

Application of Standard Fasteners

CM-S-003

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
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Introduction

- Accumulation of failed standard fasteners was observed
- Source:
hydrogen embrittlement
- Other non-conformities
cannot be excluded




Any crack, if present, would be parallel with nut axis.



Example 1

Failed nuts on clutch assembly of small rotorcraft.

- 5 out of 12 nuts failed
- subsequently 1 bolt failed (no nut failure)



Example 2

- 2 fatalities, 1 severely burned
- Detachment of flight control fastener
- Root cause: Failed nut
- A number of cracked nuts were found on other hydraulic boost servos





Figure 8: Lower flight control push-pull tube rod end



Defects observed



Origin:



Problem

If **Standard Fasteners** are used in **Critical Installations**, deviations from the standard, such as manufacturing flaws and errors, may result in **unexpected failure** of the fastener with undesirable consequences at the aircraft level.

The **overall quality system** applicable to standard parts and the degree of **industry oversight** of the parts producers is not always adequate.

Is a standard fastener made according to the standard?

Has the manufacturer an adequate quality system?

Definitions

Standard Fastener

A fastener that is a Standard Part.
Fasteners (nuts and bolts) being produced according to a certain standard which is not directly approved by the agency.

Qualified Standard Fastener

A Standard Fastener that requires additional verification of compliance to specification and/or control of their source, by methods defined by the DAH.

Critical Installation

A structural/mechanical assembly, which may include fasteners the failure of which (single or multiple due to common cause) is classified as **hazardous or catastrophic**.

General

- Applicable to CS-VLA, CS-VLR, CS-23, CS-25, CS-27, CS-29, CS-P and CS-E
- Addresses DAH to
 - Provide guidance to the designer
 - To instruct POSs and MOAs as necessary to ensure CAW


Typically standard fastener are not appropriate for use as critical part

How can you know you get what you ordered ?

→ You cannot!

BUT

→ You can ensure, by additional procedures, ensure that the risk of the fastener failing during service is reduced



How to identify the risk

- Identify all critical installations
 - Failure with hazardous or catastrophic consequence
- Identify if standard fasteners are used
- Identify the consequence of loss of fastener(s)
 - Redundancy of fasteners alone may not be sufficient, since they all can suffer from the same defect
 - For double locking it needs to be checked if the fail safe philosophy is still maintained
- Identify consequence of manufacturing process variation

Measures to mitigate the risk **without** new P/N

- Use qualified standard fasteners
 - Define additional procedures/checks to ensure appropriate characteristics
 - Define acceptance criteria
 - Define who needs to do the checks
 - Ensure that during maintenance only qualified standard fasteners are used
- Identify approved suppliers
 - Define the quality system needed for approved suppliers
 - Ensure that during maintenance only fasteners from approved suppliers are used in critical installations

Measures to mitigate the risk **with** new P/N

- Preferred: Do not use standard fasteners
 - Order fasteners according to your own drawing (built-to-print part)
or
 - Order Standard Fasteners
 - Ensure by additional checks that the fasteners are meeting the required characteristics
and
 - Allocate a new part number to the fastener



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