

**Annex to Decision 2016/019/R**  
**'AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2, Amendment 8'**

The Annex to Decision 2014/017/R is hereby amended as follows:

The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted, new or amended text as shown below:

1. deleted text is marked with ~~strike through~~;
2. new or amended text is highlighted in grey; and
3. an ellipsis (...) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

1. The new AMC2 ORO.GEN.160 has been introduced:

**Subpart GEN — General requirements**

**Section I — General**

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**AMC2 ORO.GEN.160 Occurrence reporting**

**REPORTABLE EVENTS OF PBN OPERATIONS**

- (a) A reportable event should be an event that adversely affects the safety of the operation and may be caused by actions or events external to the functioning of the aircraft navigation system.
- (b) Technical defects and the exceedance of technical limitations, including:
  - (1) significant navigation errors attributed to incorrect data or a database coding error;
  - (2) unexpected deviations in lateral/vertical flight path not caused by flight crew input or erroneous operation of equipment;
  - (3) significant misleading information without a failure warning;
  - (4) total loss or multiple navigation equipment failure; and
  - (5) loss of integrity, e.g. RAIM function, whereas integrity was predicted to be available during preflight planning,should be considered a reportable event.
- (c) The operator should have in place a system for investigating a reportable event to determine if it is due to an improperly coded procedure or a navigation database error. The operator should initiate corrective actions for such an event. ...

2. AMC1 ORO.FC.230 has been amended as follows:

**Subpart FC — Flight crew**

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**SECTION II — ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CAT OPERATIONS**

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**AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking**

RECURRENT TRAINING SYLLABUS

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(b) Recurrent checking

Recurrent checking should comprise the following:

(1) Operator proficiency checks

(i) Aeroplanes

Where applicable, operator proficiency checks should include the following manoeuvres as pilot flying:

- (A) rejected take-off when an FSTD is available to represent that specific aeroplane, otherwise touch drills only;
- (B) take-off with engine failure between  $V_1$  and  $V_2$  (take-off safety speed) or, if carried out in an aeroplane, at a safe speed above  $V_2$ ;
- (C) ~~precision instrument 3D~~ approach operation to minima with, in the case of multi-engine aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative;
- (D) ~~non-precision 2D~~ approach operation to minima;
- (E) at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation;
- (~~E~~F) missed approach on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative;
- (~~F~~G) landing with one-engine-inoperative. For single-engine aeroplanes a practice forced landing is required.

(ii) Helicopters

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- (B) For pilots required to engage in IFR operations, proficiency checks include the following additional abnormal/emergency procedures:
  - ~~precision instrument 3D~~ approach operation to minima;
  - go-around on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine;

- ~~non-precision 2D~~ approach operation to minima;
- at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation;
- in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine to be included in either the ~~precision or non-precision~~ 3D or 2D approach operation to minima;
- landing with a simulated failure of one or more engines;
- where appropriate to the helicopter type, approach with flight control system/flight director system malfunctions, flight instrument and navigation equipment failures.