Comment Response Document (CRD)
to Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 22-2005

AMENDING
DECISION NO. 2003/19/RM OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AGENCY

of 28 November 2003

on acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks

"FUEL TANK SAFETY: incorporation of the Critical Design Configuration Limitations (CDCCL) into Acceptable Means of Compliance for Part-M, Part-145 and Part-66"

Explanatory Note

I. General

1. The purpose of Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 22-2005 was to put forward an amendment to Annex I, II and IV of the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) to Part-M/-145/-66 to Decision 2003/19/RM of the Executive Director of 28 November 2003.[1]

II. Consultation

2. NPA 22-2005 containing the draft Executive Director Decision amending Decision N° 2003/19/RM was published on the web site (www.easa.europa.eut) on 20 December 2005.

   By the closing date of 20 March 2006, the Agency had received 65 comments from 12 national authorities, professional organisations and private companies.

III. Publication of the CRD

3. All comments received have been acknowledged and incorporated into a Comment Response Document (CRD). This CRD contains a list of all persons and/or organisations that have provided comments and the answers of the Agency.

4. In responding to comments, a standard terminology has been applied to attest EASA's acceptance of the comment. This terminology is as follows:

   - **Accepted** – The comment is agreed by the Agency and any proposed amendment is wholly transferred to the revised text.
   - **Partially Accepted** – Either the comment is only agreed in part by the Agency, or the comment is agreed by the Agency but any proposed amendment is partially transferred to the revised text.
   - **Noted –** The comment is acknowledged by the Agency but no change to the existing text is considered necessary.
   - **Not Accepted** - The comment is not shared by the Agency

5. The Agency's Decision will be issued at least two months after the publication of this CRD to allow for any possible reactions of stakeholders regarding possible misunderstandings of the comments received and answers provided.

6. Such reactions should be received by EASA not later than 13-12-2006 and should be sent by the following link: CRD@easa.europa.eu;

[1] Decision No 2003/19/RM of the Executive Director of the Agency of 28.11.2003 on acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 of 20 November 2003 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks.

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
1.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.704 Continuing airworthiness management exposition	European Regions Airline Association	11. The exposition should contain information, as applicable, on how the maintenance organisation ensures that no modification, repair or maintenance has an adverse effect on a feature identified as a Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation; this requires the development of appropriate procedures where necessary by the operator or contracted maintenance organisation. The exposition should state how the completion of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations is traced. An operator, Part M, Part 145 or Part 66 licensed individual cannot ensure any adverse effect of a modification, repair or maintenance task per the AMM/CMM since it only has to comply with the maintenance data provided by the TC/STC holder, DOA or appropriately qualified entity. **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.	Accepted. The TC holder will issue the applicable airworthiness limitations including CDCCL. Those limitations should be followed by the operators, maintenance organisations and individuals who are responsible for the correct implementation of the TC, STC holders instructions. This paragraph will be modified accordingly.	The paragraph 11 of AMC M.A.704 shall be modified accordingly: 11. The exposition should contain information as applicable, on how the continuing airworthiness management organisation complies with CDCCL instructions.

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2.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.708(b)3. Continuing Airworthiness Management	European Regions Airline Association	When managing the design of modifications or repairs the organisation should ensure that Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations are taken into account by communicating all the relevant information on the configuration of the aircraft. An operator, Part 145 or Part M does not manage the design of mods or repairs. Nevertheless clarification about the meaning of managing design could help clarify the intent of the requirement. It's also not clear to whom communication should be addressed and what is considered relevant information on the aircraft configuration **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.	Partially accepted. The proposed AMC wording has been modified to reflect the text of M.A.708(b)3 as shown in right column. It is agreed that the wording "managing the design" was confusing.	In AMC M.A.708(b)3 the following paragraph shall be added to the proposed text: "When managing the approval of modifications or repairs the organisation should ensure that Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations are taken into account."

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3.	Draft Decision Part-M Appendix I to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301(b)	European Regions Airline Association	2.4.1 If CDCCL have been identified for the aircraft type by the TC/STC holder, maintenance instructions should be developed. CDCCL are characterised by features in an aircraft installation or component that should be retained during modification, change, repair, or scheduled maintenance **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.	Partially accepted. Paragraph 2.4.1 is modified. As paragraph 2.4.2 is proposed to be removed following comment 62, paragraph 2.4.1 becomes 2.4.	Paragraph 2.4.1 is modified as follows: 2.4 Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) If CDCCL have been identified for the aircraft type by the TC/STC holder, maintenance instructions should be developed. CDCCL are characterised by features in an aircraft installation or component that should be retained during modification, change, repair, or scheduled maintenance for the operational life of the airplane or applicable component or part.

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4.	Draft Decision Part-M Appendix I to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301(b)	European Regions Airline Association	2.4.2 – Text too long to duplicate It's not the responsibility of Part 145, M or operator to develop new maintenance instructions. These result from the MRB. The operator can only be more restrictive in its Maintenance Program in matters that concern tasks intervals or by introducing hard times. The CDCCL features that must be retained during changes, modifications, repair or scheduled maintenance must be clearly indicated in the respective maintenance data provided by TC/STC holders. **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.	Accepted. As paragraph 2.4.2 is proposed to be removed following comment 62, paragraph 2.4.1 becomes 2.4. Refer to comment 3.	Paragraph 2.4.2 removed.
5.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.65(b)(3) Safety and quality policy, maintenance procedures and quality system	European Regions Airline Association	Paragraph 4 – text too long to duplicate Once again the Part 145 approved organisation can only comply with instructions given to it by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. This paragraph essentially requires the maintenance organisation to question every instruction received from whatever source. **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond	Accepted. Text paragraph 4 is modified to better reflect the responsibilities of maintenance organisation on this issue.	Text in AMC 145.A.65(b)3 modified as follows: 4. The maintenance organisation should ensure that when carrying out a modification, repair or maintenance, Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations are not compromised; this will require the development of appropriate procedures where necessary by the maintenance organisation.

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			the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.		
6.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.70(a) Maintenance organisation exposition	European Regions Airline Association	Once again the Part 145 approved organisation can only comply with instructions given to it by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. This paragraph essentially requires the maintenance organisation to question every instruction received from whatever source. **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.	Accepted. Refer to comment answer 1.	Text modified in AMC 145.A.70(a): 11. The exposition should contain information as applicable, on how the maintenance organisation complies with CDCCL instructions. The exposition should state how the completion of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations is traced.”

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7.	General Comment(s) General Comment – applies to whole of NPA	European Regions Airline Association	I believe this NPA should only focus on issues like awareness, training and traceability since CDCCL's are a new category of items that require in terms of control special treatment as is already used Airworthiness Directives, ALI's, etc. It should not be the operator, Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual to bear responsibility of guaranteeing the "quality" of the maintenance data (modifications, repairs, maintenance tasks etc.) produced by TC/STC holders or Part 21 organisations in respect to CDCCL's or any other issue. **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.	Agreed. The responsibilities of maintenance organisations have been clarified in several places as AMC M.A.704 ; AMC 145.A.65(b)3; AMC 145.A.70(a).	See modifications in paragraphs referred in the previous columns.
8.	General Comment(s) Page 1, NPA Introduction Comments for the NPA Second paragraph that describes the incorporation of Fuel Tank Safety requirements	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering recommends the verbiage be changed to state: “Fuel Tank Safety: incorporation of the Airworthiness Service Instructions that include Airworthiness Limitations that will be mandated, and other information that are acceptable means of compliance for Part –M, Part-145, and Part 66”. **Justification:** The FAA feels it is important to clarify the NPA applicability, which not only includes Part M requirements, but also includes fuel tank ALI (including CDCCL) that will be mandated by AD.	Not accepted. The Agency understands the FAA justification, but ALI are existing concepts within certification and maintenance, while the purpose of this NPA is to highlight the introduction of CDCCL into the AMCs of Part-M, Part-145 and Part-66. TC and STC documentation will explain both the ALI and CCDCL concepts.	Text not modified.

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9.	Explanatory Note Part IV. Content of the draft decision Page 5 of 16, paragraph 10	FAA	After the sentence "This policy had been harmonised with the policies of FAA, Transport Canada and CTA Brazil ", FAA Flight Standards/Engineering recommends the following sentence be added: This means that the referenced authorities agree on the objective and the principles contained in the policy but there may be differences in the details of implementation. **Justification:** The FAA feels it is important to clarify that harmonization may not include detailed application of agreed upon principles. (For example, the FAA does not recognize a safety assessment based on JAR 25.1309 as being compliant with SFAR 88 requirements).	Not accepted. Although the Agency agrees on the suggestion, we think that this document is not the good document to explain details of agreements of implementation between FAA and EASA. Those discussions are continuously being worked out between FAA and EASA.	Text not modified.
10.	Explanatory Note Part IV. Content of the draft decision Page 5 of 16, paragraph 12	FAA	After the sentence "The JAA interim policy highlights the need for a safety review based on JAR 22.1309 practices", FAA Flight Standards/Engineering recommends the following words in parentheses be added: (this is not equivalent to the requirements of FAA's SFAR 88.). **Justification:** Again, the FAA feels it is important to clarify that harmonization may not include detailed application of agreed upon principles.	Not accepted. Although the Agency agrees on the suggestion, we think that this document is not the good document to explain details of agreements of implementation between FAA and EASA. Those discussions are continuously being worked out between FAA and EASA.	Text not modified.
11.	Explanatory Note Part IV. Content of the draft decision Page 6 of 16, paragraph 16	FAA	Currently, there is a sentence that states, "The integrity must be maintained to ensure that unsafe conditions do not develop." FAA Flight Standards/Engineering recommends the sentence be reworded as follows: The integrity of the design feature must be maintained to ensure the prevention of ignition sources. **Justification:** The rewording is intended to clarify that not all cases where an ignition source was not prevented would necessarily result in an unsafe condition. Other faults or conditions may also have to occur to result in an unsafe condition.	Accepted.	Part IV. Content of the draft decision § 16 modified as follows: ~~The integrity must be maintained to ensure that unsafe conditions do not develop~~. The integrity of the design feature must be maintained to ensure the prevention of ignition sources.

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12.	Explanatory Note Part IV. Content of the draft decision Page 6 of 16, paragraph 16	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the following sentence should be worded: These features may exist in the fuel tank system and it s related installation or in systems that could, if a failure condition were to happen, interact with the fuel tank system in such a way that an ignition source could develop. **Justification:** The FAA feels the rewording is needed to be explicit regarding what kind of failure condition is the focus of the NPA.	Partially accepted. Although we accept the remark from the FAA, we propose to modify the text by deleting the last sentence which does not seem necessary to operators and maintenance organisations.	Part IV. Content of the draft decision § 16 modified as follows: ~~These features may exist in the fuel system and its related installation or in systems that could, if a failure condition were to happen, interact with the fuel system in such a way that an unsafe condition would develop in the fuel system.~~
13.	Explanatory Note Part IV. Content of the draft decision Page 6 of 16 paragraph 19	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the following sentence should be worded: For the affected existing fleet the ALI will be mandated by an airworthiness directive (AD) requiring incorporation of the necessary measures into the airworthiness limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. **Justification:** The FAA feels there is a need to ensure that applicability is clear. This is a fleet issue and is not limited to a select airplane or group of airplanes.	Accepted.	Last sentence of paragraph 19 is modified as follows: For the affected existing fleet the ~~The~~ ALI including CDCCL will be mandated by an airworthiness…
14.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.201 (h) Responsibilities Page 9 of 16, paragraph 4	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the following sentence should be worded: An operator should therefore have adequate knowledge of the design status (type specification, customer options, airworthiness directives (AD), Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), modifications, major repairs, operational equipment) and required and performed maintenance. **Justification:** The FAA feels the configuration definition of an airplane must include major repairs.	Accepted	Paragraph 4 modified as follows: 4. An operator should therefore have adequate knowledge of the design status (type specification, customer options, airworthiness directives (AD), Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), modifications, major repairs, operational equipment) and required and performed maintenance. Status of aircraft design and maintenance should be adequately documented to support the performance of the quality system.

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15.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.501 (d) Installation Page 10 of 16, paragraph 7	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the following sentence should be worded: When using raw or consumable material on an aircraft or component near or adjacent to or that directly impacts an identified Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation item, it should be assured by an accountable person that the CDCCL has not been compromised. **Justification:** The FAA feels that it must be made clear the degree of assurance/consideration that is required when working on, or adjacent to, a CDCCL.	Accepted.	Following paragraph shall be added: 7. "When using raw or consumable material on an aircraft or component near or adjacent to or that directly impacts an identified Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation item, it should be ensured that the CDCCL has not been compromised."
16.	Draft Decision Part-M Appendix 1 to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301 (b) Page 11 of 16, paragraph 2.4	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the section should be worded: Maintenance Service Instructions **Justification:** The FAA feels the current title is misleading. Specifically, we believe there is a need to make sure the title of this paragraph is consistent with the content, otherwise the information that follows may not be applied to other than CDCCL.	Noted: Paragraph 2.4.1 is modified. As paragraph 2.4.2 is proposed to be removed following comment 62, paragraph 2.4.1 becomes 2.4. Refer to comment 3.	
17.	Draft Decision Part-M Appendix 1 to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301 (b) Page 11of 16, paragraph 2.4.1	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the following sentence should be worded: CDCCL are characterized by features in an aircraft installation or component that should be retained during modification, change, repair, or scheduled maintenance for the operational life of the airplane or applicable component or part. **Justification:** The FAA believes this language must be included because it is the basic premise for the development of the ICA, i.e., effective for the operational life of the airplane, parts, and components.	Accepted Paragraph 2.4.1 is modified. As paragraph 2.4.2 is proposed to be removed following comment 62, paragraph 2.4.1 becomes 2.4. Refer to comment 3.	Paragraph 2.4.1 modified and becomes a new paragraph 2.4: "2.4 Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) If CDCCL have been identified for the aircraft type by the TC/STC holder, maintenance instructions should be developed. CDCCL are characterised by features in an aircraft installation or component that should be retained during modification, change, repair, or scheduled maintenance for the operational life of the airplane or applicable component or part. "

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18.	Draft Decision Part-M Appendix 1 AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301 (b) Page 12 of 16, paragraph 2.4.2	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the Standard Wiring Practices Manual, and the Structural Repair manual should be added to the existing TC/STC manuals listed in the stated paragraph. **Justification:** The FAA believes the current list may be interpreted as an all inclusive list, and not consider the manuals we suggest be listed.	Accepted, As paragraph 2.4.2 is proposed to be removed following comment 62, paragraph 2.4.1 becomes 2.4. Refer to comment 3.	Paragraph 2.4.2 removed.
19.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.50 (a) Certification of maintenance Page 14 of 16, paragraph 3	FAA	FAA Flight Standards/Engineering believes the following sentence should be worded: Any time maintenance is performed on a Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations item, such maintenance should be documented in accordance with the operator's record keeping procedures. **Justification:** The FAA feels that it is imperative that some form of record keeping be maintained for CDCCL related tasks.	Partially accepted. We cannot make reference to the operator's procedures as this is a Part-145 issue. However in the light of the remark, it appears that the wording is insufficient, and additional wording shall be added to the paragraph 3: "At any scheduled or unscheduled maintenance task carried out to a fuel system feature classified as a CDCCL, and before release to service the maintenance records shall reflect that the correct configuration is maintained and ensured. This should be done by the marking: CDCCL task." Refer to comment response 50 mention on Form1 required.	Paragraph 3 added: 3. At any scheduled or unscheduled maintenance task carried out to a fuel system feature classified as a CDCCL, and before release to service the maintenance records shall reflect that the correct configuration is maintained and ensured. This should be done by the marking: "CDCCL task".

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20.	General Comment(s)	FAA	In addition to the substantive changes the FAA has detailed in the preceding twelve NPA comment forms, we are suggesting some edit type corrections in the NPA that are intended to clarify the applicability, ensure technical correctness, and be better harmonized with FAA regulatory language and guidance. **Justification:** FAA Flight Standards, and FAA Engineering representatives believe our proposed changes to the NPA (substantive and editorial) do not compromise the intent of the NPA. Furthermore, we be believe the suggest changes are consistent with both EASA and FAA's ongoing harmonization effort regarding the Fuel Tank System Safety initiatives. In addition to the comment forms, we are attaching an edited version of the NPA, which depicts our suggested substantive changes in red, and the suggested non-substantive changes in green.	Noted. Those modifications could not be found in the FAA comments and the changes could not be implemented.	
21.	Explanatory Note Page 6, Paragraph 19 – Explanatory Note	Transport Canada	Transport Canada noted that through discussions with EASA and the FAA on fuel tank safety, our understanding of what constitutes ALI (Airworthiness Limitation Item) differs from that stated in paragraph 19 of the Explanatory Note. Our understanding is that ALIs are maintenance and inspection tasks or CDCCLs (Critical Design Control Configuration Limitations) required to preclude the development of unsafe conditions within the fuel system and do not include design changes. Incorporation of required design changes will be mandated through Airworthiness Directives **Justification:** Potential misunderstanding or not harmonized definition of ALI.	Accepted. Paragraph 19 shall be modified accordingly. ADs will also mandate the ALI including the CDCCL. Refer to comment 13.	Paragraph 19 modified: 19. As applied to fuel tank systems, ALI means fuel system mandatory instructions that can include ~~design changes,~~ maintenance, inspections. … For the affected existing fleet the ~~The~~ ALI including CDCCL will be mandated by an airworthiness…
22.		DGAC France	DGAC France has no comment on the subject NPA	Noted.	

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23.	Draft Decision Part-M Appendix 1 to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301(b) New paragraph 2.4, last section on page 12 of 16 of the NPA	Airbus	This section – although intended to clarify the documentation requirements given by this AMC - created confusion by its wording. It is not clear whether it – once adopted - would require - separate maintenance instructions manual chapter for fuel tank safety issues, and/or - separate issues of revisions for fuel tank safety related changes to existing documentation, or - if it would be sufficient to unambiguously identify fuel tank safety related changes in maintenance documentation revisions to differ them from changes to other systems. Airbus is requesting a more practical wording identifying EASA-preferred options to demonstrate compliance with M.A.302 and M.B.301 (b). **Justification:** Airbus is requesting a more practical wording as basis to investigate whether major revisions to its current approach to identify and publish changes to maintenance instructions would become necessary after adoption of this NPA. The current Airbus approach has been found sufficient to ensure adequate safety and traceability of revisions to maintenance instruction for all Airbus types. Changes to proven proceedings without safety benefit would only create administrative and financial burden on the aircraft manufacturers.	Accepted, As paragraph 2.4.2 is proposed to be removed following comment 62, paragraph 2.4.1 becomes 2.4. Refer to comment 3.	Paragraph 2.4.2 removed.
24.	Draft Decision Part-145 Draft Decision AMC Part 145	SAMCO	CDCCL are design related and therefore part of the TC/STC holders and Part 21 organization responsibilities. TC/STC holders and Part 21 organization should provide specific procedures regarding the CDCCL items in their continuous airworthiness and maintenance instructions. Part 145 organizations perform maintenance as requested by the Operator/Owner in accordance with TC/STC holders and/or other Part 21 approved maintenance instructions. As mentioned in the NPA the above is already part of	Partially accepted. See also comments 4, 5, 6, 7. EASA feels that it is necessary to clarify how to handle the Fuel Tank Safety concept within the maintenance organisations, and particularly the respect of TC and STC holder's instructions.	No change in text.

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			Part 145 and therefore the introduction does not require change of Part 145 regulation. Furthermore it is our opinion that the introduction of the CDCCL does not require amendment of the Part 145 AMC/GM and that therefore the change of the 145 AMC/GM is superfluous as it does not specify additional Part 145 requirements. Part 145 already provides guidance regarding maintenance on critical systems and it is therefore not required to introduce additional guidance material/AMC regarding CDCCL. The proposed NPA creates a special position for CDCCL items in relation to other critical design items such as ALI. Furthermore the proposed NPA places some responsibilities of the design organization with the maintenance organization and/or operator. **AMC.145.A.30(e)** This AMC already provides sufficient guidance on the training/assessment requirements of the Part 145 staff. Creation of CDCCL does not alter the requirements as mentioned in this AMC and it is the responsibility of the maintenance organization to provide the required training and assessment. If CDCCL specifically requires special training one could argue that the AMC should/could also specifically require special training for other/all critical maintenance tasks such as maintenance on flight, propeller and engine controls systems. **AMC 145.A.45(d)** The NPA states that change of maintenance instructions linked to CDCCL should be considered a modification that requires Part 21 approval. Requiring that the amendment regarding maintenance instructions of CDCCL items are to be approved by the TC holder limits the authorization (and responsibility) of the Part 145 organization It would for instance not allow the use of alternative yet equivalent tooling unless specifically approved by the TC		

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			holder. 145.A.45(d) allows the Part 145 organization only to amend the instructions on how to carry out maintenance it does not allow to change any design or inspection requirement. It allows the maintenance organization to use alternative/equivalent tooling and to make changes in the manner the maintenance is carried out but it does not allow to make changes in the end result, TC holders original intent or to make changes to the aircraft or component. Amending maintenance instructions is already limited by the Part 145 to the use of alternative (equivalent) tooling and in case where the TC holders original intent can not be achieved by using the original instruction or where the original intent can be achieved in a more efficient manner. Furthermore it is already required to inform the TC holder of any alterations to the maintenance instructions made by the maintenance organization thus creating the possibility for the TC holder to respond to the changes. **AMC 145.A.50(a)** Tracing critical tasks is already part of the Part 145 requirements as per 145.A.65 CDCCL are therefore already traced and do therefore not require specifically to be mentioned in AMC 145.A.50(a) **AMC 145.A.65(b)(3) and 145.A.70(a)** The maintenance organization only incorporates modification and repairs as per instructions specified by the (S)TC holder. The maintenance organization is not responsible for the design aspects of such modifications or repairs or on their effect on the CDCCL. Other Maintenance is performed in accordance with maintenance instructions specified by the (S)TC holder. As already explained under 145.A.45(d) the maintenance organization can only provide an alternative maintenance instructions in the way maintenance is performed not in		

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			the original outcome. **Justification:** See above		
25.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.704 § 11	UK CAA	Suggestion how paragraph should read: The continuing airworthiness management exposition should contain information, as applicable, on how the organisation ensures that no modification, repair or maintenance undermines a feature identified as a Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation; this requires the development of appropriate internal procedures where necessary that describe this management role with the operator or contracted maintenance organisation. The exposition should state how the compliance of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations is traced. **Justification:** Clarification.	Accepted. The TC holder will issue the applicable airworthiness limitations including CDCCL. Those limitations should be followed by the operators, maintenance organisations and individuals who are responsible for the correct implementation of the TC, STC holders instructions.	The paragraph 11 of AMC M.A.704 shall be modified accordingly: 11. The exposition should contain information as applicable, on how the continuing airworthiness management organisation complies with CDCCL instructions.
26.	Draft Decision Part-M Draft Decision Part-145 AMC M.A.704 11 and AMC 145.A.70(a)	UK CAA	The design of a modification is a DOA activity and should be addressed by a DOA through their Information for Continued Airworthiness, as the effect cannot be quantified by a maintenance management organisation. Repairs and maintenance are also governed by the same constraints. **Justification:** Clarification	Accepted. Refer to comment 25. The TC holder will issue the applicable airworthiness limitations including CDCCL. Those limitations should be followed by the operators, maintenance organisations and individuals who are responsible for the correct implementation of the TC, STC holders instructions.	Refer to modification of text in comment 25.

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
27.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.30(e)	UK CAA	Suggestion how paragraph should read: Additional training in fuel tank safety as well as associated inspection standards and maintenance procedures should be required of maintenance organisations' technical staff, especially those technical support staff involved with the management of CDCCL, SB assessment, work planning and maintenance programme management. **Justification:** Clarification	Accepted.	New paragraph in AMC 145.A.30(e) shall read: 11. Additional training in fuel tank safety as well as associated inspection standards and maintenance procedures should be required of maintenance organisations' technical staff, especially those technical staff involved with the compliance of CDCCL tasks. EASA guidance is provided for training to maintenance organisation staff in an Appendix IV to be added to AMC to Part-145.
28.	General Comment(s)	UK CAA	While those who are involved currently in SFAR 88 issues may understand what Fuel Tank safety is meant to mean, it is suggested that a definition to put it in context is included in the Continuing Airworthiness regulation EC 2042 article 2. **Justification:** Clarification	Noted. Although we agree with your comment, the proposal is outside of the scope of this NPA.	No change in text.
29.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.501 (b)	Austrocontrol	Refer to justification **Justification:** This change will not be supported. CDCCL will not be the case on component level of small A/C.	Not accepted. The initial proposed change is no more required as it is covered by ADs.	No change in text
30.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.501 (d)	Austrocontrol	New Para 7 will not be supported **Justification:** This change will not be supported. CDCCL will not be the case on component level of small A/C.	Accepted. Text shall be modified. Refer to comment 15.	AMC M.A.501(d)§7 shall read: "When using raw or consumable material on an aircraft or component near or adjacent to or that directly impacts an identified Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation item, it should be ensured that the CDCCL has not been compromised".

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
31.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.704	Austrocontrol	AMC M.A. 704 This text will be supported **Justification:** N/A	Noted.	
32.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.706 (f)	Austrocontrol	AMC M.A. 706 (f) text will not be supported **Justification:** There is no reference in the Regulation so the Paragraph is a stand alone. It is too much to address this item here again.	Not accepted. Refer to comment 48.	No change in text.
33.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.708 (b)(3)	Austrocontrol	AMC M.A. 708 (b) 3 Text will be supported **Justification:** N/A	Noted.	
34.	Draft Decision Part-M Appendix I to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301(b)	Austrocontrol	Page 11 of Para 1.1.14 will be supported. **Justification:** N/A	Noted	
35.	Draft Decision Part-M Paragraph 2.4	Austrocontrol	Delete this text. **Justification:** Paragraph 2.4 is too much and is the responsibility for the TC holder.	Accepted: Paragraph 2.4.1 is modified. As paragraph 2.4.2 is proposed to be removed following comment 62, paragraph 2.4.1 becomes 2.4. Refer to comment 3.	2.4.2 shall be removed as shown in comment 62.
36.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.30 (e)	Austrocontrol	Delete this text. **Justification:** Paragraph 11. This text reflects CAMO personal and is in the wrong place here. This has nothing to do with Part 145 personal.	Partially accepted. The "continuing airworthiness management organisation" is changed to "maintenance organisation" through response to comment 27 to the UKCAA.	New paragraph in AMC 145.A.30(e) shall read: 11. Additional training in fuel tank safety as well as associated inspection standards and maintenance procedures should be required of maintenance organisations' technical staff, especially those technical staff involved with the compliance of CDCCL tasks. EASA guidance is provided for

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
					training to maintenance organisation staff in an Appendix IV to be added to AMC to Part-145.
37.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.42	Austrocontrol	AMC 145.A.42 Will not be supported. **Justification:** CDCCL should stay on the Aircraft Level and not on the component level.	Not accepted, because some components have been classified as CDCCL at component level.	No change in text.
38.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.45 (b)	Austrocontrol	AMC 145.A.45 (b) text will be supported. **Justification:** N/A	Noted.	
39.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.45 (d)	Austrocontrol	AMC 145.A.45 (d) text will be supported. **Justification:** N/A	Noted.	
40.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.45 (g)	Austrocontrol	AMC 145.A.45 (g) text will be supported. **Justification:** N/A	Noted.	
41.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.50	Austrocontrol	AMC 145.A.50(a) text will be supported **Justification:** Consideration should be given to the fact that CDCCLs on component level are not adequate.	Noted. However the text of the reply to comment 37 states that CDCCL may affect components as well.	
42.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.65 (b)(3)	Austrocontrol	AMC 145.A.65 (b)(3) supported **Justification:** N/A	Noted.	

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
43.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC 145.A.70	Austrocontrol	AMC 145.A.70 is not supported. **Justification:** The issue is adequately addresses in other paragraphs. It is not necessary to address it here again.	Not accepted. However the AMC 145.A.70 will be modified as shown in Comment Response no 6.	Last paragraph of AMC 145.A.70 modified as follows: The exposition should contain information as applicable, on how the maintenance organisation ensures an adequate respect of CDCCL instructions. The exposition should state how the completion of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations is traced.
44.	Draft Decision Part-66 AMC 66.A.45	Austrocontrol	AMC 66.A.45 is supported with comments. **Justification:** The AMC should be specified to be an AMC to 66.A.45 (d). The Module and the Level of the training should be addressed in Appendix III to Part-66	Partially accepted. We agree that the training guidelines should be provided. AMC 66.45 shall be replaced by AMC 66.A.45 (d). EASA does not think that the Appendix III should be modified, however the following paragraph should be added to the text of AMC 66.A.45(d).	In AMC 66.A.45 (d), add a new paragraph 3. which reads: 3. Theoretical and practical training should also take into account critical aspects such as Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations. EASA guidance is provided for training in an Appendix IV to be added to AMC to Part-66. ~~3.~~ 4 ~~4.~~ 5 ~~5.~~ 6 ~~6.~~ 7 ~~7.~~ 8
45.	General Comment(s) Page 7 – Para 22	Thomas Cook UK	typographical error – states CDDCCL **Justification:** Editorial	Accepted.	Page 7 – Para 22 modified: Do nothing: This is not a viable option as ~~CDDCCL~~ CDCCL play a key role in fuel tank safety.

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
46.	Explanatory Note Page 8 – Para 24	Thomas Cook UK	The NPA states that the position with the FAA is harmonised. There are issues that will be raised within the comments to the NPA that may require further review with the FAA. How will the Agency address these and how would industry be consulted? **Justification:** Need to have a harmonised position with the FAA if operators are not to be presented with potential unnecessary problems in delivering/redelivering Aircraft.	Noted. The harmonisation between EASA and FAA is an on-going process of which operators and maintainers are frequently informed.	
47.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC . MA 704.11	Thomas Cook UK	The NPA states "exposition should state how the completion of the CDCCL is traced" – more guidance is needed to explain what level of traceability is required. If it is for example only that Approved Data should be used (which is implicit in the Regulations) then this is acceptable. If however, each CDCCL via its implementing AD, requires to be individually tracked and recorded, then this presents a much more difficult scenario. For example, one manufacturer has a proposed CDCCL task that requires the air gap between an FQI probe and the Aircraft structure to be maintained. Is it the intention that individual records are required to be maintained for each probe? **Justification:** This presents an extremely difficult recording situation for the operator, particularly in the event of an unscheduled fuel tank entry and also potentially could lead to differing interpretations of the AMC.	Noted. Refer to change proposed at comment 1.	The paragraph 11 of AMC M.A.704 shall be modified accordingly: 11. The exposition should contain information as applicable, on how the continuing airworthiness management organisation complies with CDCCL instructions.
48.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC . MA 706 (f)	Thomas Cook UK	The NPA requires training for certain CAMO Technical staff. **Justification:** There is no guidance as to what the content or level of such training should be and this will lead to varying interpretations and implementation. To date, very little, if any, guidance has been published by Authorities or Manufacturers in respect of this.	Accepted. A new paragraph will be added to this AMC to better reflect the training needed to CAMO continuing airworthiness staff for Fuel tank Safety.	In AMC M.A.706(f), add a new paragraph which reads: Additional training in fuel tank safety as well as associated inspection standards and maintenance procedures should be required of continuing airworthiness management organisations' technical staff, especially those technical support staff

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
					involved with the management of CDCCL, SB assessment, work planning and maintenance programme management EASA guidance is provided for training to CAMO continuing airworthiness staff in an Appendix XII to be added to AMC to Part-M.
49.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC . 145.A.30 (e)	Thomas Cook UK	The NPA requires training for certain CAMO Technical staff. **Justification:** There is no guidance as to what the content or level of such training should be and this will lead to varying interpretations and implementation. To date, very little, if any, guidance has been published by Authorities or Manufacturers in respect of this.	Accepted. A new paragraph will be added to this AMC which provides EASA guidance to maintenance organisation staff on training for Fuel Tank Safety.	In AMC 145.A.30(e), add a new paragraph which reads: 11. Additional training in fuel tank safety as well as associated inspection standards and maintenance procedures should be required of maintenance organisations' technical staff, especially those technical staff involved with the compliance of CDCCL tasks. EASA guidance is provided for training to maintenance organisation staff in an Appendix IV to be added to AMC to Part-145.
50.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC . 145.A.42 (b)	Thomas Cook UK	Could the Agency confirm that it is not a requirement that the EASA Form One be annotated with the term CDCCL? **Justification:** Clarification	Not accepted. As per Part 145 Appendix I, block 13 instructions: the CDCCL has to be mentioned in block 13: "*Block 13* It is mandatory to state any information in this block either direct or by reference to supporting documentation that identifies particular data or limitations relating to the items being released that are necessary for the User/ installer to make the final airworthiness determination of the item."	No change in text.

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
51.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC . 145.A.50 (a)	Thomas Cook UK	This requires that CDCCL tasks be traced during Maintenance before a CRS is issued. **Justification:** This can be open to many different interpretations, particularly in respect of unscheduled maintenance – to maintain a consistent approach and implementation, guidance should be provided on the type of documentation that would be expected.	Accepted. In the light of the comment, it appears that the wording is insufficient, and additional wording shall be added to the paragraph 3: "At any scheduled or unscheduled maintenance task carried out to a fuel system feature classified as a CDCCL, the maintenance records shall reflect that the correct configuration is maintained and ensured. This should be done by the marking: CDCCL item."	Paragraph modified: 3. At any scheduled or unscheduled maintenance task carried out to a fuel system feature classified as a CDCCL, the maintenance records shall reflect that the correct configuration is maintained and ensured. This should be done by the marking: "CDCCL task".
52.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC . 145.A.65 (b)	Thomas Cook UK	References to training. **Justification:** This can be open to many different interpretations, to maintain a consistent approach and implementation, guidance should be provided.	Accepted. The paragraph in right column should be added to the text of AMC.145.A.65 (b)3 similar to AMC 66-A.45(d):	Middle sentence of paragraph 145.A.65(b)3 modified as follows: Training should be provided to end indiscriminate routing and splicing of wire and to provide comprehensive knowledge of critical design features of fuel tank systems that would be controlled by a Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation. In AMC 145.A.30(e), add a new paragraph which reads: 11. Additional training in fuel tank safety as well as associated inspection standards and maintenance procedures should be required of maintenance organisations' technical staff, especially those technical staff involved with the compliance of CDCCL tasks. EASA guidance is provided for training to maintenance organisation staff in an Appendix IV to be added to AMC to Part-145.

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53.	Draft Decision Part-145 AMC . 145.A.70 (a)	Thomas Cook UK	The NPA states "exposition should state how the completion of the CDCCL is traced" – more guidance is needed to explain what level of traceability is required. If it is for example only that Approved Data should be used (which is implicit in the Regulations) then this is acceptable. If however, each CDCCL via its implementing AD, requires to be individually tracked and recorded, then this presents a much more difficult scenario. For example, one manufacturer has a proposed CDCCL task that requires the air gap between an FQI probe and the Aircraft structure to be maintained. Is it the intention that individual records are required to be maintained for each probe? **Justification:** This presents an extremely difficult recording situation for the operator, particularly in the event of an unscheduled fuel tank entry and also potentially could lead to differing interpretations of the AMC.	Noted. As long as the CDCCL items are clearly identified in the manufacturer's documents, the sign off of maintenance tasks is enough. The maintenance shall be traceable in accordance with the manufacture's instructions. Refer to Comment 47.	
54.	Draft Decision Part-66 AMC . 66.A.45	Thomas Cook UK	In respect of training the NPA uses the phrase "take into account" – this does not provide enough guidance. **Justification:** Different interpretations will be applied with this wording and more specific guidance is required. This will potentially lead to an inconsistent approach to tasks being undertaken in respect of this critical area which is unacceptable.	Accepted. AMC . 66.A.45 shall be modified as shown in the right column.	In AMC 66.A.45 (d), add a new paragraph 3. which reads: 3. Theoretical and practical training should also take into account critical aspects such as Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations. EASA guidance is provided for training in an Appendix IV to be added to AMC to Part-66. ~~3.~~ 4 ~~4.~~ 5 ~~5.~~ 6 ~~6.~~ 7 ~~7.~~ 8

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
55.	General Comment(s)	Thomas Cook UK	There is no Section B material provided specifically in respect of the new requirements. **Justification:** Addition of Section B material may assist in addressing some of the concerns raised in responses to the NPA.	Not accepted. The Agency does not feel that it is necessary to modify Section B as part of this NPA. In addition the commentator has not provided any specific proposal to modify the section B,	
56.		Mytravel Aircraft Eng.	**1**. Page 8 - Para 24 - The NPA states that the position with the FAA is harmonised. This is difficult to understand when there are many areas that are still unclear within the NPA. **2.** AMC MA704.11 - states "exposition should state how the completion of the CDCCL is traced" - more guidance is needed to explain what level of traceability is required. If it is for example only that Approved Data should be used (which is implicit in the Regulations) then this is acceptable. If however, each CDCCL via its implementing AD, requires to be individually tracked and recorded, then this presents a much more difficult scenario. For example, one manufacturer has a proposed CDCCL task that requires the air gap between an FQI probe and the Aircraft structure to be maintained. Is it the intention that individual records are required to be maintained for each probe? This presents an extremely difficult recording situation for the operator, particularly in the event of an unscheduled fuel tank entry and also potentially could lead to differing interpretations of the AMC. **3.** AMC MA 706 (f) - requires training for certain CAMO Technical staff. There is no guidance as to what the content or level of such training should be. **4.** AMC 145.A.30 (e) - requires training for certain CAMO Technical staff. There is no guidance as to what the content or level of such training should be. **5.** AMC 145.A.42 (b) - Could the Agency confirm that it is not a requirement that the EASA Form One be	1. Noted. 2. Noted. Refer to comment 1. 3. Noted Refer to comment 48. 4. Noted Refer to comment 49. 5. Noted Refer to comment 50.	

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
			annotated with the term CDCCL? **6.** AMC 145.A.50 (a) - This requires that CDCCL tasks be traced during Maintenance before a CRS is issued. This can be open to many different interpretations, particularly in respect of unscheduled maintenance - to maintain a consistent approach and implementation, guidance should be provided on the type of documentation that would be expected. **7.** AMC 145.A.65 (b) - In respect of the references to training, more guidance is needed to avoid differing interpretations. **8.** AMC 145.A.70 (a) - see comments for MA 704.11 above. **9.** AMC 66.A.45 - in respect of training, the phrase 'take into account' does not provide enough guidance and will lead to different interpretations as to what is actually required. **10.** There is no Section Material provided in respect of CDCCL. Addition of this may help to address some of the above concerns **Justification:**	6. Noted Refer to comment 51. 7. Noted Refer to comment 52 8. Noted Refer to comment 43. 9. Noted Refer to comment 44. Noted. No change needed.	
57.	Draft Decision Part-M AMC M.A.704 Continuing airworthiness management exposition	AAPA	11. The exposition should contain information, as applicable, on how the maintenance organisation ensures that no modification, repair or maintenance has an adverse effect on a feature identified as a Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation; this requires the development of appropriate procedures where necessary by the operator or contracted maintenance organisation. The exposition should state how the completion of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations is traced. An operator, Part M, Part 145 or Part 66 licensed individual cannot ensure any adverse effect of a	Noted. Refer to comment 1.	

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
			modification, repair or maintenance task per the AMM/CMM since it only has to comply with the maintenance data provided by the TC/STC holder, DOA or appropriately qualified entity. **Justification:** An operator, Part M or 145 approved organization is not, in general terms, authorized to carry out maintenance and/or repair and/or modification action that goes beyond the instructions contained within the associated maintenance, structural repair or component maintenance manuals. In the event that any maintenance, repair or modification action is required that extends outside the scope of these instructions, written instructions for accomplishment must have been provided by the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entity. Therefore it is incumbent on the TC holder, DOA or other qualified entities, not a Part M, 145 or 66 licensed individual, to ensure that their instructions do not contain procedures that would in any way denigrate the safety of the fuel tanks and associated systems.		
58.	Explanatory Note (Page 6) Section IV ("Content of the Draft Decision"): Item 18, 3rd sentence	Boeing	Replace the text of the third sentence with the following: "CDCCL are fuel tank system safety features defined by holders of type certificates or supplemental type certificates that operators must develop appropriate procedures to maintain them when working in the areas defined by the CDCCL." **Justification:** Clarification is necessary. CDCCL are not controlled by operators at any time. Any changes to CDCCL must be approved by the Regulatory Agency's relevant Type Certification Office.	Partially accepted. The 3rd line will be modified as follows: "CDCCL are fuel tank system safety features defined by holders of type certificates or supplemental type certificates who are responsible fro developing appropriate guidelines."	Item 18, 3rd sentence is modified as follows: CDCCL are fuel tank system safety features defined by holders of type certificates or supplemental type certificates who are responsible fro developing appropriate guidelines.

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59.	Explanatory Note (Page 8) Section V ("Regulatory Impact Assessment""): Item 24 – Impacts: Safety	Boeing	Replace the text of this item with the following: "Safety. CDCCL are a key element of fuel tank safety. Increasing awareness of these critical features and establishing requirements to maintain them during maintenance will improve safety." **Justification:** Clarification is necessary. While Boeing agrees with the conclusion regarding an improvement in safety, CDCCL are not "tasks," but design configuration features.	Accepted. Text of Safety impact will be modified accordingly.	Item 24 is modified as follows: Safety. CDCCL are a key element of fuel tank safety. Increasing awareness of these critical features and establishing requirements to maintain them during maintenance will improve safety
60.	Explanatory Note (Page 8) Section V ("Regulatory Impact Assessment""): Item 24 – Impacts: Economic	Boeing	The NPA states: "The number of CDCCL is relatively limited so the impact on operators and maintenance organizations should be limited." We suggest clarifying this text. Although the number of CDCCL may relatively limited, the impact on manufacturers, operators, and maintenance organizations will be an additional cost and effort to implement and continue to ensure CDCCL are met. These additional costs should be quantified and stated. **Justification:** It is not clear what data were used to reach these economic conclusions. The statement in the NPA does not appear to be based on the actual experience of the holders of type certificates or supplemental type certificates. The cost to date to develop and provide all the approved and cross-referenced data required by the additional fuel safety requirements has already been significant. Also, there are additional recurring and non-recurring costs for the operators. Thus, the overall economic impact is not "limited," but significant.	Noted. We agree that economic impacts may be more than limited, however operators, maintenance organisations and manufacturers have not provided detailed economic figures , ADs have been circulated for comments and no economical comments have been provided. Those ADs and schedules to comply with have been discussed with operators and manufacturers and maintenance organisations. Therefore the costs of introducing the CDCCL programme should not be over-emphasized.	

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61.	Draft Decision Part-M (Page 10) AMC M.A.704 (Continuing airworthiness management exposition), paragraph 11, last sentence	Boeing	Replace the last sentence of the paragraph with the following: "The exposition should trace/establish after the completion of any work in the area of a Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation that any CDCCL features are not adversely affected." **Justification:** Clarification of the requirement is needed. Since this requirement is new to the industry, Boeing strongly recommends that EASA provide further clarification and guidance on how operators will be able satisfy this requirement.	Not accepted. The proposed statement relates to certification of maintenance, while this paragraph concerns the operator's exposition. Refer to comment 1.	
62.	Draft Decision Part-M (Page 11), Appendix I to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B. 301 (b), New paragraph 2.4.2., 7th line	Boeing	The last sentences of the new paragraph state: " ... For example, fuel system bonding can be identified as a subsystem and, as such, could be a Maintenance Significant Item (MSI). Any new maintenance requirements should be included in the maintenance development process to ensure full maintenance needs are treated in accordance with the established processes (eg., MSG) as necessary." We request that EASA delete all references to MSIs in the proposed NPA 22/2005 requirements. **Justification:** Maintenance Significant Items (MSI) in the context of fuel tank safety reviews have been defined as non-safety items and are not connected to CDCCLs, which are defined as Airworthiness Limitations. In addition, this NPA title states NPA 22/2005 is introducing CDCCL into Acceptable Means of Compliance for Part-M, Part 145, and Part-66. Also, the current development of MSIs does not use established processes; instead, it uses a modified process where the emphasis is based on fuel tank safety aspects and not on functional failures -- which is a change in the philosophy of the MSG process.	Accepted: The full paragraph 2.4.2 should be removed as this information is already available in the EASA D 2006/CPRO/ Certification Policy statement on Fuel Tank Safety published on the EASA web site.	Paragraph 2.4.2 removed.

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63.	Draft Decision Part-M (Page 12) Appendix I to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B. 301 (b), New paragraph 2.4.2, 2nd paragraph	Boeing	Delete the sub-paragraph beginning with " ... The maintenance task descriptions ..." **Justification:** We recommend this change for necessary consistency. The subject of this subparagraph is different from that introduced by the NPA. The task descriptions and interval requirements mentioned in the subparagraph are associated with items that have specific task or check interval requirements. However, as stated in this NPA (see page 6, Section IV, Item 16,) CDCCL refers to a feature of the fuel system design and is, therefore, not a task- or interval-oriented part of the continued airworthiness for the fuel system.	Accepted. Paragraph 2.4.2 shall be removed. Refer to response to comment 62.	Paragraph 2.4.2 removed.
64.	Draft Decision Part-145 (Page 14) AMC 145.A.50(a) ("Certificate of maintenance"), new paragraph 3	Boeing	Replace new paragraph 3 with the following: "Before a certificate of release to service is issued after the completion of any work in the area of a Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation, it should be traced/established that any CDCCL features are maintained." **Justification:** Clarification of the requirement is needed. Since this requirement is new to the industry, Boeing strongly recommends that EASA provide further clarification and guidance on how operators will be able satisfy this requirement.	Partially accepted. Refer to answer to comment 19. Additional wording will be added to the paragraph 3: "At any scheduled or unscheduled maintenance task carried out to a fuel system feature classified as a CDCCL, and before release to service the maintenance records shall reflect that the correct configuration is maintained and ensured. This should be done by the marking: CDCCL task."	Paragraph 3 modified as shown: 3. At any scheduled or unscheduled maintenance task carried out to a fuel system feature classified as a CDCCL and before release to service, the maintenance records shall reflect that the correct configuration is maintained and ensured. This should be done by the marking: "CDCCL task".

#	Para	Commentor	Comment/Justification	Response	Resulting text
65.	Draft Decision Part-66 (Page 16) New paragraph AMC 66.A.45 (“Type/task training and ratings”)	Boeing	Delete this new paragraph until the actual EASA requirements are more defined. **Justification:** Clarification is needed. Introduction of a new paragraph with a title of “Type/task training and ratings” suggests that the training required may be formal and may require rating endorsement on existing certifications. Also, use of the phrases “critical aspects” and “such as” implies that CDCCL awareness is only one of the subjects for which training is required, but does not mention any other subject.	Partially accepted. The Agency feels that this paragraph should not be deleted and further Guidance on training will be added. Refer to answer to comment 54.	In AMC 66.A.45 (d), add a new paragraph 3. which reads: 3. Theoretical and practical training should also take into account critical aspects such as Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations. EASA guidance is provided for training in an Appendix IV to be added to AMC to Part-66. ~~3.~~ 4 ~~4.~~ 5 ~~5.~~ 6 ~~6.~~ 7 ~~7.~~ 8