

Helicopter Vibration Health Monitoring

RMT.0350 AND RMT.0351 (OPS.074 (A) AND OPS.074 (B)) - 19.11.2013

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) addresses a regulatory issue regarding vibration health monitoring (VHM) system in commercial air transport (CAT) helicopters that have a maximum certified take-off mass of more than 3 175 kg or a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of more than 9. A VHM system allows detecting mechanical failures before they could lead to a serious incident or accident.

Section II of Part III of ICAO Annex 6 contains a recommendation, not a standard, that this type of helicopters (large helicopters) should be equipped with a VHM system.

NPA 2013-10 'Helicopter offshore operations' already considered this recommendation. It proposes to mandate the installation of a VHM system in CAT helicopters operating in a hostile environment, but not for those operating in a non-hostile environment

Subsequently, the specific objective of this NPA is to validate the need for a regulatory requirement for VHM equipment to be installed in new, and retrofitted to existing CAT helicopters that are not involved in offshore operations, but have a maximum certified take-off mass of more than 3 175 kg or a MOPSC of more than 9.

The Agency has assessed all aspects related to operations by the relevant helicopters with specific attention to the safety level and the cost impact associated with instalment or retro-fitment of a VHM system. The assessment indicates that the major issues in helicopter operations are related to piloting. This information will be further considered during the RMTs addressing pilot licensing and operator pilot training. The Agency concludes that a regulatory requirement for VHM system is not required, as a significant safety improvement for the relevant helicopters would not be introduced. In addition, the associated costs cannot be justified. Consequently, the ICAO Annex 6 recommendation is not transposed into EU legislation for other than helicopter offshore operations in hostile environment.

With this NPA, the Agency publishes its assessment and proposes not to amend the Air OPS rules.

Nevertheless, the Agency encourages EHEST to promote voluntary installation of VHM equipment.

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	Applicability	Process map	
Affected regulations and decisions:	Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 `Air Ops'	Concept Paper: Terms of Reference: Rulemaking group:	No 23.08.2013 No
Affected stakeholders:	Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operators of helicopters with a MTOM of more than 3 175 kg or a MOPSC of more than 9 not involved in offshore operations. Design organisations of the same balicopters	RIA type: Technical consultation	Light
		during NPA drafting: Duration of NPA consultation: Review group: Focussed consultation:	NO 2 months TBD TBD
Driver/origin: Reference:	Legal obligation (ICAO alignment) N/A	Publication date of the Opinion: Publication date of the Decision:	2014/Q3 2015/Q3

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1. Procedural information

1.1. The rule development procedure

The European Aviation Safety Agency (hereinafter referred to as the 'Agency') developed this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008¹ (hereinafter referred to as the 'Basic Regulation') and the Rulemaking Procedure².

This rulemaking activity is included in the Agency's Rulemaking Program 2014-2017 under RMT.0350 and RMT.0351 (former task number OPS.074(a) and OPS.074(b)).

The text of this NPA has been developed by the Agency. It is hereby submitted for consultation of all interested parties³.

The process map on the title page contains the major milestones of the rulemaking activity to date and provides an outlook of the timescale of the next steps.

1.2. The structure of this NPA and related documents

This NPA is based on a light RIA which is included in the safety risk assessment contained in Chapter 2.

The document is structured as follows:

Chapter 1: Procedural information related to the task.

Chapter 2: Explanatory Note on the core technical content.

Chapter 3: Proposed text for the new requirements.

Chapter 4: References to affected IR, AMC and GM.

Chapter 5: Appendices.

1.3. How to comment on this NPA

Please submit your comments using the automated **Comment-Response Tool (CRT)** available at <u>http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/</u>⁴.

The deadline for submission of comments is **20 January 2014**.

1.4. The next steps in the procedure

Following the closing of the NPA public consultation period, the Agency will review all comments.

The outcome of the NPA public consultation will be reflected in the respective Comment-Response Document (CRD).

The Agency will publish the CRD together with the Decision.

¹ Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 6/2013 of 8 January 2013 (OJ L 4, 9.1.2013, p. 34).

² The Agency is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such process has been adopted by the Agency's Management Board and is referred to as the 'Rulemaking Procedure'. See Management Board Decision concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of Opinions, Certification Specifications and Guidance Material (Rulemaking Procedure), EASA MB Decision No 01-2012 of 13 March 2012.

³ In accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation and Articles 5(3) and 6 of the Rulemaking Procedure.

⁴ In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster (<u>crt@easa.europa.eu</u>).

2. Explanatory Note

2.1. Issue

2.1.1. Overview of the issues to be addressed

Due to their design, helicopters are potentially vulnerable to catastrophic mechanical failures because of the number of single-load-path critical parts within the rotor and rotor drive systems and the reduced redundancy within their design. These facts and the previously very high accident rates led to the development of Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM) systems which are now established as proven safety tools used to identify the onset of mechanical failure.

Part III of ICAO Annex 6 includes a recommendation that helicopters with a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 3 175 kg or a maximum seating configuration of more than 9 should be equipped with a vibration health monitoring system.

NPA 2013-10 'Helicopter offshore operations' included the ICAO recommendation in its consideration when suggesting a regulatory requirement for VHM system in commercial air transport (CAT) operations with helicopters operating in a hostile environment. Helicopter offshore operations are, therefore, not further considered in this NPA.

As a result, this RMT shall address the question if a general requirement for VHM system is considered necessary for CAT helicopters that are not involved in offshore operations, but have a maximum certified take-off mass of more than 3 175 kg or a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of more than 9. This corresponds with the definition of a large helicopter as given by the airworthiness certification specifications.

If so considered, Annex IV to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012⁵ should be amended to include a regulatory requirement on the installation of VHM systems.

2.1.2. Who is affected?

CAT operators which are <u>not</u> involved in offshore operations but utilise helicopters with a maximum certified take-off mass of more than 3 175 kg or a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of more than 9. These operators are presently not regulatory committed to install a VHM system.

2.1.3. Safety risk assessment

(a) General

The high helicopter accident rates in the 1970s and 1980s were reduced over a period when a number of initiatives implementing quality and safety management systems was introduced. VHM systems were among them. It is, however, difficult to quantify if a safety improvement was attributable to VHM systems.

The principal purpose of a VHM is to increase the likelihood of detection of incipient faults in the rotor and rotor drive system that could prevent continued safe flight and landing by providing timely warning of potential failures to the pilot and maintenance personnel.

⁵ Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

The safety risk assessment will indicate if the VHM system should be recommended to be installed in the relevant helicopters.

(b) Number of relevant existing helicopters

The assessment of the Agency's databases indicates that approximately 160 relevant CAT helicopters of different manufacturers and types are operated in the Member States. The majority of the helicopters (97%) are involved in medevac/air ambulance/HEMS operations. The remaining 3 % perform public transport.

The same databases indicate that another 130 helicopters are involved in 'Utility (civil multi-role)' operations. As the database does not specify if these are CAT operators, they are not considered within this RIA.

(c) Accidents involving the relevant helicopters

From 2001 to the end of 2012, the relevant helicopters were involved in 37 accidents, and 12 different helicopter types were represented according to the Agency's database⁶. The database does not identify if helicopters are equipped with a VHM system, but it is known that the S-92 was so equipped.

Table 1 Helicopters and accidents	
EC 145/Bölkow BK-117	9
MIL MI-2 (No longer in service)	9
Sikorsky S-76	4
Bell B-412	3
Eurocopter AS-365	3
Bell B-212	2
PZL Swidnik W3	1
MIL MI-8	1
Eurocopter SA-330	1
Eurocopter AS-332	1
Sikorsky S-61	1
Sikorsky S-92	1
Sum	36

⁶ See 5.1 for details of the accidents.

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According to the accident reports available to the Agency, the accidents are within 4 flight categories;

Table 2	Accident categories	
Medical		21
Passenger		7
Ferry/reposit	tioning	6
Training		2
	Sum	36

For the purpose of this RMT, the accidents are divided into being technical or non-technical. 32 of 36 accidents appear as non-technical.

Table 3	Non-technical accident	:
Collision with	n obstacles/CFIT ⁷	21
Loss of cont	rol in flight	4
Damage cau	sed by rotor downwash	3
Mid-air collis	ion	1
Fuel starvati	on	1
Engine failur	e due to inlet icing	1
Military inter	vention (shot down)	1
	Sum	32

The military intervention is not linked to the operation of the helicopter. Therefore, 31 of the 32 accidents are linked to the operation of the helicopter, representing 86 % of the accidents.

The remaining 4 accidents were due to technical faults (technical accidents). They are individually different and involved 4 helicopter types.

Table	4 Technica			
Year	Accident	Cause	Helicopter	Category
2003	Gearbox failure	Unknown	MI-2	Ambulance. Over land.
2005	Rotor failure	Servo failure	S-76	Passenger fight. Over water.
2007	Engine failure	Fuel pump failure	S-61	Passenger flight. Over land.
2011	Engine failure	Unknown	Bell 212	Passenger flight. Over land.

⁷ CFIT: Controlled flight into terrain.

These accidents represent 11 % of all accidents. Each accident represents less than 3 %.

A presentation of the number of accidents in table 5 illustrates the relationship between operational and technical accidents. In addition, the military intervention is included.



Table 5 illustrates that the main problem areas for the relevant helicopters are found within the operational (non-technical) accidents. This information will be further considered during the RMTs addressing pilot licensing and operator pilot training.

(d) Safety benefits from VHM system in the relevant helicopters

According to the Certification Specification for Large Rotorcraft (CS-29), VHM is vibration monitoring of rotors and/or rotor drive systems. If the VHM system is requested by the applicant or required by operational regulations as specified in CS 29.1465, a safety analysis must be used to identify all component failure modes for which VHM could provide reliable means of early detection, and necessary thresholds for alerts must be established.

The 4 technical accidents that happened during the period from 2001 through 2012 are pictured in table 6.



Statistically the table indicates that technical accidents are few and they are spread throughout the selected timeframe.

The involved helicopters were not equipped with a VHM system.

Engine failure was the cause in 2 of the accidents. A VHM system can monitor the engines but it is unlikely that a pre-warning would have been possible in the case of the fuel pump failure. In the case of the unknown engine failure, a possible VHM warning cannot be disregarded, however, it cannot be substantiated.

The gearbox failure that caused one of the remaining accidents might have been preventable by using VHM. However, as the cause of failure remains unknown, it is impossible to substantiate this statement.

A main rotor failure was caused by failure of a servo actuator. It is unlikely for this to have resulted in significant vibration prior to the accident.

Future failure of rotor and transmission systems can be minimised by good design, but they may still occur. In this respect, VHM can provide additional benefits.

There are also other factors to be considered. Operations solely over land under VFR have the prerogative to make unscheduled precautionary or emergency landings should a technical problem arise. The potential benefit of a VHM system for these operations may not be as significant. When flights are performed under IFR, over water, at night or over hostile land areas, the operator may, however, see an advantage in a VHM system.

(e) Safety risk assessment – conclusion

The majority of the helicopters covered by this NPA are used in ambulance/HEMS operations (157). Those operations are typically conducted in VMC. The remaining helicopters are passenger flights (5) over water or over land.

During a 12-year period (2001 – 2012) these helicopters experienced 4 technically related accidents out of a total of 36 accidents. There are no similarities between the accidents except that the end result was an engine failure in 2 of the accidents.

The 4 technical accidents involved 4 of the 12 helicopter types exposed to accidents in general.

According to CS-29, a VHM system is vibration monitoring of rotors and/or rotor drive systems. If the system is requested by the applicant or required by operational regulations, component failure modes and necessary thresholds for alerts must be established based on a safety analysis.

The helicopters did not have a VHM system installed. In 2 of the accidents, the initiation causes might have been detectable by a VHM system. It would, however, be speculative to apply that such system, if it was installed, would have provided a prewarning. VHM systems are assumed to initiate warnings for approximately 60 % of all potentially catastrophic rotor drive system failure cases.

By applying statistics to the above figures; of the 162 relevant helicopters, 36 experienced accidents. 4 of them were technical accidents of which 2 had a 60 % possibility to be detected if a VHM system was fitted. This indicates that 0,7 % of all the relevant helicopters or 3,3 % of the helicopters involved in accidents might have benefited from a VHM system as shown in table 7.



As stated in (d) above, a VHM system is not a panacea that will prevent all failures as it will have its own limitations.

The Agency concludes that based on the review of accidents, mandatory fitment of a VHM system cannot be justified.

However, as it is a general assumption or acceptance in the industry that a VHM system may provide extra safety benefits, the Agency is proposing to the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) to promote voluntary installation of VHM equipment in the relevant helicopters and to develop guidance for operators how best to use the data to improve operations.

2.2. Objectives

The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in Chapter 2.1.

This NPA shall validate if a VHM system introduces a significant safety improvement for helicopter operations.

2.3. Policy options

Three policy options were suggested in the Pre-RIA as detailed in table 8.

Option	Short title	Description
0	Do nothing	Baseline option. Leave regulations unchanged. Regulatory requirement for VHM system will not be introduced.
1	Amend regulations	Regulatory requirement for VHM system will be introduced A) for new helicopters B) for new helicopters and helicopters in service
2	Encourage instalment	Regulatory requirement for VHM system will not be introduced, but instalment and use of the system will be promoted.

Table 8 Selected policy options

2.4. Analysis of impacts

2.4.1. Safety impact

On the one hand, the installation of a VHM system allows detection of incipent faults in mechanical systems. This could prevent hazardous and catastrophic failure conditions arising as appropriate maintenance action can be taken. On the other hand, the accidents

review shows that most of the helicopter accidents are due to loss of control or controlled flight into terrain. It cannot be established with certainty that in the few accidents that were caused by mechanical failures, the systems would not have failed, had a VHM system been installed. In addition, it is to be considered that most operations take place in accordance with VFR and that onshore helicopter operations are conducted in a manner that allows a safe forced landing. A clear safety benefit by installing VHM system cannot, therefore, be established. Nevertheless, it could be for certain type of operations and operating environment. This is, however, a decision to be taken by the operator based on its hazard identification process. Option 2 is, therefore, seen as having a slightly positive impact while options 0 and 1 are neutral.

2.4.2. Environmental impact

Not affected.

2.4.3. Social impact

Not affected.

2.4.4. Economic impact

A VHM system retro-fitted or installed in a helicopter will reduce the available payload which for some operations may be significant. Necessary upgrading or training within the maintenance facilities will be required to interpret and use the data to improve operations. These facts have an economic impact.

Retro-fitment of a VHM system into existing helicopters must be performed during a major overhaul, some of which are not planned before 2018 according to operators. For some of the relevant helicopters, retro-fitment is expected to be not technically challenging. For helicopter types that do not already use VHM system, and for those where manufacturer retrofit SB⁸ or STC⁹ does not exist, the installation requires a very long downtime, and for some of them, installation is not considered technically feasible. The associated economic impact for a similar safety gain will, therefore, vary substantially for the different helicopter types if at all available.

Installation of VHM system prior to delivery of a new helicopter is feasible at an extra cost of approximately EUR 0.5 million, which is approximately 12 % of the basic price for a helicopter (Bell 429: EUR 4.2 million). An annual service/support cost is quoted at EUR 15 000.

The economic impact associated with VHM system retro-fit or installation is related only to option 1 which is affected negatively. Options 0 and 2 do not have an economic impact (neutral).

2.4.5. Proportionality issues

The potential cost impact of option 1 may create an undue higher burden for small operators in comparison to larger operators.

This is a negative influence for option 1.

2.4.6. Impact on 'Better Regulation' and harmonisation

Based on the analysis above, 'Better Regulation' and harmonisation is not achieved by any of the options. Options 0 and 2 do not initiate any requirements for regulation. Therefore, harmonisation remains unchanged without negative consequences. This influences options 0 and 2 neutrally.

⁸ Service Bulletin

⁹ Supplemental Type Certificate

Option 1 will introduce a not wanted or not required regulation, but will harmonise regulations in a not wanted direction. This influences option 1 negatively.

2.4.7. Comparison and conclusion

Comparison of options

Table 8 depicts the comparison between options 0, 1 and 2.

The options are graphically introduced by assigning values to the influences;

– Positive = +

- Neutral = 0
- Negative =

Table 8Comparison of opt	Comparison of options						
Impacts	Option 0	Option 1	Option 2				
Safety	0	0	0/+				
Economic	0	-	0				
Proportionality issues	0	-	0				
'Better Regulation' and harmonisation	0	-	0				
Result	0	-	0				

Conclusion

As a general rule the safety and economic options are weighed highest during comparison. Based on this and also the remaining options, it is evident that options 0 'No amended regulation' and 2 'Encourage installation' are preferred.

This indicates that a regulatory requirement for VHM system in the relevant helicopters will not be proposed, but the Agency will encourage installation of the system on a voluntary basis.

2.5. Overview of the proposed amendments

2.5.1. Which IR or ACM and GM might need amendment

Based on the above explanations the Agency will not amend Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 or EASA Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) or Guidance Material (GM) to Part CAT to include a requirement for VHM system in CAT helicopters that are not involved in offshore operations, but have a maximum certified take-off mass of over 3 175 kg or a MOPSC of more than 9.

ICAO compliance is not affected as the corresponding ICAO provision has the status of a recommendation.

3. Proposed amendments

3.1. Draft Regulation (Draft EASA Opinion)

Amendments to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 are not proposed.

3.2. Draft Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material

Amendments to the associated AMC and GM are not proposed.

4. References

4.1. Affected regulations

Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 is not affected.

4.2. Affected AMC and GM

EASA Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) are not affected.

4.3. Reference documents

The Agency is going to bring this issue to EHEST with a recommendation to encourage installation of VHM equipment on a voluntary basis in those large CAT helicopters that are not involved in offshore operations in hostile areas.

5. Appendices

5.1. Reported accidents

Occurrence 1 of 36

File number		Local Date	2001-03-24	State of		
				Occurrence		
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: CTOL: Collision	Injury Level	None	
Class		Category	with obstacle(s)			
			during take-off and			
			landing			
Aircraft	SIKORSKY - S7	6		Damage Level	Minor	
Make/Model						
/Series						
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT	
					Emergency	
					Medical Service	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -					
Descriptive	Collision aircra	aft - object ground	d - Collision aircraft-tree	e / tall vegetation -	– during Landing -	
Factors	Vertical landin	ig -				

Occurrence 2 of 36

File number		Local Date	2002-02-09	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: LALT: Low	Injury Level	None
Class		Category	altitude operations		
Aircraft	BK117			Damage Level	Substantial
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Passenger
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Weather encounters				
Descriptive	Event 2 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collision	is with obstacle/terr	rain/aircraft -
Factors	Collision aircraft - object ground - Collision aircraft-tree / tall vegetation during En-route -				
	Event 3 : Cons	equential events	- Forced landing	- during Post-impac	t

Occurrence 3 of 36

File number		Local Date	2002-02-13	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: RAMP: Ground	Injury Level	Fatal
Class		Category	Handling		
Aircraft	MI 2			Damage Level	Minor
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collision	s with obstacle/terr	rain/aircraft -
Descriptive	Collision aircra	ift - object ground	I - Collision aircraft-per	son - – <i>during</i> Stan	ding - Standing :
Factors	Rotors turning	-			

Occurrence 4 of 36

File number		Local Date	2002-05-12	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: LOC-I: Loss of	Injury Level	None
Class		Category	control - inflight		

Aircraft Make/Model /Series	MI-2		Damage Level	Substantial		
Registration	Operator		Operation type	CAT		
				Emergency		
				Medical Service		
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft/system/comp	onent - during	En-route - Cruise -			
Descriptive	Event 2 : Aircraft operation gen	eral - Helicopter flight p	oath deviation - Heli	copter - inadequate		
Factors	rotor rpm – <i>during</i> Manoeuvring					
	Event 3 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft handling - Hard landing during Landing -					
	Emergency landing or off-runwa	ay landing -				

Occurrence 5 of 36

File number		Local Date	2002-11-24	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: CFIT: Controlled	Injury Level	Fatal
Class		Category	flight into or		
			toward terrain		
Aircraft	BELL-412			Damage Level	Destroyed
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Weather encoun	ters - IMC - - – duri	i ng Approach
Descriptive	Event 2 : Cons	equential events	- Missed approach	- – during Approacl	1 - <i>-</i>
Factors	Event 3 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collisior	is with obstacle/teri	rain/aircraft -
	Collision aircraft - terrain during Approach - Missed approach or go-around -				
	Event 4 : Aircraft/system/component - Non-component specific events - Explosions / fire/				
	fumes / smoke	e - Fire - – during	Post-impact		

Occurrence 6 of 36

File number		Local Date	2003-01-29	State of Occurrence		
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: SCF-PP: power plant failure or malfunction	Injury Level	None	
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	PZL - W3			Damage Level	Destroyed	
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Emergency Medical Service	
Events and Descriptive Factors	Event 1 : Aircraft/system/component - 7200 Turbine engine <i>during</i> Manoeuvring Event 2 : Consequential events - Engine shutdown/flameout <i>during</i> Manoeuvring Event 3 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - high terrain - <i>during</i> Landing					

Occurrence 7 of 36

File number		Local Date	2003-06-03	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: SCF-NP:	Injury Level	None
Class		Category	System/component		
			failure or		
			malfunction [non-		
			power plant]		

Aircraft Make/Model /Series	MI 2	Damage Level	Substantial		
Registration	Operator	Operation type	CAT Emergency Medical Service		
Events and Descriptive Factors	Event 1 : Aircraft/system/component - 6300 Main rotor drive system - 6320 Main rotor transmission <i>during</i> Take-off - Initial climb - Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - level terrain - <i>during</i> Take-off - Initial climb -				

Occurrence 8 of 36

File number		Local Date	2003-06-05	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: ADRM:	Injury Level	Serious
Class		Category	Aerodrome		
			2: TURB:		
			Turbulence		
			encounter		
Aircraft	BK117			Damage Level	None
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Injuries to person	ns - Injuries-propelle	r/jet blast –
Descriptive	<i>during</i> Landing	g - Vertical landin	g -		
Factors					

Occurrence 9 of 36

File number		Local Date	2003-12-18	State of Occurrence		
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain	Injury Level	Serious	
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	BELL-212			Damage Level	Destroyed	
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Ferry/positioning	
Events and Descriptive Factors	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - level terrain - <i>during</i> En-route - Cruise -					

Occurrence 10 of 36

File number		Local Date	2003-12-19	State of Occurrence	
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing	Injury Level	None
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	BK117			Damage Level	Substantial
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Emergency

					Medical Service	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -					
Descriptive	Collision aircraft - object ground - Collision aircraft-other object - <i>– during</i> Taxi - Air					
Factors	taxi/hover taxi	-				

Occurrence 11 of 36

File number		Local Date	2004-03-30	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: CTOL: Collision	Injury Level	Fatal
Class		Category	with obstacle(s)		
			during take-off and		
			landing		
Aircraft	AS365			Damage Level	Destroyed
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collision	s with obstacle/terr	rain/aircraft -
Descriptive	Collision aircra	ift - object ground	I - Collision aircraft-cab	le/wire/power line	- – during Take-off
Factors	Event 2 : Consequential events - Emergency descent during Take-off				
	Event 3 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -				
	Collision aircra	ift - terrain - c	luring Take-off		

Occurrence 12 of 36

File number		Local Date	2004-06-11	State of		
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing	Injury Level	Minor	
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	BK117			Damage Level	Substantial	
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Emergency Medical Service	
Events and Descriptive Factors	Event 1: Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - object ground during Landing - Vertical landing - Event 2: Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - terrain during Landing					

Occurrence 13 of 36

File number		Local Date	2004-09-18	State of			
				Occurrence			
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: CFIT: Controlled	Injury Level	None		
Class		Category	flight into or				
			toward terrain				
Aircraft	SIKORSKY - S76			Damage Level	Substantial		
Make/Model							
/Series							
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT		
					Emergency		
					Medical Service		
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft handling - Undershoot <i>during</i> Approach -					
Descriptive	Final approach) -					

Factors	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -				
	Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - level terrain - – during - Final approach -				

Occurrence 14 of 36

File number		Local Date	2004-11-21	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: LALT: Low	Injury Level	None
Class		Category	altitude operations		
Aircraft	SA 365			Damage Level	Substantial
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Training/check
Events and	Event 1 : Cons	equential events	- Ditching - - - – durin	g Manoeuvring - Ho	overing - Hovering in
Descriptive	ground effect				
Factors	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft handling - Altitude related - Too close to ground				
	during Manoeuvring - Hovering - Hovering in ground effect				

Occurrence 15 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-03-14	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: LOC-I: Loss of	Injury Level	Serious
Class		Category	control - inflight		
Aircraft	MI 2			Damage Level	Destroyed
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Helicopter flight (oath deviation - Heli	icopter - other
Descriptive	deviation from	n flight path –	during Landing - Vertic	al landing -	
Factors	Event 2 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collision	is with obstacle/teri	rain/aircraft -
	Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - level terrain during Landing - Emergency				
	landing or off-runway landing -				

Occurrence 16 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-03-31	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: AMAN: Abrupt	Injury Level	Serious
Class		Category	maneuvre		
			2: LOC-I: Loss of		
			control - inflight		
			3: F-POST:		
			Fire/smoke (post-		
			impact)		
Aircraft	MI 2			Damage Level	Destroyed
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft handling	- Abrupt manoeuvre	e - Crew-manoeuvre
Descriptive	- <i>– during</i> Tak	e-off - Vertical ta	ke-off -		
Factors	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -				
	Collision aircra	aft - object ground	d - Collision aircraft-oth	er object - – during	Vertical take-off -
	Event 3 : Aircr	aft/system/comp	onent - Non-componer	nt specific events - E	xplosions / fire/

fumes / smoke - Fire - - during Post-impact - -

Occurrence 17 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-04-21	State of Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: SEC: Security	Injury Level	Fatal
Class		Category	related		
Aircraft	MI 8			Damage Level	Destroyed
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Passenger
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Security generally	y - Military interven	tion – <i>during</i>
Descriptive	En-route				
Factors					
Narrative	Unofficial: Th	he helicopter was	ferrying pax when it we	ent down. The natio	onal army claimed
	responsibility for shooting down a helicopter and killing all 11 people onboard one of them				
	apparently executed after surviving the crash.				

Occurrence 18 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-08-10	State of		
				Occurrence		
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: SCF-NP:	Injury Level	Fatal	
Class		Category	System/component			
			failure or			
			malfunction [non-			
			powerplant]			
			2: LOC-I: Loss of			
			control - inflight			
Aircraft	SIKORSKY - S7	6		Damage Level	Destroyed	
Make/Model						
/Series						
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT	
					Passenger	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft/system/component - 6700 Rotorcraft flight control system during					
Descriptive	En-route					
Factors	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -					
	Collision aircra	aft - terrain - Aircr	aft collision - level terra	ain - — during En-ro	ute	

Occurrence 19 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-08-17	State of Occurrence	
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing	Injury Level	None
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	BK117			Damage Level	Substantial
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Emergency Medical Service
Events and	Event 1: Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -				
Descriptive	Collision aircra	Collision aircraft - object ground - Collision aircraft-tree / tall vegetation during Landing			
Factors	Event 2 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft handling	- Hard landing	during Landing

Occurrence 20 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-09-06	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: LOC-I: Loss of	Injury Level	None
Class		Category	control - inflight		
Aircraft	MI 2			Damage Level	Substantial
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Air Navigation Services - Operational issues - Communications during				
Descriptive	Approach - Final approach -				
Factors	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aeroplane flight path deviation - Aeroplane - mush/stall				
	– during Approach - Final approach -				

Occurrence 21 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-09-28	State of Occurrence	
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain	Injury Level	Fatal
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	BK117			Damage Level	Destroyed
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Emergency Medical Service
Events and Descriptive Factors	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - high terrain - during En-route - Cruise -				

Occurrence 22 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-11-04	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: TURB:	Injury Level	Serious
Class		Category	Turbulence		
			encounter		
Aircraft	BELL-412			Damage Level	None
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Emergency
					Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Injuries to persons - Injuries-propeller/jet blast				
Descriptive	<i>during</i> Landing - Run-on landing -				
Factors					

Occurrence 23 of 36

File number		Local Date	2005-12-14	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: TURB:	Injury Level	Minor
Class		Category	Turbulence		
			encounter		
Aircraft	BK117			Damage Level	Substantial
Make/Model					

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/Series						
Registration	Operator	Operation type	CAT			
			Emergency			
			Medical Service			
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Damage to aircraft - Propeller/rotor/jet blast					
Descriptive	<i>during</i> Landing - Vertical landing -					
Factors	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Damage to aircraft - Damaged by object during					
	Landing - Vertical landing -					

Occurrence 24 of 36

File number		Local Date	2006-01-25	State of			
				Occurrence			
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: F-POST:	Injury Level	Fatal		
Class		Category	Fire/smoke (post-				
			impact)				
			2: CTOL: Collision				
			with obstacle(s)				
			during take-off and				
			landing				
Aircraft	SA330 J			Damage Level	Destroyed		
Make/Model							
/Series							
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT		
					Passenger		
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collisior	is with obstacle/ter	rain/aircraft -		
Descriptive	Collision aircraft - terrain during Take-off - Vertical take-off -						
Factors	Event 2 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collisior	is with obstacle/ter	rain/aircraft -		
	Collision aircra	aft - object ground	d – during				

Occurrence 25 of 36

File number		Local Date	2006-03-05	State of Occurrence		
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain	Injury Level	Fatal	
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	SA365			Damage Level	Destroyed	
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Ferry/positioning	
Events and Descriptive Factors	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - high terrain - during En-route					

Occurrence 26 of 36

File number		Local Date	2006-11-27	State of		
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain	Injury Level	Fatal	
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	BELL-412			Damage Level	Destroyed	
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Ferry/positioning	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -					

Descriptive	Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - high terrain during En-route - Climb to
Factors	cruising level or altitude -

Occurrence 27 of 36

File number		Local Date	2007-03-05	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: MAC: Airprox/	Injury Level	Fatal
Class		Category	ACAS alert/ loss of		
			separation/ (near)		
			midair collisions		
Aircraft	AS332 - DA20 -			Damage Level	Destroyed
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Ferry/positioning
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collisior	is with obstacle/teri	rain/aircraft -
Descriptive	Aircraft collisio	on - moving aircra	ft - Aircraft collision - b	oth aircraft aloft	- during En-route
Factors					

Occurrence 28 of 36

File number		Local Date	2007-04-03	State of			
Occurrence Class	Accident	Occurrence Category	1: CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing	Injury Level	None		
Aircraft Make/Model /Series	SIKORSKY - S76			Damage Level	Minor		
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT Training/check		
Events and Descriptive Factors	Event 1 : Aircr Landing Event 2 : Aircr Collision aircra Event 3 : Cons Event 4 : Aircr	Event 1: Aircraft operation general - Aircraft handling - Beside landing surface during Landing Event 2: Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft - Collision aircraft - object ground - Collision aircraft-other object during Vertical landing - Event 3: Consequential events - Evacuation during					

Occurrence 29 of 36

File number		Local Date	2007-04-18	State of		
				Occurrence		
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: SCF-PP:	Injury Level	None	
Class		Category	powerplant failure			
			or malfunction			
Aircraft	SIKORSKY - S6	1 N		Damage Level	Substantial	
Make/Model						
/Series						
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT	
					Passenger	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft/system/comp	onent - 7200 Turbine e	ngine - 7201 Turbin	e engine - generally	
Descriptive	- Turbine engi	ne - mechanical fa	ilure - — during Approa	ach		
Factors	Event 2 : Aircraft/system/component - 7200 Turbine engine - 7201 Turbine engine - generally					
	- Turbine engine - fuel starvation - – <i>during</i> Approach					
	Event 3 : Consequential events - Engine shutdown/flameout - Engine shutdown (hard)					
	<i>during</i> Approa	ich				
	Event 4 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft handling	- Hard landing –	during Approach -	

Occurrence 30 of 36

File number		Local Date	2007-12-06	State of		
				Occurrence		
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: LOC-I: Loss of	Injury Level	Serious	
Class		Category	control - inflight			
Aircraft	MI 2			Damage Level	Destroyed	
Make/Model						
/Series						
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT	
					Ferry/positioning	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Flight crew	– <i>during</i> Standing -	Standing : Other -	
Descriptive	Event 2 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Weather encount	ters - IMC - - – duri	ng Final approach -	
Factors	Event 3 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Flight crew	– during Approach -	Final approach -	
	Event 4 : Cons	equential events	- Missed approach	- – during Approacł	n - Final approach -	
	Event 5 : Consequential events - Missed approach during Approach - Final approach -					
	Event 6 : Aircraft operation general - Weather encounters - Loss of visual reference					
	<i>during</i> Approach - Final approach -					
	Event 7 : Aircr	aft operation gen	eral - Aircraft - collision	is with obstacle/terr	ain/aircraft -	
	Collision aircra	aft - terrain - Aircr	aft collision - level terra	ain - – <i>during</i> F inal a	approach -	

Occurrence 31 of 36

File number		Local Date	2008-07-07	State of			
				Occurrence			
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: FUEL: Fuel	Injury Level	Serious		
Class		Category	related				
Aircraft	MI 2			Damage Level	Destroyed		
Make/Model							
/Series							
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT		
					Ferry/positioning		
Events and	Event 1 : Aircr	aft/system/comp	onent - 7200 Turbine e	ngine - 7201 Turbin	e engine - generally		
Descriptive	- Turbine engine - fuel starvation - – <i>during</i> En-route						
Factors	Event 2 : Aircr	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -					
	Collision aircra	aft - terrain - Aircr	aft collision - level terra	ain - – <i>during</i> En-ro	ute		

Occurrence 32 of 36

File number		Local Date	2008-12-21	State of Occurrence		
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: CTOL: Collision	Injury Level	None	
Class		Category	during take-off and			
			landing			
Aircraft	BK117			Damage Level	Substantial	
Make/Model						
/Series						
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT	
					Emergency	
					Medical Service	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -					
Descriptive	Collision aircra	aft - object ground	I - Collision aircraft-tall	structure during	g Landing	
Factors						

Occurrence 33 of 36

File number	Local Date	2009-02-17	State of	
			Occurrence	

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Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: WSTRW:	Injury Level	Fatal	
Class		Category	Windshear or			
			thunderstorm.			
			2: LALT: Low			
			altitude operations			
Aircraft	MI 2			Damage Level	Destroyed	
Make/Model						
/Series						
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT	
					Emergency	
					Medical Service	
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -					
Descriptive	Collision aircra	aft - terrain - - -	during En-route			
Factors						

Occurrence 34 of 36

File number		Local Date	2011-03-30	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: ARC: Abnormal	Injury Level	None
Class		Category	runway contact		
Aircraft	SIKORSKY - S92			Damage Level	Substantial
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Passenger
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft handling during Standing				
Descriptive	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft handling - Hard landing during				
Factors					

Occurrence 35 of 36

File number		Local Date	2011-10-18	State of	
				Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: SCF-PP:	Injury Level	None
Class		Category	powerplant failure		
			or malfunction		
Aircraft	BELL-212			Damage Level	Substantial
Make/Model					
/Series					
Registration		Operator		Operation type	CAT
					Passenger
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft/system/component - 7200 Turbine engine - 7201 Turbine engine - generally				
Descriptive	– during En-route				
Factors	Event 2 : Consequential events - Emergency autorotation (helicopter) during En-route				
	- Emergency descent en-route -				
	Event 3 : Aircraft operation general - Helicopter flight path deviation - Helicopter - dynamic				
	roll-over during Landing - Emergency landing or off-runway landing -				

Occurrence 36 of 36

File number		Local Date	2012-07-21	State of Occurrence	
Occurrence	Accident	Occurrence	1: LOC-I: Loss of	Injury Level	Minor
Class		Category	control - inflight		
			2: CTOL: Collision		
			with obstacle(s)		
			during take-off and		
			landing		

Aircraft Make/Model /Series	BK117		Damage Level	Destroyed
Registration	Operator		Operation type	CAT
				Emergency
				Medical Service
Events and	Event 1 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -			
Descriptive	Collision aircraft - object ground - Collision aircraft-cable/wire/power line during Take-off			
Factors	- Vertical take-off -			
	Event 2 : Aircraft operation general - Helicopter flight path deviation - Helicopter - deviation			
	from heading during Take-off - Uncontrolled descent during take-off -			
	Event 3 : Aircraft operation general - Aircraft - collisions with obstacle/terrain/aircraft -			
	Collision aircraft - terrain - Aircraft collision - level terrain during Take-off - Uncontrolled			
	descent during take-off -			

Source: EASA database

5.2. Oversight of relevant helicopters

Row Labels	Count of Aircraft Type
Agusta-Bell	11
14	11
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	11
AgustaWestland	21
15	21
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	19
Passenger	2
Bell Helicopter Textron	13
14	13
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	12
Passenger	1
Eurocopter	110
10	91
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	91
12	19
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	19
NH Industries	1
20	1
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	1
Sikorsky	4
12	2
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	2
24	2
Passenger	2
WSK-PZL Swidnik	2
12	2
Medevac / Air Ambulance / EMS / Airborne Hospital	2
Grand Total	162

Source: EASA database Ascend