location of occurrence:
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11. Origin of the goods: |
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12. Description of the occurrence, including details of injury, damage, etc.
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13. Proper shipping name (including the technical name):
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14. UN/ID No (when known): |
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15.Class/Division (when known):
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16. Subsidiary risk(s): |
17. Packing group: |
18 Category (Class 7 only): |
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19. Type of packaging:
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20.Packaging specification marking: |
21. No of packages: |
22. Quantity (or transport index, if applicable): |
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23. Reference No of Airway Bill:
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24. Reference No of courier pouch, baggage tag, or passenger ticket:
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25. Name and address of shipper, agent, passenger, etc.:
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26. Other relevant information (including suspected cause, any action taken):
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27. Name and title of person making report:
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28. Telephone No: |
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29. Company:
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30. Reporters ref: |
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31. Address: |
32. Signature:
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33. Date:
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Description of the occurrence (continuation) |
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Notes for completion of the form:
1. A dangerous goods accident is as defined in Annex I. For this purpose, serious injury is as defined in Regulation (EU) No 996/201076 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35)..
2. This form should also be used to report any occasion when undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods are discovered in cargo, mail or unaccompanied baggage or when accompanied baggage contains dangerous goods which passengers or crew are not permitted to take on aircraft.
3. The initial report should be dispatched unless exceptional circumstances prevent this. This occurrence report form, duly completed, should be sent as soon as possible, even if all the information is not available.
4. Copies of all relevant documents and any photographs taken should be attached to this report.
5. Any further information, or any information not included in the initial report, should be sent as soon as possible to the authorities identified in CAT.GEN.MPA.200(e).
6. Providing it is safe to do so, all dangerous goods, packaging, documents, etc., relating to the occurrence should be retained until after the initial report has been sent to the authorities identified in CAT.GEN.MPA.200(e) and they have indicated whether or not these should continue to be retained.
GENERAL
(a) The requirement to transport dangerous goods by air in accordance with the Technical Instructions is irrespective of whether:
(1) the flight is wholly or partly within or wholly outside the territory of a State; or
(2) an approval to carry dangerous goods in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA), Subpart G is held.
(b) The Technical Instructions provide that in certain circumstances dangerous goods, which are normally forbidden on an aircraft, may be carried. These circumstances include cases of extreme urgency or when other forms of transport are inappropriate or when full compliance with the prescribed requirements is contrary to the public interest. In these circumstances, all the States concerned may grant exemptions from the provisions of the Technical Instructions provided that an overall level of safety which is at least equivalent to that provided by the Technical Instructions is achieved. Although exemptions are most likely to be granted for the carriage of dangerous goods that are not permitted in normal circumstances, they may also be granted in other circumstances, such as when the packaging to be used is not provided for by the appropriate packing method or the quantity in the packaging is greater than that permitted. The Technical Instructions also make provision for some dangerous goods to be carried when an approval has been granted only by the State of origin and the State of the operator.
(c) When an exemption is required, the States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the consignment and that of the operator. For the State of overflight, if none of the criteria for granting an exemption are relevant, an exemption may be granted based solely on whether it is believed that an equivalent level of safety in air transport has been achieved.
(d) The Technical Instructions provide that exemptions and approvals are granted by the ‘appropriate national authority’, which is intended to be the authority responsible for the particular aspect against which the exemption or approval is being sought. The Instructions do not specify who should seek exemptions and, depending on the legislation of the particular State, this may mean the operator, the shipper or an agent. If an exemption or approval has been granted to other than the operator, the operator should ensure a copy has been obtained before the relevant flight. The operator should ensure all relevant conditions on an exemption or approval are met.
(e) The exemption or approval referred to in (b) to (d) is in addition to the approval required by Annex V (Part SPA), Subpart G.
CAT.GEN.MPA.205 Aircraft tracking system — Aeroplanes
Regulation (EU) 2015/2338
(a) By 16 December 2018 at the latest, the operator shall establish and maintain, as part of the system for exercising operational control over the flights, an aircraft tracking system, which includes the flights eligible to (b) when performed with the following aeroplanes:
(1) aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 27 000 kg, with an MOPSC of more than 19, and first issued with an individual CofA before 16 December 2018, which are equipped with a capability to provide a position additional to the secondary surveillance radar transponder;
(2) all aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 27 000 kg, with an MOPSC of more than 19, and first issued with an individual CofA on or after 16 December 2018; and
(3) all aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 45 500 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after 16 December 2018.
(b) Flights shall be tracked by the operator from take-off to landing, except when the planned route and the planned diversion routes are fully included in airspace blocks where:
(1) ATS surveillance service is normally provided which is supported by ATC surveillance systems locating the aircraft at time intervals with adequate duration; and
(2) the operator has provided to competent air navigation service providers necessary contact information.
EQUIPMENT, PERFORMANCE AND PROCEDURES WHEN AIRCRAFT TRACKING IS REQUIRED
(a) Automatic tracking of aeroplane position
The aircraft tracking system should rely on equipment capable of automatically detecting and transmitting a position report to the aircraft operator, except if (d)(2) applies.
(b) Position reporting period
The tracking of an individual flight should provide a position report at time intervals which do not exceed 15 minutes.
(c) Content of position reports
Each position report should contain at least the latitude, the longitude and the time of position determination and whenever available, an indication of the aeroplane altitude, except that for each flight:
(1) One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has left the gate;
(2) One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has become airborne;
(3) One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has landed; and
(4) One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has reached the gate.
(d) Source of position data
The data contained in a position report may come from:
(1) ATC surveillance systems, if the ATC surveillance data source is capable of providing this data with a delay equal to or less than 10 minutes;
(2) the flight crew, if the planned flight duration is less than two position reporting periods;
(3) aeroplane systems. In that case:
(i) the source of time, latitude and longitude data should be the navigation system of the aeroplane or an approved GNSS receiver;
(ii) the source of altitude data should be:
(A) the same source as for time, latitude and longitude data, or
(B) an approved source of pressure altitude; and
(iii) the delivery time of position reports from the aeroplane to the operational control over the flight should, to the extent possible, not exceed 10 minutes; or
(4) any data source when the position report is of a type designated by (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) or (c)(4). In that case, the delivery time of position reports from the data source to the operational control over the flight should, to the extent possible, not exceed 10 minutes.
(e) Temporary lack of aircraft tracking data
Aircraft tracking data may be incomplete due to a temporary or unexpected issue prior to or during the flight. However, the operator should:
(1) identify any loss of aircraft tracking data which is not due to a temporary issue, and
(2) address any systematic lack of aircraft tracking data affecting a given aeroplane or a given route in a timely manner.
(f) Operational control over the flights
When abnormal flight behaviour is suspected, this should be checked and acted upon without delay.
(g) Recording of aircraft tracking data during normal operation
When the tracking of a flight is required, all related aircraft tracking data should be recorded on the ground, including position data from ATC surveillance systems when they are used. The aircraft tracking data of a given flight should be retained until confirmation that the flight is completed and no accident or serious incident occurred.
(h) Preserving aircraft tracking data after an accident or a serious incident
Following an accident or a serious incident, the operator should retain the aircraft tracking data of the involved flight for at least 30 days. In addition, the operator should be capable of providing a copy of this data without delay and in an electronic format that is human-readable using a common text file editor.
(i) Procedures
The operator should establish procedures describing its aircraft tracking system, including the identification of abnormal flight behaviour and the notification of the competent ATS unit (ATS unit responsible for providing the alerting service in the airspace where the aircraft is believed to be), when appropriate. These procedures should be integrated with the emergency response plan of the operator.
ROUTES INCLUDED IN AIRSPACE COVERED BY ATS SURVEILLANCE
(a) Trajectory points located at a distance of less than 50 NM from the departure airfield and trajectory points located at a distance of less than 50 NM from the destination airfield may be considered as not part of the ‘planned route’.
(b) Trajectory points located at a distance of less than 50 NM from any diversion airfield may be considered as not part of the ‘planned diversion routes’.
(c) An ATS surveillance service may be considered ‘supported by ATC surveillance systems locating the aircraft at time intervals with adequate duration’ if those ATC surveillance systems are capable of locating aircraft at time intervals not exceeding 15 minutes when operated normally.
(d) When applicable, the operator should check that the conditions required for using the exception defined by CAT.GEN.MPA.205(b) are fulfilled before operating into new airspace blocks.
(e) When applicable, the operator should check at time intervals not exceeding 180 calendar days that the conditions required for using the exception defined by CAT.GEN.MPA.205(b) are maintained.
EXPLANATION OF TERMS
For the understanding of the terms used in CAT.GEN.MPA.205:
(a) ’capability to provide a position additional to the secondary surveillance radar transponder’ means airborne equipment other than the SSR transponder, which is operative and which can be used to automatically transmit time-stamped position data without change to the approved airborne systems; and
(b) ‘abnormal flight behaviour’: see GM1 to Annex I (Definitions).
DETERMINING WHETHER A FLIGHT NEEDS TO BE TRACKED
Table 1 provides a summary of the cases applicable to an aeroplane which is within the scope of CAT.GEN.MPA.205(a).
Table 1: Cases applicable to the flight of an aeroplane subject to the aircraft tracking requirement
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Condition 1: The planned route and the planned diversion routes are included in airspace blocks where ATS surveillance service is normally provided. |
Condition 2: The ATS surveillance service provided in all airspace blocks determined by Condition 1 is supported by ATC surveillance systems locating the aircraft at time intervals with adequate duration. |
Condition 3: The operator has provided all air navigation service providers competent for the airspace blocks determined by Condition 1 with the necessary contact information. |
Case considered: Aeroplane that is within the scope of CAT.GEN.MPA.205(a).
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Conditions 1, 2 and 3 are met altogether. |
The flight does not need to be tracked (refer to CAT.GEN.MPA.205(b)). Note: The operator should check at regular time intervals that Conditions 1, 2 and 3 are still met (refer to AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.205). |
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Either Condition 1, Condition 2 or Condition 3 is not met. |
The flight shall be tracked (refer to CAT.GEN.MPA.205(b)). Note: Lack of aircraft tracking data due to a temporary or unexpected issue may be acceptable (refer to AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.205). Examples of issues (list is indicative and not exhaustive): airborne equipment found inoperative, transmission link disturbed by environmental factors; issue with the ground-based infrastructure or the space-based infrastructure. |
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METHOD FOR ASSESSING WHETHER A FLIGHT NEEDS TO BE TRACKED
The following gives an example of a method to assess whether flights performed along a given route need to be tracked.
(a) Determine the planned route and the planned diversion routes and consider only points of these routes located at a distance of greater than or equal to 50 NM from the departure airfield, the destination airfield and the diversion airfields. If there is no such point, then the flight does not need to be tracked, otherwise go to (b).
(b) Identify all airspace blocks crossed by the result of (a) and go to (c).
(c) If every airspace block meets all of the following conditions, then the flight does not need to be tracked:
(1) ATS surveillance service is provided in the airspace block;
(2) This ATS surveillance service relies on ATC surveillance systems which are normally capable of detecting aircraft in the airspace block at time intervals not exceeding 15 minutes; and
(3) The air navigation service provider competent for the airspace block has information sufficient to contact the on-duty staff at the operator;
POSSIBLE SOURCES AND MINIMUM CONTENT OF A POSITION REPORT
Table 1 presents a summary of the possible sources and the minimum content of a position report according to AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.205.
Table 1: Possible sources and minimum content of a position report
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Planned flight duration |
Possible sources of a position report |
Minimum content of a position report |
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Flight duration < 2×reporting period |
— Airborne equipment (automatic transmission); — Flight crew; or — ATC surveillance systems. |
Latitude, longitude and time (and whenever available altitude), except for the position reports designated by point (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) and (c)(4) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.205. |
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Flight duration ≥ 2×reporting period |
— Airborne equipment (automatic transmission); — ATC surveillance systems; — Flight crew if the flight is not required to be tracked; or — Any source for position reports designated by point (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) and (c)(4) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.205. |
AIRCRAFT TRACKING — CHOICE OF THE POSITION REPORTING PERIOD
(a) Unless the aircraft tracking system includes functionalities enhancing the detection of deviations from normal operation (e.g. airborne systems capable of automatically transmitting more information under some conditions, possibility for the operational control to adjust the position reporting period of an ongoing flight, etc.), the choice of the position reporting period has a significant influence on the effectiveness of the aircraft tracking system.
(1) Indeed, assuming that an operator has set itself the objective of detecting, within a given time T, deviations from normal operation, and that the operator relies for this purpose only on position reports, then the position reporting period needs to be less than T.
(2) Furthermore, when no other information than position reports is available to locate a missing aircraft, then the search zone is a circle with a radius corresponding to the distance likely to have been covered since the last detection. The corresponding search area grows as the square of the time, until the position of the aircraft is detected again or the fuel on board is exhausted. Taking the example of an aeroplane cruising at Mach 0.8 (i.e. covering a distance of about 8 NM per minute), after 15 minutes the search area is 155 000 square kilometres.
(3) In the publication of the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau titled ‘The Operational Search for MH370’ (dated October 2017), it is recommended that ‘Aircraft operators, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft equipment manufacturers investigate ways to provide high-rate and/or automatically triggered global position tracking in existing and future fleets’.
(b) It is advised to take the above into account when setting up the aircraft tracking system.
PROVIDING CONTACT INFORMATION TO COMPETENT AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDERS
A solution for the operator to make the necessary contact information available to all competent air navigation service providers (ANSPs) could be to register to the global OPS Control Directory of ICAO. Another possible way is to provide in the ATS flight plan (item 18 ‘Other information’) information sufficient to contact the on-duty staff of the aircraft operator.
GUIDANCE
Additional guidance for the establishment of an aircraft tracking system is found in ICAO Circular 347 – Aircraft Tracking Implementation Guidelines, dated 2017.
CAT.GEN.MPA.210 Location of an aircraft in distress — Aeroplanes
Regulation (EU) 2022/2203
As of 1 January 2025, the following aeroplanes shall be equipped with robust and automatic means to accurately determine, following an accident during which the aeroplane is severely damaged, the location of the point of end of flight:
(b) all aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 45 500 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 2024.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.210 Location of an aircraft in distress —Aeroplanes
ED Decision 2021/008/R
PERFORMANCE OF THE AIRBORNE SYSTEM, TRANSMISSION SERVICE, AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
(a) Performance of the airborne system
The airborne system used to comply with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 (‘airborne system’) should:
(1) be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements; and
(2) comply with the Certification Specifications for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CS-ACNS) issued by EASA, or equivalent.
(b) Transmission service
If the airborne system relies on other equipment than ELTs for transmitting the information needed to comply with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210, the provider of the transmission service should be a surveillance service provider that is certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/373 (the ‘ATM/ANS Regulation’).
(c) Flight crew procedures
The operator should establish flight crew procedures for using the airborne system, including manual activation and manual deactivation of that system. These procedures should ensure that the flight crew manually activate the airborne system only if a search and rescue (SAR) response is needed or anticipated, and that they inform the relevant ATS unit in a timely manner when they manually deactivate or disable the airborne system to stop data transmission.
(d) Operator’s procedures
The operator should establish procedures:
(1) for assessing whether an aircraft is likely to be in a state of emergency and
(2) for informing the competent ATS unit (ATS unit responsible for providing the alerting service in the airspace where the aircraft is believed to be):
(i) when a state of emergency is identified, and
(ii) when a state of emergency no longer exists.
(e) Limiting the effects of false alerts
To reduce the frequency and effects of false alerts that are caused by the airborne system, the operator should:
(1) establish procedures for disabling any of the required functions of the airborne system;
(2) consider the airborne system inoperative if, during a flight, there were several occurrences of undesirable automatic activation of the airborne system; and
(3) analyse occurrences of undesirable (manual and automatic) activation of the airborne system to determine their probable cause; the records of such analyses should be retained for at least 12 months and provided to the competent authority on request.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.210 Location of an aircraft in distress — Aeroplanes
ED Decision 2021/008/R
OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION
(a) The purpose of point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 is to have a high probability of timely and accurately locating the accident site after an accident during which the aircraft is severely damaged, irrespective of the accident location and survivability (hence, the terms ‘automatic’, ‘robust’, and ‘accurately’ are used in CAT.GEN.MPA.210). The scope of point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 includes non-survivable accidents. Means compliant with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 are expected to:
(1) quickly inform the SAR authority concerned that an accident occurred or is about to occur and provide them with information that can easily be used for locating the accident site; and
(2) help the safety investigation authority concerned to locate the accident site and the aircraft wreckage so that they can collect evidence in a reasonable time frame.
Therefore, if an aircraft in the scope of CAT.IDE.A.280 complies with CAT.GEN.MPA.210, this aircraft is not required to be equipped with an automatic emergency locator transmitter (ELT). Similarly, if an aircraft in the scope of CAT.IDE.A.285 complies with CAT.GEN.MPA.210, this aircraft is not required to be equipped with a 8.8-kHz underwater locating device (ULD).
(b) The airborne system used to comply with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 could rely, for example, on an emergency locator transmitter of a distress tracking type (ELT(DT)), on an automatic deployable flight recorder (ADFR), or on the transmission of position reports at short time intervals (high-rate tracking (HRT)).
(c) Subpart A of the Certification Specifications for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CS-ACNS) contains general conditions applicable to the airborne system. Subpart E of CS-ACNS contains specific conditions for meeting the purpose of point CAT.GEN.MPA.210.
(d) If other transmitting equipment than an ELT is used by the airborne system for complying with CAT.GEN.MPA.210, AMC1 CNS.OR.100 to Part-CNS of the ATM/ANS Regulation contains conditions applicable to the provider of the transmission service that is used by that equipment.
(e) While AMC1 CNS.OR.100 only addresses the transmission of information to the SAR authorities, the capability to also transmit that information to the operator is advisable.
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.210 Location of an aircraft in distress — Aeroplanes
ED Decision 2021/008/R
EXPLANATION OF TERMS
The terms used in point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 and AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.210 are explained below for better understanding:
— ‘accident during which the aeroplane is severely damaged’ refers to an accident during which the aeroplane sustains damage or structural failure that adversely affects its structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics, and would normally require a major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for:
— an engine failure or damage to the engine, when the damage is limited to a single engine (including its cowlings or accessories);
— damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tyres, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, windscreens, the aeroplane skin (such as small dents or puncture holes);
— minor damage to the landing gear; and
— damage resulting from hail or bird strike (including holes in the radome);
— ‘accurately determine the location of the point of end of flight’ means locating the point of end of flight with a position accuracy that is sufficient for safety investigation purposes, and when the accident conditions are survivable, also for SAR purposes;
— ‘activation of the airborne system’ means the transition of the airborne system from another state to the activated state;
— ‘airborne system’ means the organised set of airborne applications and airborne equipment that comply with CAT.GEN.MPA.210;
— ‘ATM/ANS Regulation’ refers to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/373 of 1 March 2017 or any later EU regulation laying down common requirements for providers of air traffic management/air navigation services.
— ‘automatic means’ refers to means that do not require any human action to perform their intended function;
— ‘automatic activation of the airborne system’ means activation of the airborne system that is automatically triggered by airborne equipment;
— ‘deactivation of the airborne system’ means the transition of that system from the activated state to another state;
— ‘point of end of flight’ means, depending on the nature of the accident, the point where the aircraft crashed into land or water, or landed on land or water, or was destroyed;
— ‘required functions of the airborne system’ refers to the ‘functions of the system’, which are defined in the CS-ACNS that are applicable to locating an aircraft in distress;
— ‘robust means’ refers to means designed to work properly under the circumstances of survivable accidents, and under the circumstances of most non-survivable accidents;
— ‘the airborne system is activated’ means that the airborne system transmits signals to enable the determination of the location of the point of end of flight without sending mobile SAR facilities to the area of the transmitter; and
— ‘transmission service’ refers to the service that makes the information sent by the airborne system available to the relevant stakeholders.
CAT.GEN.MPA.215 Support programme
Regulation (EU) 2018/1042
(a) The operator shall enable, facilitate and ensure access to a proactive and non-punitive support programme that will assist and support flight crew in recognising, coping with, and overcoming any problem which might negatively affect their ability to safely exercise the privileges of their licence. Such access shall be made available to all flight crew.
(b) Without prejudice to applicable national legislation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, the protection of the confidentiality of data shall be a precondition for an effective support programme as it encourages the use of such a programme and ensures its integrity.
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING A SUPPORT PROGRAMME
The access to a support programme should:
(a) enable self-declaration or referral in case of a decrease in a flight crew’s medical fitness with an emphasis on prevention and early support; and
(b) if appropriate, allow the flight crew to receive temporary relief from flight duties and be referred to professional advice.
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROTECTION OF DATA
(a) The personal data of flight crew who have been referred to a support programme should be handled in a confidential, non-stigmatising, and safe environment.
(b) A culture of mutual trust and cooperation should be maintained so that the flight crew is less likely to hide a condition and more likely to report and seek help.
(c) Disclosure of data to the operator may only be granted in an anonymised manner such as in the form of aggregated statistical data and only for purposes of safety management so as not to compromise the voluntary participation in a support programme, thereby compromising flight safety.
(d) Notwithstanding the above, an agreement with related procedures should be in place between the operator and the support programme on how to proceed in case of a serious safety concern.
ELEMENTS OF A SUPPORT PROGRAMME
(a) A support programme should contain as a minimum the following elements:
(1) procedures including education of flight crew regarding self-awareness and facilitation of self-referral;
(2) assistance provided by professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals with relevant knowledge of the aviation environment;
(3) involvement of trained peers, where trained peers are available;
(4) monitoring of the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme;
(5) monitoring and support of the process of returning to work;
(6) management of risks resulting from fear of loss of licence; and
(7) a referral system to an aero-medical examiner in defined cases raising serious safety concerns.
(b) A support programme should be linked to the management system of the operator, provided that data is used for purposes of safety management and is anonymised and aggregated to ensure confidentiality.
TRAINING AND AWARENESS
(a) The operator should promote access to the support programme for all flight crew.
(b) Professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals, as well as trained peers, where trained peers are available, that are involved in the support programme, should receive initial and recurrent training related to their role and function within the support programme.
SUPPORT PROGRAMME
(a) A support programme is a proactive programme applying the principles of ‘just culture’ as defined in Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, whereby the senior management of the operator, mental health professionals, trained peers, and in many cases representative organisations of crew members work together to enable self-declaration, referral, advice, counselling and/or treatment, where necessary, in case of a decrease in medical fitness.
(b) The support programme should be easily accessible for flight crew, and should provide adequate means of support at the earliest stages.
FACILITATION OF TRUST IN THE SUPPORT PROGRAMME
Essential trust between management and crew is the foundation for a successful support programme. This trust can be facilitated by:
(a) establishing a platform for multi-stakeholder participation and partnership in the governance process of the support programme by involving flight crew representatives from one or more operators and representatives of the relevant operator. In some cases, a multi-stakeholder platform may also include representatives of the competent authority;
(b) participation of the representatives of those personnel covered by the support programme in the design, implementation and operation of the support programme;
(c) a formal agreement between management and crew, identifying the procedures for the use of data, its protection and confidentiality;
(d) clear and unambiguous provisions on data protection;
(e) senior management’s demonstrated commitment to promote a proactive safety culture;
(f) a non-punitive operator policy that also covers the support programme;
(g) support programme management by staff either established within the operator or by a separate independent organisation;
(h) involvement of persons with appropriate expertise when advising crews (for example, pilot peers with similar cultural backgrounds and professional staff with appropriate training in e.g. psychology, etc.);
(i) a structured system to protect the confidentiality of personal data; and
(j) an efficient communication system that promotes the benefits of the support programme, such as its positive impacts, temporary relief from duties without fear of dismissal, management of risks resulting from fear of loss of licence.
TRAINING AND AWARENESS
(a) When promoting the benefits of the support programme, the operator should stress at least the following elements of the programme:
(1) positive impacts of a support programme;
(2) awareness of job stressors and life stressors — mental fitness and mental health;
(3) coping strategies;
(4) potential effects of psychoactive substances and their use or misuse;
(5) medication use (prescribed and over-the-counter medication) to ensure the safe exercise of the privileges of the licence whilst taking medication;
(6) early recognition of mental unfitness;
(7) principles and availability of a support programme; and
(8) data protection and confidentiality principles.
(b) Mental health professionals involved in the support programme should be trained on:
(1) psychological first aid;
(2) applicable legal requirements regarding data protection; and
(3) cases where information should be disclosed due to an immediate and evident safety threat and in the interest of public safety.
(c) Peers involved in the support programme should receive practically orientated basic training in psychological first aid and regular refresher trainings.
ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUPPORT PROGRAMME
When implementing a support programme, the operator should pay attention to the following:
(a) establishment and verification of operational and data protection procedures;
(b) selection and training of dedicated and experienced staff and peers;
(c) offer of motivating alternative positions to flight crew in case a return to in-flight duties is not possible; and
(d) limitation of the financial consequences of a loss of licence, for example through extending loss of licence coverage.
POSSIBILITY TO CONTRACT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPPORT PROGRAMME TO A THIRD PARTY
The operator may contract the establishment of a support programme to a third party. For a smaller-sized operator, the synergies created by a third-party support programme can be beneficial and in some cases may provide the only feasible option to ensure access to a support programme or to ensure availability of trained peers.
OBLIGATION TO SEEK AERO-MEDICAL ADVICE IN CASE OF A DECREASE IN MEDICAL FITNESS
Joining a support programme does not remove the flight crew’s obligation to seek aero-medical advice in case of a decrease in medical fitness in accordance with MED.A.020 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011.
SCOPE OF THE SUPPORT PROGRAMME
Nothing should prevent an operator from extending the scope of the support programme to include, apart from flight crew, other safety-sensitive categories personnel, e.g. cabin crew or maintenance, as well.
MEANING OF THE TERM ‘PEER’
(a) In the context of a support programme, a ‘peer’ is a trained person who shares common professional qualifications and experience, and has encountered similar situations, problems or conditions with the person seeking assistance from a support programme. This may or may not be a person working in the same organisation as the person seeking assistance from the support programme.
(b) A peer’s involvement in a support programme can be beneficial due to similar professional backgrounds between the peer and the person seeking support. However, a mental health professional should support the peer when required, e.g. in cases where intervention is required to prevent endangering safety.